“Randal, if God exists and chooses not to intervene (because of the furtherance of a greater good) and “God-permit” the rape/murder of a child, why should you intervene to stop the evil act? If you choose to intervene, how do you know that you have not prevented a greater good from happening?” The Atheist Missionary
I have three responses.
Response one: From theodicy to defense?
If folks are going to understand the first response, they must first be clear on the difference between a “theodicy” and a “defense” . A theodicy aims to provide an account of why God allows evil. But a defense is more modest insofar as it aims only to provide a possibly true account which is sufficient to demonstrate that “God exists” and “evil exists” are not contradictory.
(Sadly, some atheists dismiss defenses as, to use John Loftus’ tired phrase, “merely punting to possibility”. That shows a complete misunderstanding of the function of a defense. The fact is that everybody uses this type of reasoning. Let’s say that Jane comes to you and says “My boyfriend Jim is a creep! We just went out for breakfast and he never mentioned that it is my birthday!” At that point it would be quite reasonable to provide a defense for Jim like this: “Look Jane, I don’t think you have grounds to call Jim a creep. You’ve known him to be a thoughtful boyfriend. So it is perfectly possible that he is planning a surprise for you later. Maybe your present consternation is part of his ruse to surprise you.” You would not be claiming this is, in fact, what Jim is up to. But given that it is wholly possible that it is, you have provided a defeater for Jane’s belief that her boyfriend is a creep. Similarly, defenses in philosophy of religion point out that there are reasonable possible scenarios in which God’s existence is consistent with the existence of evil.)
One more caveat. I think we should understand the Greater Goods theodicy as explaining not why evil occurs, but rather why suffering occurs. Sometime evil and suffering get conflated (even by me!) so it will be helpful to keep them distinct. The reason why will become clearer in point 2.
With that in mind, TAM is challenging a Greater Goods theodicy according to which one believes that for any suffering that occurs, God has morally sufficient reasons to allow that suffering to occur. TAM’s objection is a sort of reductio ad absurdum according to which, if we accept the Greater Goods resolution, then we will have reasons not to intervene when suffering does occur. And that would grind to a halt all attempts to intervene in the face of suffering and evil.
But what precisely is the problem here? It seems to me that the problem isn’t with the Greater Goods theodicy itself. That is, it isn’t that there is something improper or unseemly about God using suffering to bring about greater goods. Rather, the problem arises with the consequences that allegedly follow from believing that the Greater Goods theodicy is true. The problem, simply, is that believing it is true would provide a reason not to intervene to stop suffering and evil.
Properly understood, the reductio doesn’t provide a theist grounds to believe that the Greater Goods theodicy is false. At most it provides grounds to believe they cannot know whether the Greater Goods theodicy is true. In short, the objection provides reason to believe that God would providentially restrict our knowledge of the truth or falsity of the Greater Goods theodicy so as to ensure our continued, unrestricted moral action. In sum, at most the objection provides warrant to retreat to a Greater Goods defense.
Response two: counting up the good
But does the objection even succeed in forcing a retreat to defense? I don’t think so.
As best I can see, TAM is reasoning on a principle like this:
If I see an evil being committed I ought not intervene because not intervening will result in greater suffering which will bring about a greater increase in good than would have occurred had I intervened.
That assumption strikes me as unjustified at best and thus it ought to be rejected.
To see why we should begin by getting three scenarios in view:
Scenario 1: Jim arrives safely at work on Tuesday.
Scenario 2: Jim is mugged on the way to work on Tuesday but Randal bravely intervenes, restraining the mugger and protecting Jim from further injury.
Scenario 3: Jim is mugged on the way to work on Tuesday and Randal walks on by as the mugging proceeds, anxious to ensure that Jim receives the maximal good from the suffering being inflicted by the mugger.
We are agreed, according to a Greater Goods theodicy, that if scenario 2 or 3 occur, God allows the suffering endured by the victim in order to achieve some greater good. But beyond that, TAM is clearly assuming that the net increase of good over evil/suffering produced in scenario 3 will clearly outweigh that in scenario 2. But this strikes me as a wholly unwarranted conclusion. Let’s consider why.
First, the objection seems to presuppose, bizarrely, that the only goods to be considered in the equation are goods that arise from suffering. That’s a wholly bizarre assumption. Does the objector not know that goods also produce goods? Consequently, we also need to calculate the good produced by Randal’s bravely intervening to stop the mugging.
Second, the objector seems to presuppose, bizarrely, that the only evils to be considered in the equation are evils that arise from the suffering victim. That too is a wholly bizarre assumption. Does the objector not know that there are evils of omission as surely as evils of commission? Consequently, we also need to calculate the evil of Randal’s passive refusal to prevent further suffering by Jim at the hand of the mugger.
You might be thinking: but if Randal is passively watching, doesn’t God allow that to produce yet greater good which also must be calculated? Even if you did think that, it wouldn’t warrant the conclusion that the cumulative net increase of good in scenario 3 outweighs that of scenario 2. But that point really is moot anyway, because the evil of Randal’s passive response in scenario 3 is not itself suffering. As I noted, the Greater Goods theodicy says that God allows suffering to produce greater good. But that doesn’t mean that the evil of Randal’s passive response will produce greater good and so is allowed for the production of that greater good. (So why does God allow that kind of moral evil? This is where a complementary free will theodicy would enter the picture.)
In conclusion, the objector has no reason at all to conclude that the net increase of good in scenario 3 outweighs that of scenario 2. Indeed, if anything we have good reason to believe that the greater good of Randal’s intervening in scenario 2 contrasted with the greater evil of Randal’s passivity in scenario 3, provides a good reason to conclude that the greatest net increase of good over suffering occurs in scenario 2.
Response 3: Our moral responsibility is to become people of virtue, not engage in absurdly speculative calculations
Let’s go back to TAM’s operative principle (or at least my best reconstruction of it):
If I see an evil being committed I ought not intervene because not intervening will result in greater suffering which will bring about a greater increase in good than would have occurred had I intervened.
Note that this principle assumes that one ought to engage in moral action based upon the calculation of the cumulative increase of good over evil and suffering that will result. You might be skeptical that this whole approach of speculatively counting up hedons and dolors in various possible scenarios as a guide to moral action is mistaken straight out of the gate.
I agree with you. Our concern ought not be with the speculative calculations of net benefits all things considered. Rather, it ought to be guided by the attempt to inculcate moral virtue in ourselves to become good people (or, in Christian parlance, Christ-like). And all can surely agree that passively standing by while evil unfolds and suffering is compounded is wholly incompatible with that call to become virtuous. So the entire objection is based on a false view of moral formation and ethical action. Just do the right thing and let God worry about the rest.
