How to confound Christians with bad arguments: #2 The Indistinguishable Argument
This morning I was in a state of some emotional distress for I could not figure out what to blog about. So I put on my best white suit, plastered my hair down with Brylcreem, laid hands on the computer, and prayed in my best televangelist voice “Oh Lawrd! Send your servant a topic!”
And at that moment, as angelic choirs burst into song, there came this comment from “The Atheist Missionary”:
“Randal, why is it that your god chooses to reveal himself in ways that are indistinguishable from his not revealing himself at all?”
Perfect! Just what I was looking for. What is more, it fits nicely into my “How to confound Christians with bad arguments” series.
But wait, this isn’t an argument, is it?
I don’t claim to be able to read minds, including TAM’s. So I won’t speculate on all he might mean, or not mean, by asking this question. But I can say that I’ve heard this question many times before in contexts where it is of that sub-species known as ”argument masquerading as a perplexed question”. It is a question that is attempting to raise a problem, the “indistinguishable problem”. Assuming that the person being asked that question cannot answer it adequately, the argument springs out of the question like a leg hold trap snapping out of a bed of dried autumn leaves.
A stronger form of argument would aim to establish that it is likely that God doesn’t exist. It would proceed like this:
(1) If God revealed himself it would be in distinguishable ways.
(2) God has not revealed himself in distinguishable ways.
(3) Therefore God has not revealed himself.
A weaker form of the argument would simply show it is not reasonable to think God exists:
(1) It is only reasonable to believe God exists if we have evidence of him revealing himself in distingiushable ways.
(2) We do not have evidence of God revealing himself in distinguishable ways.
(3) Therefore it is not reasonable to believe God exists.
However we understand the argument (if there is one), the question as TAM presents it clearly assumes what I’ll call “the indistinguishability claim”:
“reality is indistinguishable from what it would be if the Christian God did not exist.”
Is this true? Unfortunately I won’t be able to get to that question here because I need to address a prior question first. Assuming this is true, what would be the problem? There are many reasonable claims in which the data available to us is also compatible with the negation of that claim. Consider my favorite example:
External world claim: The data of experience is consistent with the existence of a world external to consciousness.
True enough. But the problem is that the data of experience is also consistent with all experiences being generated by our minds. In layperson’s terms, it is consistent with us being in the matrix, or being brains in vats, or …. But we don’t lose sleep over this fact.
Clearly this indistinguishability claim is no defeater to our belief that there is an external world. So why think indistinguishability where theism is concerned would be? Where precisely are the disanalogous points that create a problem for the theist? I ask that question without conceding the “indistinguishable” claim to begin with. But before we can even assess whether the claim is true, we must ask why, if it is true, it would be a problem.
Without an answer to that question I am left to wonder: if there is a really good argument here, why is it indistinguishable from a really bad one?
Tags: atheism, divine hiddenness, skepticism, The atheist missionary, theism
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James Palmer says:
Friday, February 11, 2011 at 5:59pm
I’m not sure TAM’s argument really assumes this:
“reality is indistinguishable from what it would be if the Christian God did not exist.”
Rather, I see it as assuming this:
“When different agents communicate, it is generally clear to those receiving the communication who is doing the communicating.”
In other words, when Bob communicates me, I usually know it’s Bob and not, for instance, Frank, that is communicating with me. While there may at times be mistakes in this regard, in general, I can distinguish between communications from one intelligent agent versus another.
If that is true, should I not at least expect that an all-knowing, all-powerful intelligent agent such as God, be able to communicate in such a way that it is indeed, clearly distinguishable from other intelligent agents (i.e. humans)? Since there are many people who do not seem to be able to distinguish between them, it seems that God has fallen short of what He should be able to accomplish.
Anyway, that would be what I believe is a more charitable interpretation of TAM’s question/argument, although perhaps he will be able to clarify further (perhaps he really does mean just what you say, but that’s not how I read it.)
The Atheist Missionary says:
Friday, February 11, 2011 at 7:39pm
From now on, I am just going to pay JP to follow me around on the internet because he makes me far more comprehensible than I deserve. Well said. Simply put, Randal, why doesn’t your lord wake us up every morning with a friendly reminder that he is our creator and we owe our existence to him?
James Palmer says:
Friday, February 11, 2011 at 7:52pm
I’m happy to take my payments in donuts.
randal says:
Friday, February 11, 2011 at 8:38pm
What is your reasoning behind this question? Are you saying that God is obliged to ensure that everyone affirms his existence?
James Palmer says:
Friday, February 11, 2011 at 9:29pm
Randal, I see TAM’s argument kind of like this:
If God wants everyone to believe He exists, and is all-powerful, then he should be able to and desire to communicate to everyone powerfully enough that unless they somehow willfully disbelieve what they know to be true (I’m not sure if that’s even possible), then they will know that God exists.
However, since some people quite honestly do not believe God exists (i.e., they are not trying to disbelieve what they know to be true), then it appears that God is either not all-powerful, does not want everyone to know He exists, or simply does not exist Himself.
randal says:
Friday, February 11, 2011 at 8:37pm
“If that is true, should I not at least expect that an all-knowing, all-powerful intelligent agent such as God, be able to communicate in such a way that it is indeed, clearly distinguishable from other intelligent agents (i.e. humans)? Since there are many people who do not seem to be able to distinguish between them, it seems that God has fallen short of what He should be able to accomplish.
This is a bit confusing. What do you mean that God should communicate in a way distinguishable from other intelligent agents? Isn’t that precisely the case? God doesn’t communicate to us by email and audible voice like human beings.
James Palmer says:
Friday, February 11, 2011 at 8:43pm
“What do you mean that God should communicate in a way distinguishable from other intelligent agents? Isn’t that precisely the case? God doesn’t communicate to us by email and audible voice like human beings.”
I agree. Or at least, I agree that He doesn’t have to (I mean, He certainly *could* communicate via those messages, right?)
But if you’re right that he actually doesn’t communicate to us through the same methods that humans do, then that seems to exclude the Bible as communication from God (as it’s the ancient equivalent to an email) and excludes Jesus’ teachings as well (since that was by voice.)
So if we’ve excluded those (as you seem to do), what is left? And what we have left, is that distinguishable from being communicated by other agents, or from not being a communication at all?
(TAM – that’s worth a Maple Glazed, right?)
The Atheist Missionary says:
Friday, February 11, 2011 at 9:36pm
JP just earned one of these: http://www.thestar.com/sports/hockey/nhl/mapleleafs/article/915560–tim-hortons-launches-leafs-themed-doughnuts
James Palmer says:
Friday, February 11, 2011 at 9:37pm
How did you know I was a sucker for sprinkles?
The Atheist Missionary says:
Friday, February 11, 2011 at 9:39pm
.. because great minds think alike.
James Palmer says:
Friday, February 11, 2011 at 8:51pm
As a somewhat random aside, last week on the Colbert Report, the dean of philosophy at Harvard said that Jesus’ revolutionary philosophy was strong evidence that he was in fact God.
He didn’t go into any more detail than that, but it was interesting to see someone of a high “rank” in the world of philosophy stating that God’s communications actually are distinguishable, but distinguishable based on their content, rather than necessarily on their method.
Jerry Rivard says:
Friday, February 11, 2011 at 11:44pm
Randal: “But before we can even assess whether the claim is true, we must ask why, if it is true, it would be a problem.”
No we don’t. We can assess the truth of a claim without regard to the consequences of its truth or falsity. The consequences of a claim’s truth or falsity do not in any way determine whether or not it is true.
I think what you mean to say is something like “But before I am willing to publicly assess whether the claim is true, I want to know what your next move will be in the debate.”
randal says:
Saturday, February 12, 2011 at 7:00pm
I think you’re misreading me Jerry. I’m proposing that we assume p and then consider whether there are any unacceptable implications that follow from the truth of p. If there aren’t then that removes objections to consider it false at which point we can consider positive arguments for its truth.
I certainly agree that the consequences of a view are not rational grounds to reject that view (though they may provide prudential grounds). Nihilism is not false because things would suck if it were true.
S1lverBullet says:
Sunday, February 13, 2011 at 3:02am
(1) It is only reasonable to believe Santa Claus exists if we have evidence of him revealing himself in distingiushable ways.
(2) We do not have evidence of Santa Claus revealing himself in distinguishable ways.
(3) Therefore it is not reasonable to believe Santa Claus exists.
That sounds fine to me, and, I’m sure, to you as well, Randal.
So why is the Christian god immune to this argument?
randal says:
Sunday, February 13, 2011 at 4:54am
Hey SB, long time no post!
I’d like you to explain what you mean by “Santa Claus … revealing himself in distinguishable ways.” For example, are hoof prints and sleigh tracks left in the snow on a roof evidence in whicih Santa Claus reveals himself in distinguishable ways? What exactly do you mean by that?
Once you’ve clarified what you mean by (1) you can explain whether you understand this to be appealing to a general epistemological principle and if so then what that principle is.
S1lverBullet says:
Sunday, February 13, 2011 at 7:19am
It’s a simple and intuitive argument, Randal. Does it not address why you don’t believe in Santa Claus?
Explain to me why your question is relevant and I might try answering it.
randal says:
Sunday, February 13, 2011 at 3:11pm
The question is relevant because your “simple and intuitive argument” is depending on what I’ll call the “SB Criterion” (or SBC) which is that “for any x, x’s revealing itself in distinguishable ways is a necesary criterion for reasonable belief in x”. (Please let me know if you’d like to tweak that. I don’t want to misrepresent you.)
With that in mind, I’m asking (a) what does (SBC) actually mean? I.e. what does it mean to reveal oneself in distinguishable ways? Is that just a way of saying that one must have evidence for the existence of x? Does x itself have to have produced that evidence? Etc.
(b) Does SBC apply to every possible object of belief or only some? And if only some then what is the range of objects to which SBC applies and why does it apply to them and not others?
Without explaining this, any simplicity and intuitiveness your argument has is bought at the price of obfuscation.
S1lverBullet says:
Sunday, February 13, 2011 at 6:21pm
Obfuscation? Seriously?
Does this argument NOT address why you do not believe in Santa? If not, then why not?
randal says:
Sunday, February 13, 2011 at 10:57pm
SB,
Please address the questions I asked so that I know what it is you’re arguing.
S1lverBullet says:
Sunday, February 13, 2011 at 11:46pm
Pls go back to my post from Feb 13, 3:02 am.
S1lverBullet says:
Sunday, February 13, 2011 at 3:24am
“External world claim: The data of experience is consistent with the existence of a world external to consciousness…True enough. But the problem is that the data of experience is also consistent with all experiences being generated by our minds”
Let’s imagine that an idealist and a realist are having a debate, and that each one has a burden of proof to convince the other, and to sway the audience members.
What evidence can either one bring to bear on the question?
randal says:
Sunday, February 13, 2011 at 4:55am
For starters a realist could argue from common sense while an idealist could argue from simplicity.
S1lverBullet says:
Sunday, February 13, 2011 at 7:21am
I have no idea what arguments from common sense and from simplicity mean, but they sure don’t sound like answers to my question, which was what EVIDENCE either could bring to bear on the question.
(Can you sketch the outline of these arguments for me, for my own curiosity?)
randal says:
Sunday, February 13, 2011 at 3:15pm
Common sense: All things being equal if two competing hypotheses explain the same data but one of them is in accord with the common sense of most rational people while the other is wildly in contradiction to that common sense, then one ought to accept the first argument rather than the second.
Simplicity: The principle of parsimony (do not multiply entities beyond necessity). If you can explain human experience with appeal to minds alone, why invoke an external world of substance to correspond to the experience of those minds? That’s an unnecessary explanatory posit.
S1lverBullet says:
Sunday, February 13, 2011 at 6:25pm
Both of those arguments suck (especially the first one), and since no evidence can be brought to bear on the matter, I’d declare the debate a complete waste of everyone’s time.
The only rational position regarding idealism/realism is agnosticism.
Is the question of the existence of the Christian god really like this one? I.e. a question that you should both be agnostic about and not waste a moment of your time on?
randal says:
Sunday, February 13, 2011 at 10:59pm
SB,
I thought you were a scientifically minded individual. So it is with some surprise that I read you saying Ockham’s razor “sucks”. Since solipsism also explains all the data you’re committed to the view that you can’t rationally believe any minds exist other than your own. Now that really sucks!
S1lverBullet says:
Sunday, February 13, 2011 at 11:44pm
I do not buy the argument from simplicity, not because I do not respect parsimony, but because I do not accept that either of the 2 propositions (idealism or realism) is actually “simpler” than the other.
Consider the 2 explanations in terms of the amount of information they contain – the number of bits of information required to describe all of the data. I would argue that they contain the same amount of information. The idealist must contend with an astoundingly complex mind – one that contains all of the information required to recreate a mental world that cannot be distinguished from what the realist calls the real world. The realist does not require the existence of such a complex mind, for in the realist’s view, the information is merely external to the mind. Sorry – but that doesn’t seem any “simpler” to me. Such a mind would be at least as complex as the real world that the realist appeals to. So idealism is unable to describe the findings more parsimoniously.
I find this to be an eminently scientific approach to the question upon which, for you, it repeatedly seems that everything turns.
So yes, I am agnostic on the question of solipsism/other minds, idealism/realism, that history is accurate vs that the world was not created 5 minutes ago with the appearance of time, etc, and any other question you can muster where the 2 options cannot be distinguished from each other. I am also agnostic about undetectable teapots orbiting the Sun between Earth and Mars.
You have a penchant for defining the Christian god and his bible in ways that can’t be distinguished from his non-existance. You should also be agnostic about said god.
randal says:
Monday, February 14, 2011 at 3:19am
SB,
I beg to differ on the simplicity question. The realist and idealist are both positing the existence of minds that experience just what our minds experience. The realist also posits an external world and is obliged to provide some sort of theory of perception by which the minds experience that world. So it is plausible to argue that the idealist posits fewer entities to explain the same amount of data. There are many other grounds one would argue for idealism, including the failure of current theories of perception like the theory of appearing, sense data theories and adverbial theories. So I was simply giving one example.
SB, if you’re consistent then I presume you also don’t believe that you exist since, as Bertrand Russell and others have pointed out, it is possible that “I think therefore I am” is actually only “I think, therefore there are thoughts.” Who says thoughts need a thinker?
But if all that is true then your quarrel isn’t with the theist having an unjustified belief. Rather, your real quarrel is with everybody else you meet on a daily basis who believe all the things you’d count unjustified including that there is an external world, that other minds exist, that the world is more than five minutes old, that they exist, et cetera.
So why are you singling poor theists out? You apparently are committed to the view that virtually everyone is irrational virtually all the time!
S1lverBullet says:
Monday, February 14, 2011 at 3:50am
In science, explanations are models that permit us to explain and predict data, and parsimony refers to the preference for explanations that contain less information than that which they explain. For example, the periodic table of the elements, and the field of chemistry contain much less information than all of the elements and compounds that exist and are reacting in ways predicted by the simpler model. The field of chemistry explains the observed world with much less information than the chemical world it explains.
So yes, the “realist also posits an external world”, but the idealist posits a much more complex mind that contains the information for that which the mind experiences. Stalemate in terms of information content, I’m afraid. (As an aside, but an important one, neither idealism nor realism seem to offer any predictive capabilities). Neither explanation seems more parsimonious to me.
Sure, you can interpret Ockham’s “entity” to mean physical objects, but I don’t see why that makes much sense. Doing so would mean that Zeus is a better explanation for lightening than the theory of electromagnetism, which posits electrons, and protons, and a host of other particles that can transfer electrons under specific circumstances, etc…
As for all of these unanswerable questions that you repeatedly raise, they are such a waste of time, Randal! Maybe I don’t exist, maybe you don’t exist, maybe the world was created a nanosecond ago with the appearance of age, maybe buses don’t exist…like I said, SO WHAT?
I predict that this conversation will continue. I predict that without trauma or disease, I will not survive beyond 120 years of age. Neither of us is going to step in front of a moving bus tomorrow… Take whatever position you want, and NOTHING changes.
You seem to reduce your argument for the existence of the Christian god to these sort of questions, as if whether the Christian god exists or not, NOTHING CHANGES. But that is the bait and switch, isn’t it, because surely you do believe that EVERYTHING changes if the Christian god exists!