The other day, I watched the 2019 Clint Eastwood film Richard Jewell about the security guard who discovered a bomb at the 1996 Atlanta Olympics and was subsequently accused of being the bomber. Jewell’s mother (played in the film by the always-excellent Kathy Bates) stood by her son, never doubting him for a minute. It […]
justification
“There is insufficient evidence to warrant belief.” Eh?
This morning, I noticed an exchange between Angry Grasshopper and Ron H. on my blog regarding the nature of evidence for theism. I have excerpted the relevant bits below, but you can read the fuller exchange starting here. After that, I’ll offer my own comments. Angry Grasshopper: “I don’t reject ‘mere’ theism because it doesn’t […]
Turning an atheist argument on its head
Today, I came across this Twitter profile. So of course, I had to reply: “‘Non-believers CANNOT justify their godless beliefs, making theism the JUSTIFIED POSITION. Prove me wrong.’ I should try reasoning like ‘Artie’ more often. It makes things so easy!” This prompted a reply from “Jeffrey” followed by my rejoinders: Jeffrey: “How is this […]
The Evidential Burdens of Atheism
Over the years, I’ve met many self-described atheists who insist that they do not need to justify their atheism. They say things like this: “If you’re going to make a claim about what exists, it needs to be justified.” By implication, if you make a claim about what does not exist, you are somehow exempted […]
Yahweh vs. Thor
Going through my Twitter feed this morning I saw the following retweet via Secular Outpost: “Atheism does not require certainty. But we can be as certain the Christian god does not exist as Christians are that Thor does not exist.” I assume that the original tweeter was intending to make a claim like this: “Evidence […]
Justifying Naturalism?
In my recent dialogue with Justin Schieber we had an interesting exchange on Justin’s commitment to a position he refers to as “naturalism”. To get the most out of this article, you should begin by taking ten minutes (or so) to get the background exchange. You can start watching from here. In this exchange, Schieber […]
In defense of rational disagreement
In the discussion thread to “66. Reformed Epistemology: A Conversation with Myron Penner” Mike D objected to Myron Penner’s description of Reformed epistemology because it supported the conclusion that “people who hold starkly antithetical beliefs can both claim to have formed them according to the criteria laid out by Penner.” In other words, two different […]
66. Reformed Epistemology: A Conversation with Myron Penner
There are several topics in philosophy of religion, and on its borderlands, which are famous for fomenting in their critics that devastating triumvirate of incredulity, derision and, alas, misunderstanding. Divine command theories of ethics and intelligent design theory come readily to mind … as does Reformed epistemology, that approach to the warrant of religious belief which […]
Here comes the Sensus Divinitatis again!
One of my readers, Nate, offered a formidable response to my article “God and the Burden of Proof” which I’ve reposted below because (1) it’s too long for a comment thread, (2) it pushes the debate forward and (3) it’s well written. Following the comment I offer my own brief response. Nate’s comment is rendered […]
Thoughts on universalism and hope (a response to Nate)
Back in early February I wrote a response to Nate — one of our resident academic philosophers — and his critique of greater goods theodicy. (See “Is God a user? A response to Nate’s Principle“.) Nate offered a reply a few days later but with the flurry of activity it was never properly responded to. […]
Atheists have lots of religious beliefs, and why it matters
It is very common these days to hear atheists (skeptics, agnostics, free thinkers, humanists, apatheists, antitheists, etc…) insisting that people who have “religious beliefs” have some special epistemic burden, some particular justification threshold, that they must meet in order to hold those beliefs rationally. It goes without saying that the folks (the atheists et al) […]
The Problem of Testimonial Underdetermination
One of our commenters, Nate, is a professional philosopher. And his comments reflect the fact. In the comment thread of “Testimony, God, and, er, a glass of milk” he offered an extended quote which is worth highlighting on the main stage. Please note that I’ve changed Nate’s text to red, I’ve added boldface in a couple […]
Testimony, God, and, er, a glass of milk
In the discussion thread to “Is atheism a default position?” Emilie_dC asked the following question: “If someone shows me two glasses of milk, and tells me that they are identical except that glass A contains an additional substance that is undetectable, what should I believe? “Should I be agnostic on the matter of whether glass A […]
Miracles and the old “testimony is unreliable so we can ignore miracle claims” chestnut
One of the first responses to my newly posted interview with Craig Keener came from Mike D who commented: Mike then simply rehashes David Hume by asserting that it is always more likely that an eye-witness is errant than that a miracle occurred. Never mind that Craig Keener offers an extensive rebuttal of the Scottish […]
