A reader named Mark posted a comment to my article “Pot. Kettle. Black. Another response to Chris Hallquist” in which he raised the following objection to divine command theories of ethics:
“The point is that DCE has the apparent consequence that *if* God orders me to murder people for fun, *then* I’m obligated to do it.”
The great thing about this “objection” is that it can be readily generalized as an objection to any meta-ethical theory of ethical value or any system of normative ethics. Consider:
Objection to Deontology: “The point is that Deontological ethics has the apparent consequence that *if* the moral law obliges me to murder people for fun, *then* I’m obligated to do it.”
Objection to Utilitarianism: “The point is that Utilitarianism has the apparent consequence that *if* the greatest good requires me to murder people for fun, *then* I’m obligated to do it.”
Objection to Virtue Ethics: “The point is that virtue ethics has the apparent consequence that *if* a virtuous person will murder people for fun, *then* I’m obligated to do it.”
What do you think will be the rejoinder? Predictably the deontologist, utilitarian and virtue ethicist can argue that they do not accept that it is possible that the moral law, or the greatest good, or virtue would require (or even permit) the action in question.
The exact same point can be made by the divine command ethicist. He/she may simply reject that the counterfactual proposal is possible. That is indeed what I, as a defender of a divine command theory of moral obligation, would do.
