“A Theologian, An Atheist and A Schmuck walk into a radio show…”A Panel Discussion About The Existence Of God!

I’ll be on the panel with Justin Trottier, chief spokesperson for the Centre for Inquiry Canada, and Brian Ferguson. As you can probably guess, Trottier is the atheist. Apparently I’m the theologian and Brian Ferguson is the “schmuck”.

This will be the third time I’ve been on Drew Marshall and in case you didn’t know, I love the show’s irreverent edge. Just so long as they don’t find out that I myself moonlight as a schmuck.

I believe our segment broadcasts at 4 pm eastern and you can listen online:

http://www.drewmarshall.ca/

In this series Jason has been taking issue with the appeal to theism as an explanatory hypothesis. In his most recent installment he offers the following definition of theism:

Theism: There exists an omnipotent, omniscient, omni-benevolent creator who exists necessarily and by his own nature.

Next, Jason contends that appeal to this definition leaves many facts unexplained. Here is how he sets up the point:

I maintain that even if theism is true, there still exist facts that theism cannot explain. Here is a list of some of these facts:

• that the creator of the universe is omni-benevolent rather than omni-malevolent,  mostly good, or even indifferent
• that the creator of the universe is omnipotent rather than merely very very powerful
• that the creator of the universe is omniscient rather than merely very knowledgable

We can describe this point as the “arbitrary attributes problem”. Let’s say that there is a poor family living in a shack. Suddenly one day they begin to find food hampers left on their doorstep. They then surmise that the hampers were left by a kind old bearded man named Smithwick.

They may be on good ground to infer that an agent is leaving the food on the doorstep. They may even be on good ground to think the agent is kind. But why think that the agent is an old bearded man named Smithwick? It seems wholly arbitrary to predicate those attributes of the agent, and thus we have the arbitrary attribute problem.

Likewise, you may have reason to think an agent cause can explain facets of the universe. You may even have reason to think that agent exists necessarily. But to think the agent is omnibenevolent, omnipotent and omniscient? Isn’t that arbitrary in the same way it is arbitrary to describe the family’s “earth angel” as an old bearded man named Smithwick?

The short answer is, no. There are at least three reasons why.

To begin with, Richard Swinburne has pointed out that in terms of hypothesis formation predicating infinite powers of the agent cause of the universe is simpler than predicating powers of a particular finite measure:

“If the action of a person is to explain the existence and operation of the universe, he will need to be a very powerful person. It is a simpler hypothesis to postulate that his power is infinite rather than just very large. If we said he was powerful enough to make a universe of such and such mass but not powerful enough to make a more massive one, the question would arise as to why there was just that rather than any other limit to his power. ” (Is there a God?, 45)

Of course as a hypothesis the postulation of infinity (or power or any other attribute) is provisional and open to revision. The point, however, is that it is not wholly arbitrary or unjustified as a provisional hypothesis since positing a specific degree of finite power would raise questions about why that level of power and not another. (A person might respond: “Why not postulate an agent powerful enough to create this universe and simply not take a stand on whether the agent had sufficient power to create a greater universe?” But agnosticism of that kind is a position which also must be justified. Why can’t we provisionally conclude it likely that the agent would have power to create a slightly grander effect than the one observed? And why not a bit more grand than that? At which point we’re back to writing down “infinite” and getting on with our day.)

Second, Jason misses the fact that there are independent reasons why one would appeal to those various Omni-attributes. Consider omnibenevolence. This attribute is not simply that God happens to be the best person there could be. Instead, it asserts that the divine nature is the source across all possible worlds of objective moral value and moral obligation. This is an appealing hypothesis because, among other things, it enables one to affirm human moral intuitions that moral value and obligation are independent of human individual opinions or our existence as a species and are instead objective facts that we can recognize or fail to recognize. In addition, it avoids the need to multiply our ontology by positing an independent transcendent source of these moral values and obligations like a Platonic good. Finally, the recognition of transcendent moral obligation — e.g. I really ought to have helped that person and I ought not to have lied — fits better with a concrete agential source rather than an abstract one. (Abstract objects like a Platonic good are generally viewed as inert, and it is conceptually problematic to view obligations sourcing from inert entities.)

Third, and perhaps most importantly, we turn back to Jason’s definition. It is a good definition for certain purposes, but it also has the danger of creating a distortion in the way theists conceive of God because it offers no meaningful relation between the properties postulated, thereby leaving the theist open to that charge of arbitrary attributes. The fact is, however, that theists are not arbitrary in their postulation of attributes of deity. You can read more about the perfect being definition of God, and  how the set of attributes posited by the theist is a coherent, meaningful package in “Perfect Divine Being, Perfect Divine Commands.” (As a bonus, this article will also illumine my second point.)

In conclusion, I don’t think the (Christian) theist is vulnerable to Jason Thibodeau’s arbitrary attribute charge.

Consider a conversation in which you are likely to hear the charge.

Al: “Hey Fred, whatcha up to?”

Fred: “Just reading Randal Rauser’s blog.”

Al (making hissing noises): “Rauser? You’re reading that liar for Jesus?”

First off, let’s be clear: this isn’t an ad hominem. An ad hominem would be “Rauser? I heard he smells like a tuna sandwich left out in the sun.” In contrast, calling someone a liar is a direct attack on their character and thus on the reliability of their testimony and argument. So right there we’re already separated from the school yard plebeian insults.

So when do you get to use the “liars for Jesus” charge?

First off, use it against Christian apologists. Don’t worry about the fact that we are all apologists for one thing or another. Single out the Christian apologist for special censure as a disingenuous salesman (gender neutral: sales associate). In this way you can intimate that whatever the apologist says is under suspicion because it is to the end of closing the sale.

Next, use it whenever a Christian lies. For example, if Bob the Christian tells Al that he caught two salmon on the fishing trip and Fred knows he really only caught one, then Fred can call Bob a “liar for Jesus”. It doesn’t matter that Bob isn’t lying for Jesus in this circumstance. It is good enough that he’s a Christian who is lying.

Do that enough and you will ensure that a general air of incredulity and a pall of distrust is cast over Christians every time they open their big mouths.

Finally, remember that calling somebody a liar is the ultimate trump card:

Al to Bob the Christian: “You’re a liar for Jesus Bob.”

Bob: “No I’m not!”

Al: “See, you’re lying!”

“The first half of the book consists of a protracted discussion over religious epistemology, which is one of the best ‘introductions’ to the topics I’ve read….”

But what makes the review really interesting and well worth reading is the way he spins it into his own autobiographical narrative by contrasting it with a book he read to buoy up his faith twenty years ago in high school. That book, Answers for Atheists, Agnostics and Other Thoughtful Skeptics, follows the same dialogical format as Swedish Atheist which is what initially prompted the comparison. But it is the contrast between the two books that Adam highlights. While Answers for Atheists offers oversimplification and even caricature of the positions and reasoning of atheists, agnostics and skeptics, Adam observes that I am as likely to raise the ire of the Christian apologist: “Again many Christian apologists will not be happy, because Rauser is willing to countenance evidence that counts against Christian belief.”

Given that the world is often messy, ambiguous, and in need of more nuance and charity toward the views of others, I’ll take that as a compliment!

This kind of behavior reminds me of Mikey that irritating kid in my grade 5 class who used to say “My dad drives a Porsche. Sorry that your dad doesn’t drive a Porsche.”

(Yeah, well I’m sorry that your dad’s Porsche is a 924, Mikey.)

Today I look back at Mikey and realize it was insecurity and poor self-image that led him to behave in this manner.

Plus the fact that he was still in grade 5.

Now back to Loftus. He has blogged about Price’s review. You can read it here. Loftus quotes Price as saying:

“[Rauser] relies on rhetorical flash. He is clever and humourous, and he knows it. His delivery is the sugar that helps the medicine go down…Rauser’s cheering section will have much to smirk at here, but it is false comfort.”

In other words, rhetorical skill, style and humor are all points of criticism when one is arguing that God exists.

According to Loftus (since I haven’t yet seen the review) Price then goes on to identify two points of criticism. The first is my doctrine of scripture. But it is the second that really caught my attention. Here I’ll quote Loftus:

“Rauser’s second, “thoroughly vitiating error,” Price writes, “is the incessant appeal to the God of the Gaps.” You can see this in several of his debate proposals within the book itself. Price describes it like this: “We can’t (yet) figure out this or that, so let’s ‘solve’ the mystery by giving it a name, ‘Jehovah.’” The number of times this strategy has been used in the history of the church to defend the faith only to be shown wrong, should stop any intellectual dead in his tracks from using it any more. But Rauser uses it repeatedly in this book. Is he an intellectual? Does he not know? Has he not heard? Is he shutting his eyes with hands over his ears and yelling so this news doesn’t seep into his brain, or what?”

Of course I don’t argue “We can’t figure this out so let’s solve the mystery by giving it a name, Jehovah.” This is a stupid caricature. But note the irony here. I argue for the existence of God based on the existence of objective moral value and purpose, objective aesthetic value, the truth-seeking direction of our cognitive faculties, the post-resurrection appearances of Jesus and empty tomb, and several other points. And in his criticism Price has functionally declared this entire form of reasoning to God’s existence illegitimate by fiat, calling it all “God of the gaps”.

Do you see how question-begging this is? By definition one cannot argue that God explains anything because invoking God would be appealing to God of the gaps. This is called winning the debate by fiat. Too bad Loftus didn’t make that clear in the book. He could just have argued:

(1) Appealing to God to explain anything is God of the gaps.

(2) God of the gaps is illegitimate.

(3) Therefore, appealing to God to explain anything is illegitimate.

Done!

Jeff’s position prompted me to press him on which sources of belief can be properly basic and which are non-basic. He finally provided the following summary of his criterion of proper basicality which I’ll call Jeff’s criterion:

Jeff’s criterion (Jc): “If we have no option but simply to assume the deliverances of a source of knowledge (eg, sensory perception under normal circumstances, rational intuition), then we can accept those deliverances non-evidentially. Otherwise, we assess sources of knowledge evidentially (eg, testimony).”

I take it that Jeff wants us to believe Jc. However, a person cannot rationally believe Jc as a properly basic belief since it is clearly not among those beliefs that “we have no option but simply to assume”. Rather, it is contentious epistemological thesis. This means that if we are to be rational in assenting to Jc, Jeff will have to demonstrate how Jc is evidentially derived from beliefs that are properly basic. Thus far he has declined to provide an account of which sources of belief he accepts as properly basic, though he has specifically identified rational intuition and sense perception. So if Jeff is justified in believing Jc he should be able to demonstrate how it is derived from properly basic beliefs of rational intuition and/or sense perception.

I await with great anticipation Jeff’s defense of Jc.

My first interview is with evolutionary creationist Denis Lamoureux. You can check it out here.

So check it out, be patient as the production values become more polished over time (hey, I’m a newbie!), and spread the word!

And yes, we will be in iTunes (eventually).

Finally, my thanks to Darryl at Steady Graphics for his work on getting the podcast up and running.

In this back and forth you can get a good overview on how the appeal to prior probabilities has a superficial rhetorical sheen but little more.

Now I’ve decided to return to this series with a few more installments. We’ll start with a favorite of John Loftus. Consider, for example, the following passage where he refers to the possibility that God created through evolution:

“I’m continually amazed at how often Christians hang their hats on mere possibilities, as I’ve argued before. Such a scenario is possible, but what we want to know is if it is probable. It’s also possible that the Loch Ness Monster exists who escapes all of our attempts to detect it.”

The argument works like this. Let’s say you start by pointing out the evidence for Neo-Darwinian evolution. “Therefore,” you conclude, “Christianity is false.” And when the theist predictably retorts “But why couldn’t God have used evolution to create?” you play your trump card: “That’s possible, but is it probable?”

Your emphasis on ”probable”, coupled with a smirk, will make it clear to all that it isn’t probable. Or at least that you don’t think it is probable. Which is all that matters. (Of course you don’t think it is probable. After all, you’re an atheist. It may be probable to those who accept (1) God exists and (2) evolution is true. But who cares about them? This is your argument!)

Or take the problem of evil. You say “If God is all good and all-powerful then how could he allow x?” The theist replies: “It is possible that God allowed x for these reasons.” Blah blah theodicy blah blah defense blah blah.

Now pull out your trump card. “Sure that’s possible. But is it probable?” Emphasis. Smirk.

You win.

The blogger, Dr. Conrade Yap, liked the book and was more sympathetic with my arguments (not surprising given that he is a Christian theist). However, Dr. Yap does say some things that left me perplexed and suspecting that he had misunderstood the argument being presented. For example, he wrote:

“That does not mean I am fully persuaded by Rauser as well. Some of the examples he use are less than satisfactory. For example, in the opening chapter, he takes the stand that life has meaning from a hugely utilitarian standpoint.”

This perplexes me because I don’t endorse a utilitarian standpoint, still less a “hugely utilitarian standpoint” in that chapter. Nor can I think how the argument for objective meaning presented in that chapter could be construed as a defense of utilitarianism. (Just so we’re clear, utilitarianism is the ethical position that endorses one’s primary ethical obligation as being always to act so as to actualize the greatest good for the greatest number.)

Oh well, at least Dr. Yap liked the book!