A few days ago Fr Alvin Kimel invited the readers of his blog to formulate an argument demonstrating the incoherence of Calvinism.
The point of this challenge was to offer a rebuttal to my claim that one should be prepared to worship God if it should turn out that Reformed theology is broadly correct qua the divine nature and human election. In short, if one can present an argument that Reformed theology is incoherent, then one need not countenance the counterfactual possibility that Reformed theology could possibly be correct.
Fr Kimel has now returned with an argument from one of his readers. To be honest, I found his reader’s formulation a bit confusing on a first reading. But I’ve reproduced it in full below and below that I offer a reformulation of the reader’s argument after which I offer a response. (Readers who have limited time may be inclined to proceed to my critique and only refer back to the original statement of the argument as needed.)
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I think a simple Modus Tollens argument effectively counters the claim given. To review, Modus Tollens follows this form.
(P1): If P then Q
(P2): Not Q
(C): Therefore, not P
This is a valid deductive argument, which is what Rauser requested of you. We can make the following substitutions.
P = God is perfectly good and maximally loving. This is a premise in Rauser’s article, so it should not be objectionable.
Q = God will not deliberately create a creature for the purpose of denying that creature His maximal love. Rauser may find this (“Q”) to be objectionable. However, purposely creating something that cannot experience God’s love is an action that does not maximize love. Therefore, “Q” flows from the same premise that contains “P.” So objecting to “Q” would be to treat contrary to his first premise of God being perfectly good, maximally loving, etc.
So we have our “P1”: If P, then Q being, “If God is perfectly good and maximally loving, then He will not deliberately create a creature for the purpose of denying that creature His maximal love.”
“Not Q” would be a the creation of a creature who cannot experience His maximal love. This flows directly from his second premise which contains the election to damnation (from double predestination). In this case, the reprobate, or damned, are created specifically such that they experience Hell in lieu of God’s maximal love. This is the definition of being damned. Thus, we have a true (logically true) “P2” statement, “Under Calvinism, God creates creatures for the purpose of denying those creatures His maximal love,” which equates to “not Q.”
Since Modus Tollens is a valid deductive argument form, the only conclusion that follows is “not P” or the conclusion that under Calvinism, God is not perfectly good nor maximally loving. But this conclusion contradicts Rauser’s first premise. Therefore, either that first premise (from which we derived “P”) is false, or the election to damnation (from which we derived “not Q”) of his second premise is false. I think none of us find a problem with his first premise. So the problem must lie in the second premise — specifically the election to damnation portion.
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Getting Clear on the Argument
I said that I found this presentation confusing. Let’s begin with definitions. To recap:
P = God is perfectly good and maximally loving
Q = God will not deliberately create a creature for the purpose of denying that creature His maximal love.
And now the premises, as filled in by the reader (note that I’ve inserted “P” and “Q” into the premises). Please note that for the sake of clarity I’ve rewritten (P2) to make it clearer. In addition, I’ve added a (P0) to establish the contradiction in Calvinism:
(P0) [P] God is perfectly good and maximally loving.
(P1): “If [P] God is perfectly good and maximally loving, then [Q] He will not deliberately create a creature for the purpose of denying that creature His maximal love.”
(P2): [Not-Q] “God will create creatures for the purpose of denying those creatures His maximal love.”
(C): Therefore, [Not-P] God is not perfectly good and maximally loving.
So we have a contradiction between (P0) and (C). Therefore, Calvinism is incoherent, right?
Not so fast.
It’s all about (P1)
In my response I’m going to focus criticism on (P1) for one simple reason: if a rational person can reject (P1) then the rest of the argument is a moot point anyway.
Perhaps it would make sense at this point to reiterate the high evidential burden that Fr Kimel has assumed. He wants an argument that is so strong that it shows not only that Calvinism is likely false but that it must be false. Put another way, Fr Kimel needs an argument so strong that it can establish that Calvinism can only be accepted as true on pain of irrationality. After all, if a person can rationally accept the core claims of Calvinism, then the non-Calvinist should be prepared to concede that they would worship God if it turns out that Calvinism is true.
So can a reasonable person reject (P1)? To recap,
(P1): “If [P] God is perfectly good and maximally loving, then [Q] He will not deliberately create a creature for the purpose of denying that creature His maximal love.”
The answer is, yes, a person can rationally reject (P1). One good reason to reject a premise is because it is ambiguous, and (P1) is ambiguous. More specifically, the problem is with Q which fails to distinguish between creation for the purpose and creation for the sole purpose.
For example, God might have created Mary for the purpose of giving birth to Jesus. But it doesn’t follow that God created Mary for the sole purpose of giving birth to Jesus. And claims about the sole purpose are far more contentious than claims about a purpose. Nor need the Calvinist be committed to the claim that God created reprobate human beings for the sole purpose of being reprobated.
Furthermore, an action can be undertaken to meet a hierarchy of purposes. For example, imagine that your friend from a far flung part of the world is attending his first western wedding in your company. At the moment the groom produces a ring, he whispers “Why’s he holding that ring?” You whisper back: “To put it on her finger.” “And why does he want to put it on her finger?” You reply: “Because that’s the ceremony by which they become married.”
So an act like producing a ring can have a nested hierarchy of purposes. A groom produces a ring to place on a woman’s finger and to bring oneself into matrimonial union with that woman.
Now consider the act of God deliberately creating a creature for the purpose of denying that creature His maximal love. Just as no groom would suggest that the ring is produced for the sole purpose of placing it on a bride’s finger, so no Calvinist would say that God’s creating a creature is for the sole purpose of denying that creature His maximal love.
So what additional purposes might God have? I already provided one scenario in “Calvinism is perfectly coherent. In which I continue defending a view I reject.” In that scenario, God creates some people who will be reprobated for the purpose of expressing his divine nature more fully to the larger share of creation. You can refer back to that article to see my delightful Bruce Wayne analogy.
Please note, as well, the important analogy I draw in that article between Calvinism and Arminianism. To apply that analogy here, we can note that the non-universalist Arminian proposes that God creates some libertarianly free creatures knowing that they will freely reject his love and end up eternally alienated from him.
There is a sense on this Arminian framework in which God creates that creature “for the purpose of denying that creature His maximal love.” The point is that God desires, on this scenario, to create a world of libertarian free creatures in which some freely choose him and others freely reject him and each individual reprobated individual fits into that divine economy and the purposes behind it. But it hardly follows that their reprobation is God’s sole intent. As with the Calvinist, there are nested purposes at work.
Suffice it to say, Q ought to be rejected in present form, and (P1) with it. As a result, the attempt to demonstrate that Calvinism is incoherent fails.
