Introduction
For the fifth installment of our survey on mere Christianity, we turn to the reflections of Dr. John Mark Reynolds. Dr. Reynolds is the President of The Saint Constantine School, a Senior Fellow of Humanities at The King’s College in New York City, and a Fellow at The Discovery Institute’s Center For Science and Culture. He is also the author or co-author of several books including When Athens Met Jerusalem: An Introduction to Classical and Christian Thought and The Great Books Reader, Excerpts and Essays on the Most Influential Books in Western Civilization.
John Mark N Reynolds on Mere Christianity
“Looking toward mere Christianity is an act of inclusion from a stable Church tradition. As a result, mere Christianity cannot be a starting point, but is what an Orthodox, Roman, or a member of a historic Protestant church might do to find common ground. The mere Christian begins as a clearly defined partisan of a particular deeply rooted, intellectually rich Christian tradition that then chooses to see where he can agree. Such a Christian looks for the common ideas and practices (orthodoxy and orthopraxis) of those who have chosen to root themselves in the long Christian tradition. As a result, there is no hope for anyone who denies the first few ecumenical councils and does not interact with those they reject to be mere Christian. There is no hope for those who develop peculiar institutions, such as race based slavery or same sex marriage, of being mere Christians.”
Reflections
One could summarize Reynolds’ rich statement as follows: There are no mere Christians. Rather, there are robust Christians who all share a “common ground” of belief and practice, and that common ground constitutes mere Christianity. Reynolds’ point is well taken: mere Christianity is an abstraction from a much wider and richer field of belief and practice. To ask what a mere Christian looks like is akin to asking what the average Canadian looks like. (And don’t forget that family of demographic abstraction which boasts 2 1/2 kids.)
Reynolds may be correct that mere Christianity only exists as an abstraction from robust Christianities. But is it the case that every “mere Christian begins as a clearly defined partisan of a particular deeply rooted, intellectually rich Christian tradition…”? For example, consider a person whose consideration of Christianity is beset with skepticism and doubt. And yet, they want to be a Christian, or at least to see whether they can overcome their doubts. They are like the man who, desiring to own a BMW on a very limited budget, asks “What’s the least expensive BMW model I can buy?” Similarly, this individual on a limited credulity budget asks, “What’s the least I must believe to be a Christian?”
The answer to that individual’s question may be an abstraction from robust Christianities. Nonetheless, isn’t it possible for him to become a mere Christian by accepting that common ground of belief and practice irrespective of whether he commits to an additional set of robust claims from which that core is abstracted?
There is much else in Reynolds’ description that is deserving of closer reflection. For example, I’d like to hear more about what it means to deny the first few ecumenical councils. And just which list of councils would be required? Is it the first four or the first seven? And why that list and not another?
Finally, I was intrigued by Reynolds’ final sentence: “There is no hope for those who develop peculiar institutions, such as race based slavery or same sex marriage, of being mere Christians.” First, I wonder, “no hope” in what sense? No hope of being a mere Christian? Or no hope of salvation? Or both/and?
Also, consider that many antebellum churches in America were reconciled to race-based slavery. We can all agree that this was a wicked reconciliation, but did it follow that these robust Christianities had thereby abdicated the mere Christian core? In short, was antebellum American Christianity characterized by mass apostasy?
And if so, what about the postbellum reconciliation of these same churches with the practice of lynching and Jim Crow laws, and later the opposition to the civil rights movement? What about churches today that are silent on the carnage wrought by elective abortion (a special concern of the right) and who chant “Build the wall!” to block “caravans” of desperate refugees (a special concern of the left)?
And what should we make of that specific reference to “same-sex marriage,” in particular? Is Reynolds referring only to churches that practice same-sex marriage? Or is he also identifying churches that simply recognize the state’s right to marry gay couples in a secular ceremony?
Lastly, what other institutions would be sufficiently “peculiar” to warrant exclusion from being merely Christian? And why that criterion and not another?
