This post is prompted by the following comment and question from Emilie:
You’ve asked John to explain his criteria for justification. Were he to do that, I would imagine that you would have some criticisms. Could you tell us what your criteria for justification are? I’d like to understand from what perspective your criticisms might come.
Emilie, as I said, I have written literally dozens of articles on topics relating to the epistemology of Christian belief. This is not surprising since I focused in my doctoral work on that question. I am happy to provide some links to past articles on the topic below. I deal with these issues more fully and systematically in my forthcoming book The Swedish Atheist, The Scuba Diver, and other Apologetic Rabbit Trails (Intervarsity, 2012). (Yes Piero, that is another reference to one of my books. Sorry about that. I know you look askance on the practice of authors referring to the books they’ve written. That’s almost as unforgivable as scientists referring to the experiments they’ve conducted or musicians playing the music they’ve composed.)
These articles provide a quick overview for the comprehensive moderate foundationalist, proper functionalist epistemology that I hold in which basic metaphysical commitments or worldview presuppositions can be properly basic absent defeaters. This is true of Christianity and, in principle, of naturalism as well. However, in the final article I raise some problems with naturalism.
If you have any comments or questions regarding what is written here please post them below. I do not blog anymore at the Christian Post blogs (where most of these articles are found) since it became a cesspool of intolerant and abrasive fundamentalism while I was there, so if you post any questions or comments there I won’t see them.
In this article I recount a dialogue with an atheist over the (ir)rationality of religious belief.
Speaks for itself.
In this essay I critique some arguments presented by blog readers against the notion that religious beliefs could be properly basic.
In this article I explain two approaches to deciding which kind of beliefs could possibly constitute knowledge. The a priori approachs applies a particular method that stipulates in advance which beliefs would qualify while the a posteriori approach looks and sees which beliefs are likely candidates. I defend the latter approach.
In this article I argue for the proper basicality of belief in God despite the fact that belief in God is not formed through sense perception.
In this article I explain further how beliefs about God can be properly basic.
In this article I critique the notion of beliefs (and religious beliefs in particular) that are indefeasible or immune to refutation. I believe that justification is prima facie, not ultima facie (but of course I’m willing to concede that I could be wrong since self-referential defeat is a nasty business).
In this article I explain some ways that theological claims are open to falsification.
In this article I point out how naturalism is unjustified.