In this article, I continue my response to Michael Brown’s response to my review of Brown’s book Can You Be Gay and Christian? The topic in this installment is Brown’s response to the second part of my review. (You can read that part of my review here.)
Let me begin with a quick summary of the claim under contention. While the Hebrew categorization of “to’evah” can identify ritually impure actions, Brown argues that in the case of Leviticus 18 and 20, it identifies immoral actions which are intrinsically wrong. Given this assumption, when homosexual intercourse is condemned in 18:22 and 20:13, it follows that these prohibitions should be interpreted as absolute moral condemnations rather than limited and culturally relative ritual impurities.
In my response, I point out that sexual intercourse during menstruation is also condemned as to’evah in Leviticus 18 and 20 (18:19 and 20:18). The problem is that there doesn’t seem to be anything intrinsically immoral about menstrual intercourse. On the contrary, it would seem that the prohibition of this action should be interpreted in terms of ritual impurity.
The point I’m making can be construed as a reductio ad absurdum. (A reductio is an argument in which a premise is assumed for the sake of argument in order to demonstrate that it has implausible consequences which are sufficient to warrant rejection of the premise.) Here’s the argument:
(1) All actions classified as to’evah in Leviticus 18 and 20 are immoral. (Premise for reductio)
(2) Menstrual intercourse is classified as to’evah in Leviticus 18 and 20.
(3) Therefore, menstrual intercourse is immoral.
(4) But menstrual intercourse is not immoral.
(5) Therefore, the classification of an act as to’evah in Leviticus 18 or 20 does not entail that the act is immoral.
To be sure, the act may nonetheless be immoral. The simple point is that inclusion in the prohibition lists of Leviticus 18 and 20 is insufficient to establish this conclusion.
Here is Brown’s response:
* * *
Brown makes several points here.
To begin with, he notes that some scholars like Robert Gagnon agree that not all acts condemned in Leviticus 18 and 20 are immoral: in particular, the condemnation of menstrual intercourse is ritual in nature.
But Brown does not take that view. Instead, he believes that the condemnation of menstrual intercourse is indeed immoral. Thus, he rejects (4). However, he seems to take the view that there are degrees of immorality and menstrual intercourse is presumably low on that scale. By contrast, however, homosexual intercourse is identified as especially detestable in these prohibitions. In other words, it is seriously immoral.
Further, Brown points out that homosexual intercourse is so problematic that the Torah assigns the death penalty for offenders. However, it is worth noting that not every action to which the Torah assigns the death penalty appears to be seriously immoral. Consider, for example, the prescription that non-Levites who approach the Tabernacle should be executed (e.g. Numbers 1:51).
Finally, Brown notes that the NT reiterates an absolute condemnation of homosexual intercourse, thereby placing it clearly in the arena of moral rather than mere ritual prohibitions.
To sum up, the Torah condemnation of menstrual intercourse can be interpreted as a ritual impurity (as with Gagnon) or a moral indiscreation (as with Brown). But if it is interpreted as the latter, it is a relatively low moral offense. Nonetheless, Brown’s position remains problematic for those who insist that there is no moral offense at all in the act.
