Doxaphobia and its foolish pretenders

Posted on 09/07/12 36 Comments

So far as I know, “doxaphobia” is a neologism traceable to me. At least I haven’t seen it used elsewhere.

And what is doxaphobia, you ask?

Well first off, don’t confuse it with “doxophobia” which is the fear of expressing one’s opinion. However, doxaphobia is a kissing cousin of doxophobia. While the latter is the fear of sharing opinions, the former is the fear of holding opinions. You see, the Greek word “doxa” refers to a common or widely held belief. And doxaphobia is the fear of holding beliefs.

As you can see, I rank doxaphobia as a phobia, that is, a clinical anxiety disorder. It is a disorder because this is not the way people are supposed to be. There is a reasonable fear of dogs, but the cynophobe may shake at the sight of a chihuahua. There is a reasonable fear of heights, but the acrophobe may hyperventilate on a step ladder. There is also a reasonable fear of belief. A man may feel angst that he could be wrong in the beliefs he holds about another person, for example. (Should I believe I can trust him? That he’s a stand-up guy?) But there are limits. For example, he doesn’t worry that the other person exists. Or at least he shouldn’t.

Enter doxaphobia. The doxaphobe worries not just that he might be mistaken in his beliefs in this other person. He even worries that he might be mistaken in believing this other person exists. Yeah, I’m serious. Come over here and let’s take a look.

Don’ t look at me like I’m crazy. What if the other person is a robot? What if the other person is a character in a dream? What if the other person doesn’t exist? What if everything is a dream? Help me! What do I do?

The doxaphobe reaches out for a line to save him lest he drown. And the line he grasps firmly is doubt.

Ahh yes, I shall doubt that the other person exists. After all, If I never believed the person existed to begin with, I wouldn’t be wrong if it turns out the person didn’t exist. A no-risk strategy. Brilliant!

And so the doxaphobe witholds belief in the existence of other people for fear that they might not exist.

It’s not as crazy as I you might think. I can’t stand the thought of being wrong, you know. I can’t bear the thought of believing p and it being the case that not-p.

But wait doxaphobe. What about the external world?

What about it?

Well if the person might be a dream, might the external world be a dream as well? Might it be the case that the external world doesn’t exist at all?

I suppose it might. I suppose I could be wrong… I suppose I shall not believe in the external world either.

But wait doxaphobe, what about yourself?

What about me?

Do you exist?

Of course I exist! Of that much I surely can’t be wrong. After all, I’m thinking.

Not so fast doxaphobe. Are you thinking? Or are there just thoughts? Do thoughts need a thinker? Can you be sure?

Ahh, think you’ll outsmart me, do you? Well I have an answer. I’ll withold belief in myself! “I” may indeed by merely the content of some thoughts. So I shall remove the thought that I exist.

You see dear reader, the sorry lot of the doxaphobe? Poor chap, doubting everything. And look at him now, writing desperately on that fancy stationary, and talking to himself as he does:

Doubt, it is the adult attitude to truth. Skepticism. Be a skeptic. I am a skeptic. Not that I believe I exist of course, but I shall doubt. Doubt it all. Then I won’t be wrong. Because nobody should believe p when it might be the case that not-p.

Poor doxaphobe filled the pages of his fancy stationary with such musings. Then one day he left the window open and they blew out the window and over the landscape. Day after day passerby would find sheets that trumpeted the value of absolute, unqualified doubt, with nary a kind word for the benefits of belief.

Most people read the pages with brows furrowed, laughed, and were on their way. After all, the reasonable person finds a place for belief along with doubt.

But others were strangely enamored by the musings of the poor doxaphobe. For some reason it seemed to them that these ramblings made good sense. They seemed sophisticated, exotic, and somehow even scientific. And so these folk too began to sing the praises of unrestricted doubt. Meanwhile all references to “belief” were consigned to the ignoble realm of “faith”.

Mind you, the vast majority of these individuals were not themselves true doxaphobes. Rather, they were mere inconsequential dabblers. They naively adopted the language of doubt and used it to their advantage. Whenever there was a particular thing they wanted to criticize — a holy text, a charismatic leader, a questionable policy — they would invoke the unrestrained language of the doxaphobe. Doubt! Doubt! Always Doubt! Skepticism is the way to truth!

And yet, these folk would keep right on believing in other people and the external world and their accountant and their favorite sports team and whatever else they happened to fancy.

They were like meat eaters who happened to become “vegetarians” every time haggis was on the menu.

http://blogforthelordjesus.wordpress.com Mike Gantt

You’ve given a good inventory of Emperor Skepticism’s wardrobe, indicating how little thread is really present. Yet, oh, how the mobs of intelligentsia praise his sartorial splendor. Who among them will have the courage to shake himself and follow truth wherever it leads?
Raymond Ingles

And the whole essay falls apart once one realizes that there are different degrees of belief, that ‘belief’ and ‘doubt’ exist on a continuum of certainty.

So everything has some doubt associated with it. Nothing is of probability ’1′. On the other hand, some things have an awful lot of nines after the decimal point.
- http://www.randalrauser.com/ Randal Rauser
  
  Ray, your point is utterly irrelevant to this essay. The point is (or should be) clear: when people associate reason with skepticism simpliciter, they are either mentally ill or inconsistent.
  
  Take John Loftus. He constantly employs the unqualified statements of the doxaphobe when he makes silly claims that skepticism is the way to truth or knowledge. In his case he’s clearly a dabbler.
  - Walter
    
    Could it be that John is simply employing hyperbole when presenting his case?
    - http://www.randalrauser.com/ Randal Rauser
      
      This would constitute an extraordinarily inept use of hyerbole. I’ve repeatedly pointed out to John that a reasonable person finds the golden mean between skepticism and credulity, and yet he persists in propagating this misleading nonsense that reason is exercised in skepticism.
      
      Too bad more people don’t take his advice and doubt what he says.
  - Raymond Ingles
    
    What if you went back and read his essays, but replaced the language you object to with the phrase, “It’s wise to remember that nothing is completely certain.”
    - http://www.randalrauser.com/ Randal Rauser
      
      If we changed a sentence that is obviously false with a sentence that is plausibly true then we’d slightly improve John’s writing. That seems pretty uncontroversial.
      - Raymond Ingles
        
        Sigh. What if that’s what he meant in the first place?
        
        http://www.randalrauser.com/ Randal Rauser
        
        Sigh. Those are two completely different statements. To be skeptical of p is to withhold belief in p. That is completely different from believing that-p while recognizing that one could be wrong in believing that-p. Thus, you attempt to save the writing of “Skeptics” like John by foisting on them a monumental confusion.
AdamHazzard

You’re describing derealization and depersonalization. Both are considered dissociative symptoms. Both can occur as symptoms of schizophrenia. As can hyper-religiosity.
http://twitter.com/AtheistMission TheAtheistMissionary

There is a recurrent theme on this blog: it is unreasonable to doubt the tenets of Christianity (i.e. virgin birth, God becoming man and then orchestrating his own crucifixion, resurrection, ascension, etc.) because the application of skepticism can lead us to doubt even the most widely accepted beliefs.
Raymond has hit the nail on the head: nobody can be absolutely certain of anything and we all live our lives based on the balance of probabilities. So what’s more probable – that the events described in the New Testament actually happened as described or are the product of exaggeration, myth and wishful thinking on the part of a race living in expectation of the fulfilment of Old Testament prophecies? I know where I’m placing my money.
- http://www.randalrauser.com/ Randal Rauser
  
  “There is a recurrent theme on this blog: it is unreasonable to doubt the tenets of Christianity (i.e. virgin birth, God becoming man and then orchestrating his own crucifixion, resurrection, ascension, etc.) because the application of skepticism can lead us to doubt even the most widely accepted beliefs.”
  
  That isn’t a theme of this blog because I’ve never argued such a thing, ever. And it certainly has absolutely nothing to do with the content of this post. Rather than engage irrelevant strawmen please focus on what’s written.
  - AdamHazzard
    
    “Rather than engage irrelevant strawmen please focus on what’s written.”
    If what’s written is intended as an implicit critique of atheism, it is an irrelevant strawman.
    - http://www.randalrauser.com/ Randal Rauser
      
      The article has nothing, per se, to do with atheism. The sole concern is a particular kind of skepticism.
      - AdamHazzard
        
        A particular kind of skepticism which no one actually seems to espouse.
        
        http://www.randalrauser.com/ Randal Rauser
        
        Actually, it is a good description of ancient Greek skepticism. As for contemporary self-described skeptics like Loftus, the whole point is that they don’t really endorse it and are, in fact, mere dabblers, inconsistent poseurs.
        
        AdamHazzard
        
        So your message is — “doxaphobia” equals lunacy, and “skeptics like Loftus” are “dabblers” and “inconsistent poseurs” because they don’t press their own skepticism to the point of insanity.
        
        This is a strawman argument (if it can be called an argument) precisely because it elides any discussion of appropriate skepticism.
        
        http://www.randalrauser.com/ Randal Rauser
        
        No, doxaphobia doesn’t equal “lunacy”. You should avoid introducing prejudicial, non-technical terms. It would be inappropriate to diagnose someone who is agoraphobic or aerophobic as a “lunatic”. The same goes here. Phobias are psychological disorders, and anybody who would be so fearful of error that they would disabuse themselves of all their beliefs is psychologically disturbed, akin to Howard Hughes washing his hands till they bled for fear of germs.
        As for Loftus et al, if they say that being reasonable is always being a skeptic and doubting, but they don’t follow their own advice then yes, they’re being inconsistent. And because they are attempting to pose as a particularly rigorous skeptic and yet fail to attain the standard, they are indeed poseurs.
        It is a bit bizarre that you close off by accusing me of undermining “any discussion of appropriate skepticism”. Are you kidding? By demonstrating that rationality is not equivalent to unbridled skepticism, but rather a golden mean between skepticism and credulity, I’ve laid the foundation for a meaningful and constructive discussion of the things we should believe and the things we should doubt.
        
        AdamHazzard
        
        You devised a strawman — an unconditional skepticism indistinguishable from a “psychological disorder” — and pitched it as the only consistent kind of skepticism.
        
        You say, “By demonstrating that rationality is not equivalent to unbridled
        skepticism, but rather a golden mean between skepticism and credulity,
        I’ve laid the foundation for a meaningful and constructive discussion of
        the things we should believe and the things we should doubt.”
        
        You haven’t demonstrated any such thing. And skepticism has to be judged as appropriate or not in the context of some specific claim. The idea of a “golden mean” — “Fifty percent skepticism and fifty percent credulity does the trick in every case!” — is absurdly simplistic.
        
        http://www.randalrauser.com/ Randal Rauser
        
        “You devised a strawman — an unconditional skepticism indistinguishable from a “psychological disorder” — and pitched it as the only consistent kind of skepticism.”
        
        Adam, you’re showing yourself to be a very poor reader. I was dealing with people who define reason solely in terms of skepticism and doubt.
        
        At the same time, I defined reason as the correct balance between skepticism and doubt. And again here you show yourself a poor reader. You interpret “golden mean” to entail “Fifty percent skepticism and fifty percent credulity.” That doesn’t even make sense, for in that case it would follow that you didn’t believe anything since these two attitudes would cancel each other out.
        
        What the golden mean refers to is believing when it is appropriate to believe, and withholding belief when it is appropriate to withhold belief.
        
        You really ought to slow down and read for understanding, not quick refutation based on your absurdist interpretations.
        
        AdamHazzard
        
        You say,
        
        “At the same time, I defined reason as the correct balance between skepticism and doubt.” [I think you meant between skepticism and belief -- maybe I'm not the one who needs to slow down and read for understanding....] “What the golden mean refers to is believing when it is appropriate to
        believe, and withholding belief when it is appropriate to withhold belief.”
        
        And what “doubt” means is questioning whether a particular belief is appropriate, either in the context of prior knowledge or in the light of new evidence.
        
        Atheism suggests that a belief in the Christian god is inappropriate in the context of prior knowledge. It suggests that religious doubt is warranted by the enormity of the claims involved and the paucity of evidence. It suggests that we routinely discard other beliefs when they are as poorly supported, and that granting belief to the Christian god under those circumstances constitutes an epistemic double standard.
        
        I’m always disappointed when Christians dodge the issue by attacking “doubt” as an abstraction. At root, I suspect you and I apportion doubt and belief in roughly the same way. Except when it comes to certain issues. And that’s the meat of the matter.
        
        http://www.randalrauser.com/ Randal Rauser
        
        You’re right of course. That was an erratum borne of typing in haste.
        
        Once we are agreed that John’s sweeping and unqualified invocation of doubt is inappropriate we can get on to discuss the skeptic issues that you’re talking about here, viz. doubt of this or that belief. Hopefully you find the chance to read my book length treatment of these issues which is coming out next month. As you can appreciate, the question of why a person accepts one worldview rather than another is not the kind of question that can be adequately addressed in a blog post or two.
Walter

Lot of good points in this post, but we should mention that the flip side of this is just as bad. There are some individuals who believe that their every opinion is an unassailable fact and that anyone who disagrees with them is suffering from stupidity and/or delusion.
Zeno

Randal,

Your post has given me a big frowny face. Why do I have a big
frowny face, you ask? Because your posts make it very difficult for me to
continue to say things like “Doubt everything” as though saying such things constitutes
a substantive contribution to conversations about religion. This has greatly
upset me. If I can’t just repeat general and platitudinous maxims about
probabilities, then what am I supposed to do? Am I to actually learn analytic
philosophy/Bayesian Confirmation Theory and use those skills to discuss these
issues more intelligently? I hope you understand that I would prefer not to do
that. After all, it’s not like I have to learn about probabilities and philosophy
in order to bloviate on those matters to the applause of fawning followers.

Do you not care at all that I am quite fond of this
ridiculous “Doubt everything” maxim and would like to continue repeating it in
an erudite tone before like-minded people who congratulate each other for
repeating it? Have you no concern for the fact that I don’t want to learn why professional
epistemologists and philosophers regard my maxim as execrable mental rubbish
and, when they come across it, ask sardonically if the maxim comes in two-ply?
And most importantly, have you ever considered how big of a frowny face it
gives me to be exposed as a sciolist, a sophomoric neophyte whose ignorance
about epistemology is exceeded only by the overweening confidence with which I
put my ignorance on display? How happy do you think it makes me to realize that
philosophical conversation is wasted on me and those I proudly rally with
because we lack either the integrity or the intelligence for it?

So you can see now why I have a big frowny face. I find your
demand for logical rigor and responsible conversation difficult, and would
prefer to frolic in the puerile fields of intellectual nothingness where
refutations of my ideas can be safely ignored. I live in America, and I have a
right to know very little about those things I discuss and write about most
often. So please, let me exercise my rights.

Best,

Foolish Pretender
- http://www.randalrauser.com/ Randal Rauser
  
  I meant no harm.
Walter

What Randal calls doxaphobia, I would call agnosticism gone wild.
Randal, do you believe that agnosticism is ever warranted? Is it somehow wrong to withhold commitment one way or another on some particular beliefs? For example, I consider myself to be agnostic about the resurrection of Jesus. I don’t rule out the possibility a priori, but I don’t feel like the available evidence is sufficient to tip me towards a profession of belief or outright disbelief. My agnosticism about the event does not preclude me from having a tentatively held opinion about what I think happened; it’s just that I don’t feel strongly enough one way or the other to express any kind of certainty. Does being agnostic in specific instances mean that a person is a dabbler or poseur in skepticism?
- http://www.randalrauser.com/ Randal Rauser
  
  “Randal, do you believe that agnosticism is ever warranted?”
  
  Of course. I stated that reason is evinced in the proper granting of belief when it is appropriate to believe and the withholding of belief when it is appropriate to withhold belief. So if reason includes cases of propositional assent it just as surely includes cases of withholding of propositional assent.
  
  “Does being agnostic in specific instances mean that a person is a dabbler or poseur in skepticism?”
  
  The dabbler is the person who defines reason in terms of skepticism alone rather than in terms of the proper portioning of skepticism to belief.
Crude

I’m just commenting to say haggis isn’t nearly as bad as people say. Also good: liver pudding, scrapple, uni and chicken livers.
- http://www.randalrauser.com/ Randal Rauser
  
  Yum, I know where I’m going for dinner.
epicurus

When I left Christianity I felt like everything I was sure of had been blasted away and I wondered how or if I could ever be sure of anything again. Later, when I discovered the ancient greek sceptics like Sextus Empiricus, I found their ideas of suspending judgement in all things very appealing, as this was exactly what I was feeling I had to do after having my christian knowledge foundation kicked out from under me.
I’m not referring to the consistency of living it, I’m just referring to the pull of skepticism if one has had some severe belief foundation butt kicking occur.
Bilbo

I only have a B.A. in philosophy, and only one epistemology course, several decades ago. However, the professor made it clear that the problem of global skepticism was still very much alive in philosophy. Given that most people (including philosophers) believe that there is an external world and other minds (and my own mind), how are we justified in this belief? I realize that the field of epistemology has progressed much since the early 1970s, but I’m willing to bet that the problem of global skepticism remains. This doesn’t mean that we should be skeptical of our own minds, other minds, or the external world (most people, including myself would say that we should NOT skeptical of these things). But it does mean that we aren”t sure why we shouldn’t be.

I think there is a lesson to be drawn here: It is possible to have at least some beliefs for which we cannnot prrovide justification, but which are beliefs that we should havee.
- http://www.randalrauser.com/ Randal Rauser
  
  I think you’re conflating the problem of skepticism with the problem of knowledge. The problem of knowledge is what you’re describing and it goes to the heart of epistemology: How do I know there are other minds? How do I know I exist? How do I know anything? To be sure, the problem of knowledge remains whether it concerns a specific class of knowledge (e.g. other minds) or knowledge simpliciter (e.g. knowing anything).
  
  What I was talking about was the problem of skepticism. This is the problem of people responding to the problem of knowledge by advocating that we ought not believing anything at all. As I pointed out, if people actually followed this course of action their behavior would be analyzable in terms of a phobia, a mental illness.
  
  That said, there may be people who say in principle that they endorse global skepticism but who in fact act in a way completely indistinguishable from people who don’t endorse global skepticism. For example, you throw a baseball at a global skeptic’s head and a regular person’s head and they both immediately duck. Is the first person really doubting the immediate deliverances of their sense perception? It’s possible I suppose, but I doubt it. So it is very difficult to live global skepticism consistently.
  
  Still, is global skepticism a live option today as a response to the problem of knowledge? Well it should hardly be surprising that if you can find philosophers who endorse solipsism and who deny that chairs exist and all sorts of other wonderfully erudite and slightly crazy things, then you can also find the odd philosopher here or there who might endorse global skepticism. (Indeed, endorsing a position widely considered defunct, and doing it vigorously and with a touch of panache, is one very good way to start on the tenure track.)
  
  But now I’m rambling. Suffice it to say, the problem of knowledge is still very much alive in philosophy, but global skepticism as a response to it has about as many takers these days as the rotary engine. (I say that even as rumors abound that Mazda will produce another RX-7.)
  - Bilbo
    
    I might be mistaken, but I think we are making the same point, but from different approaches. If philosphically, we cannot refute skepticism, nor justify beliefs about certain things, but nevertheless admit that somehow we know or are justified (or warranted) to believe those things, then we are admitting that there are at least some things that we should believe, even though we cannot justify those beliefs. And this would mean that someone who says that we should always begin with skepticism is endorsing a view that only a very few solipsists and Mazda people agree with.
    - http://www.randalrauser.com/ Randal Rauser
      
      I’m not sure what you mean by “philosophically refute skepticism”. If you’re talking about global skepticism then I think there are many great refutations of it. Indeed, I offered one myself by explaining it as a mental disorder. Implicit in my critique is the claim that the skeptic’s fear of error is far in excess of the actual threat of errant belief. I provide an account of knowledge in “Theology in Search of Foundations” and based on that moderate externalist epistemology I don’t think global skepticism poses any real threat. The real concern today would instead be skepticisms in particular areas, e.g. ethical knowledge, aesthetic knowledge or religious knowledge.
      
      By the way, these days people who take a global skeptical position over the problem of knowledge do not typically advocate the global skeptic’s response of withholding belief. Instead, folks like Richard Rorty redefine belief (and even truth and knowledge) in pragmatic terms, eschewing the so-called “mirroring” relationship of correspondence truth.
      - Bilbo
        
        Ouch! Expensive book! I’ll check local seminary library first. Meanwhile, I don’t think globabl skepticism is a “threat.” I think the fact that most philosophers reject it, even though they can offer no sufficient philosophical arguments (logical arguments from known or widely accepted premises that do no beg the question) against it, suggests that people who insist that we must start from a skeptical position are in trouble. And if we can’t start with skepticism and can’t get to knowledge regarding our own mind, other minds, or an external world, then perhaps we shouldn’t take skepticism about ethics, aesthetics, or religion so seriously.
        
        http://www.randalrauser.com/ Randal Rauser
        
        I talk about the same issues at some length in my soon to be released book “The Swedish Atheist, the Scuba Diver, and Other Apologetic Rabbit Trails.” And the best part: 12 bucks.
        
        I do think philosophers offer “sufficient philosophical arguments” against global skepticism, by which I mean sufficient arguments to reject it as the most likely or reasonable explanation of our epistemic state.