The end of antitheism once and for all

Posted on 12/14/11 40 Comments

I think we’ve made some progress on the “antitheism” front. I’ll put it like this.

(1) I am glad x exists (where “I” is any human being able to grasp (1) and x  is the best human being “I” has ever known or known of).

(2) If God exists then God is infinitely better than x .

(3) If I am glad that x exists then I ought to be glad if any agent infinitely better than x exists.

(4) Therefore I ought to be glad if God exists.

This argument demonstrates that any reasonable person must be glad if God exists.

So what do we do with all the acrimony that remains?

First the problem: There is a long set of predications that are made of God (the “thick descriptions” that are found in a formalized religious system like Christianity) which seem prima facie incompatible with (2). They are of the “Well I wouldn’t allow that so why would God?” type. What do we do with those predications?

The religious adherent who seeks to maintain that thick description of the most perfect being has one of two possible solutions. Either concede that that particular predication is false or offer a defense of how the predication is compatible with (2). (Of course there is a third possibility: refuse to offer any resolution. Technically speaking, there is a fourth possibility as well. Claim that God is not perfect after all. However, the fourth “possibility” is impossible for anyone who takes the Anselmic definition seriously. The third possibilty is a back-up option like a safety net, but it isn’t one of which you automatically avail yourself. First you do your best to span the tight-rope and see how far you get by considering which predications should be rejected or revised and which can be defended with an apologetic.)

Regardless, the defense of the thick description is a secondary issue which falls on the shoulders of every adherent to a thick description. The primary issue, for this post at least, is that antitheism cannot even get a toehold in rational discourse because every rational and minimally moral person who understands what “God” means should be glad if God exists.

 

Share
  • http://www.atheistmissionary.com/ The Atheist Missionary

    The Amalekite infants aren’t glad.

    • randal

      TAM, this is empty bluster.

      Here are two propositions:

      (i) a child is killed in a genocidal attack and God exists (where God = a being infinitely better than the best human being you’ve known or known of).
      (ii) a child is killed in a genocidal attack and God does not exist.

      These are your two options. Which would you prefer to be true?

      • Jag Levak

        “These are your two options. Which would you prefer to be true?”

        If you prefer something to be true, do you think that a good enough reason to believe it is true?

        • randal

          “If you prefer something to be true, do you think that a good enough reason to believe it is true?”

          No. Good thing that premise is no part of this argument.

          • Jag Levak

            If the question of preference is irrelevant to truth, what was the purpose of the question?

            And presumably, the setup could be expanded to, for example, these propositions:

            1) All the pain and suffering we see in the world takes place, and there is a benevolent and loving god.

            2) All the pain and suffering we see in the world takes place, and there is no god.

            3) All the pain and suffering we see in the world takes place, and there is a vindictive and malevolent god.

            But my question would be, given those options, what difference would our preferences make?

            • randal

              Jag, the point of the argument is not the truth of theism but rather the incoherence of antitheism.

              As for your 3), that’s a use of the word “God” which is completely different from that which is found in classical theism. Within classical theism, the Anselmic conception is widely held, and the concept of a most perfect being which is vindictive and malevolent is contradictory.

              You could refashion 3) as follows: “All the pain and suffering we see in the world takes place, and there is a vindictive and malevolent agent of great power.” But that would be quite irrelevant to my argument against antitheism.

              • Jag Levak

                “the point of the argument is not the truth of theism but rather the incoherence of antitheism.”

                Ah, in that case, I think your question could use a clarification. Was the slaying of this child in a genocidal attack something which this God found preferable to all alternate possible worlds wherein this child was not slain, or was this slaying contrary to the preferences of this God?

                “As for your 3), that’s a use of the word “God” which is completely different from that which is found in classical theism.”

                It might be outside of classical Christian theism, but other religions have had such gods. That’s why I used the generic lower-case god term.

                If an atheist finds all the detestable god concepts humans have worshipped loathsome, I don’t see that there would be anything incoherent about that. Is it only antitheism if it is directed particularly at the Christian god? (as defined by theologians, not by Christians like Fred Phelps)

                • randal

                  “Ah, in that case, I think your question could use a clarification. Was the slaying of this child in a genocidal attack something which this God found preferable to all alternate possible worlds wherein this child was not slain, or was this slaying contrary to the preferences of this God?”

                  My point was actually quite clear throughout. The question you raise here is a matter for theodicy, not a matter for antitheism.

                  “If an atheist finds all the detestable god concepts humans have worshipped loathsome, I don’t see that there would be anything incoherent about that.”

                  Christians worship a God who they believe is perfect. Christians disagree about the predications they make of that God. For example, some believe God commanded genocide, others (myself included) don’t. You may find certain predications of God made by certain Christians to be loathsome, but that is very different from finding the core concept of God as a perfect being loathsome.

                  • Jag Levak

                    “Christians worship a God who they believe is perfect.”

                    Perfection is basically the quality of conforming, without flaw, deviation, or adulteration, to the description which defines a type standard. To say God is perfect, without specifying a perfect what, is no more informative than to say God is an excellent. I would assume the type standard which applies to God is a god standard, but by this, are we saying that God conforms perfectly to our idea of what a god should be, or that he conforms perfectly to God’s idea of what a god should be? Why would humans know what it takes to make a perfect god?

                    “Christians disagree about the predications they make of that God.”

                    If they disagree with each other, I would take that to mean at least some of them, possibly all of them, would also disagree with God’s predications. So when those who have a different god standard from the one God has say that God is a perfect god, then presumably God, even if perfect according to his own standard, would be something different from what the mistaken Christian has in mind when he says God is a perfect god.

                    “You may find certain predications of God made by certain Christians to be loathsome, but that is very different from finding the core concept of God as a perfect being loathsome.”

                    Unless it can be established what the standard is for the core concept of a god, saying God is a perfect one doesn’t shed much light on the matter. We are left to infer what must be compatible with such putative perfection by what a god is alleged to have done, or decreed. I don’t know why perfect conformity to a godly god standard would necessarily preclude the ordaining of genocide, merely because I find it repellent from my perspective, and contrary to my values.

                    • randal

                      “To say God is perfect, without specifying a perfect what, is no more informative than to say God is an excellent.”

                      This is nicely put, but it is also false.

                      All things being equal is it better to be an agent or a non-agent? I believe it is better to be an agent. So if God exists God is an agent. But what kind of agent? From there we work our way through power, knowledge, goodness, and so on. This is a brief synopsis of complex reasoning but the basic picture is there in outline and it is a plausible way to proceed. There simply is no reason to adopt Jag’s deep skepticism about our intuitive abilities to fine-tune a concept of God.

                    • Jag Levak

                      “All things being equal is it better to be an agent or a non-agent?”

                      All things being equal? Are you asking whether it is better to do something than to do nothing in a case where doing something is equal to doing nothing? If so, then I don’t know, because if they are equal, I don’t see what would make either one better.

                      If you are simply asking if it is better to do something than to do nothing, then in that case, I don’t know. I think it would depend a great deal on what the something is. I can think of a great many things I would rather not do than do.

                      But if the aspect of agency you were focusing on was autonomous self determination, then in that instance I would have to say, I don’t know. If the actions and experience of being an agent were identical to the actions and experience of being a fatalistically determined drone, then again I would be at a loss to see what would make one better than the other.

                      “I believe it is better to be an agent.”

                      If you believe it, does that mean God also believes it? Does your God always agree with you?

                      “There simply is no reason to adopt Jag’s deep skepticism about our intuitive abilities to fine-tune a concept of God.”

                      I not only think we have that ability, it seems pretty clear we have the ability to fine-tune multiple concepts of God.

  • Walter

    “It’s not God that I do not accept, you understand, it is this world of God’s, created by God, that I do not accept and cannot agree to accept.”

    from The Brothers Karamazov

  • The Atheist Missionary

    Is a full bluster a fillibuster?

    I’m with Walter.

    I’ll take scenario (ii) if you’re suggesting that Yahweh ordered the genocide. Any day of the week.

    • randal

      I didn’t say anything about what God commanded or didn’t command. That is irrelevant to the question.

      Your reply entails a rejection of premise (3):

      (3) If I am glad that x exists then I ought to be glad if any agent infinitely better than x exist.

      Why would you reject this premise? That strikes me as a bizarre position to take.

      • The Atheist Missionary

        I’m happy to have Yahweh exist if he’s infinitely (or even only marginally) better than the best person I’ve ever known*. That kind of person wouldn’t smite infants.

        * One reason why I love this blog is that it forced me to reflect on the best person I’ve ever known. His name was Jessie, he’s long deceased and he was a dish washing superintendant at Jasper Park Lodge. Just a super guy.

        • randal

          TAM concedes that antitheism is indefensible even as he recalls fond memories of Jessie. A perfect ending!

          (Incidentally, remember Joshua Kadison’s song “Jessie”? I know it’s about a gal, but it’s still a great, indefensibly and unapologetically sentimental song: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gre4DZuA6k4)

  • Walter

    I would have to say that the mere existence of a supremely benevolent creator is not very comforting for one suffering immensely in this life unless that creator is offering future recompense for the suffering I am enduring in this life. But that claim moves us beyond the god of religious philosophy into the quagmire of special revelation and revealed religion.

    • randal

      “I would have to say that the mere existence of a supremely benevolent creator is not very comforting for one suffering immensely in this life unless that creator is offering future recompense for the suffering I am enduring in this life.”

      Scenario 1: Gary is suffering immensely in this life and no supremely benevolent creator exists.
      Scenario 2: Gary is suffering immensely in this life and a supremely benevolent creator exists.

      I’d prefer that (2) exist, not least because all things considered it suggests the distinct possibility of better things to come for Gary which would not obtain otherwise. Will not the supremely benevolent judge of all the earth do right?

      • Walter

        I’d prefer that (2) exists as well.

        • Frank

          I prefer (1). Gary’s immense suffering at the hands of an intentional being is worse than Gary’s suffering due to a random universe.

          You want us to say (2), on the basis that the ends justify the means. But they do not.

          You want us to say (2), because Gary will be in paradise soon. But why did this perfect god allow Gary to suffer before getting his prized eternity on a cloud? Why not get paradise without the suffering? What if Gary was 2-years old when he died of a terrible disease, and never loved, never kissed, never lived? I prefer (1).

          • randal

            “You want us to say (2), on the basis that the ends justify the means. But they do not.”

            Just tell me how you defend the argument I presented.

  • Robert

    There is no sense in arguing by definition. See here: http://lesswrong.com/lw/nz/arguing_by_definition/

    Sure, if God is really-cool-and-super-nice-and-the-best-thing-EVER then I would want him around. Oh … except for the fact that my non-belief will force him to hurt me or remove me from existence. That kind of sucks.

    • randal

      Robert, let’s say that Tony tells you he hates Republicans because being a Republican means you support the NRA. Pointing out that being a Republican does not oblige one to support the NRA and so this is not a good reason to “hate” Republicans is a perfectly legitimate way to argue.

      The antitheist holds a view of God that is even more obtuse than Tony’s view of Republicans. If antitheism ends up looking ridiculous after I’ve presented this argument, well then so much better for the argument since that was the point: it is obtuse!

    • Robert

      People insist that “X, by definition, is a Y!” on those occasions when they’re trying to sneak in a connotation of Y that isn’t directly in the definition, and X doesn’t look all that much like other members of the Y cluster.

      The human mind has this label called “God”, and it really bothers some of us that you want to force Anselm’s label of “God” onto what others label “God”.

      Saying that X number of people for X number of years accepted Anselm’s definition might be true. However, some people think the Anselm’s definition is misused: e.g. William Craig gets up on stage and argues for the God of the Philosophers as if Yahweh is the perfect representation of that argument. Craig uses a definition of God that works well in argument, and then hopes that the audience will not be too bothered by the abyssal gap between “God” and “Yahweh”.

      • randal

        “The human mind has this label called “God”, and it really bothers some of us that you want to force Anselm’s label of “God” onto what others label “God”.”

        I can’t “force” atheists to accept the Christian definition of God. I live in a free country where they are free to adopt any absurd caricature they like. Heck, millions of them already do with caricatures like “the flying spaghetti monster”. As I said, the concept of perfection is as firmly ensconsed in the Christian conception of God as it possibly could be. And that is not only in academic theology. As I pointed out, I have never met a Christian who said that God is less than perfect. (And it certainly wouldn’t be proper to worship an entity that was less than perfect.) Now you complain about Craig’s defense of various actions attributed to Yahweh in the Old Testament. I already dealt with that by pointing out that for Yahweh to be God every one of those actions must either be consistent with divine perfection or it must be that Yahweh did not in fact commit or command the action in question. Again, that is all perfectly irrelevant to the immediate question of antitheism.

        So I’ll state it one more time, slightly differently:

        Christians accept that “God is perfect”. It is non-sensical to hate a perfect being. Hence, it is non-sensical to hate God, should it be that God does in fact exist.

        • Robert Gressis

          Hi Randal,

          You wrote, as a nutshell version of your position:

          “Christians accept that ‘God is perfect’. It is non-sensical to hate a perfect being. Hence, it is non-sensical to hate God, should it be that God does in fact exist.”

          I think the problem here is that there are formal and substantive senses of “perfect”. In the formal sense, it comes close to making no sense to say “X is perfect, but I still hate X” (it doesn’t actually make no sense; it could be that you know you resent someone for his moral perfection, and wish you didn’t, but acknowledge that you do).

          By the substantive sense of “perfect”, though, I mean something like this:

          THEIST: I think the God as described in the Bible is perfect.
          ANTITHEIST: I think the God as described in the Bible is monstrous.

          CLASSICAL THEIST: the God as described in the Bible is the greatest conceivable being, and is therefore formally perfect.
          ANTITHEIST: Perhaps the Anselmian God is perfect, both formally and substantively, but I find that the God of the Bible is so imperfect that He couldn’t possibly be identical to the Anselmian God. So, I have no problem with the Anselmian God, but a big problem with the God of the Bible (if He existed).

          Whaddya think?

          • randal

            That fits in nicely with what I’ve been saying. We can begin with the confession that God is the most perfect being as a formal declaration. And I emphatically agree that it is nealy non-sensical to say you hate God, properly understood. Nor do I think most people actually mean that. Rather, they tend to mean they hate any being who allows children to die of disease, and innocent people to be killed in war, et cetera. By my lights then, what they’re really saying is that any agent who allowed such things wouldn’t be God.

            I have no sympathy for the antitheist’s rhetoric (my focus here) but I do have sympathy for people who are confident that God wouldn’t allow x (war, disease, etc). That brings us into the stormy waters of defending a particular substantive conception of perfection. As I said, for each predication which appears to be inconsistent with perfection there are two possible options: deny the predication or explain why the predication is actually consistent with perfection.

            In closing, you describe the Classical Theist’s perspective like this: “the God as described in the Bible is the greatest conceivable being, and is therefore formally perfect.” That’s problematic since God is described as changing his mind, losing his temper, striking out in anger, not knowing the future, not knowing all true statements about the present, and a number of other things which appear to be inconsistent with perfection. Consequently, classical theists would typically deny many of these statements (e.g. God isn’t really ignorant of the future…), and they’d do so at least in part to match up the presentation of God in scripture with a concept of perfection. So it isn’t a matter of reading the Bible and saying “Oh, the presentation of the divine being in that book is consistently what we’d call perfection.” That would be a very implausible position to take.

            • Robert Gressis

              Hi Randal,

              You’re right. I shouldn’t have written, “the God as described in the Bible is the greatest conceivable being, and is therefore formally perfect” but rather “the God as referred to in the Bible is the greatest conceivable being, and is therefore formally perfect.”

              This leaves open the possibility that many of the descriptions given of God are incorrect, and many of the actions attributed to Him were not in fact His actions, but that nonetheless the Being to whom the Jews were relating was the God of classical theism.

        • Robert

          Yea, force was too strong a word. I’m sorry, I retract that.

          But I think we generally agree. Anselm’s God is really awesome, and I totally hope this God exists unless he will hurt me. I can’t think of a rational argument against that.

          • randal

            I really do think this is progress. We all agree that we hope God exists. We disagree over whether it is likely that God exists given the nature of the world and thus we also disagree over which states of affairs are consistent with God existing. Significant disagreement to be sure, but progress nonetheless.

            • clamat

              Seconded (or thirded or fourthed). I sincerely hope god exists, but I seriously doubt he does.

              • Frank

                I don’t. The universe is more magical without him.

                • randal

                  Frank,

                  I don’t really understand your epigrammatic response. Here is the argument again.

                  (1) I am glad x exists (where “I” is any human being able to grasp (1) and x is the best human being “I” has ever known or known of).

                  (2) If God exists then God is infinitely better than x .

                  (3) If I am glad that x exists then I ought to be glad if any agent infinitely better than x exists.

                  (4) Therefore I ought to be glad if God exists.

                  Obviously you don’t disagree with (1). Nor can you disagree with (2) based on the definition of God as the most perfect being. So I take it your disagreement is with (3). But what is your argument for rejecting (3)?

                  • Jag Levak

                    “(2) If God exists then God is infinitely better than x .”

                    A perfect diamond is not necessarily ‘better’ than a good, but imperfect, Dutch apple pie. A perfect god might be infinitely different from a good, but flawed, human, but to say it is better requires more context. Are you saying this perfect god would be infinitely better than x from the perspective of the perfect god, from the perspective of x, or in terms of its value to “I”?

                    If I were x, the idea of being a perfect god actually wouldn’t hold much attraction for me, or at least, no more appeal than the idea of becoming something utterly alien and unrecognizable. Would I like to know everything? No. I actually like learning, and surprises, and a bit of mystery. Would I like to be eternal and changeless? To me, that sounds like just about the most pointless existence imaginable. Infinite power? That could be fun, except for one problem. The price tag that goes with that is that I can only do exactly that which I have always known I will do. Presto, no fun anymore, and we are back to pointless-ville.

                    (3) If I am glad that x exists then I ought to be glad if any agent infinitely better than x exists.

                    If I value a good human, then should I value a perfect god even more? I don’t see why. From everything I’ve been able to detect of this perfect god, being in the company of this god seems indistinguishable from being alone. I’d much rather have the company of fellow humans. And not necessarily in spite of their flaws, but sometimes partly because of them. When people say they hope a perfect god exists, I think what they really mean is that they hope they will someday find that a perfect god exists and that they will interact in some way with it, or derive some benefit from it. I suspect people would not value the existence of a perfect god so much if it were stipulated that they would never have any experience or confirmation of it. I think it isn’t the perfection, per se, that people value. It is the prospect of a relationship and all that can go with that. And I suspect most people would value a vibrant relationship with a flawed human over a seeming non-relationship with some perfect, and perfectly remote, alien abstraction.

                    • randal

                      “A perfect diamond is not necessarily ‘better’ than a good, but imperfect, Dutch apple pie.”

                      Yes, not every object is directly commensurable with every other object. But that doesn’t mean everything isn’t commensurable with God.

                      “Would I like to know everything? No. I actually like learning, and surprises, and a bit of mystery.”

                      You are claiming that all things being equal it is not greater to know the truth of a proposition than not. I think most people will disagree with you and recognize that knowledge is preferable to ignorance. The reason you propose some ignorance is better is to secure a certain quality of life (e.g. “excitement” from learning). But if your life was already infinitely pleasurable you wouldn’t need to buy a little more pleasure through ignorance.

                      “From everything I’ve been able to detect of this perfect god, being in the company of this god seems indistinguishable from being alone.”

                      Theists believe that, among other things, God created and sustains all things. That’s the kind of agent we’re talking about . (Remember, we’re not engaged here in arguments for the existence of God. Rather, we’re just clarifying what theists mean when they say God.) In that case, your comment is analogous to the person who retorts that they don’t need to accept the existence of gravity, electromagnetism, and the weak and strong nuclear forces because “being in the company of these four fources seems indistinguishable from being alone.”

                      “And I suspect most people would value a vibrant relationship with a flawed human over a seeming non-relationship with some perfect, and perfectly remote, alien abstraction.”

                      Deists believe in something like a perfectly remote, alien abstraction. But other theists like Christians don’t believe in that kind of being.

  • Walter

    “And I suspect most people would value a vibrant relationship with a flawed human over a seeming non-relationship with some perfect, and perfectly remote, alien abstraction.”

    Deists believe in something like a perfectly remote, alien abstraction. But other theists like Christians don’t believe in that kind of being.

    Some Christian theists do believe in an abstract God. Spend a little time on Ed Feser’s blog. These Aristotelian-Thomists denounce any view of God as a person or being. For them, God simply is existence and goodness itself. Although I suppose they would say that you could interact with the resurrected Jesus while living your next life? It’s all rather confusing to me.

    • randal

      I don’t know about Ed Feser but traditional Thomism doesn’t deny the personhood of God. It is true however that there are Christians who have. Paul Tillich is one of the most well known modern theologians who famously (I say infamously) talked about a hyper-transcendent God beyond God. Of course John Hick does as well. But it is important to recognize those views as deviations from the historic Christian position which seeks a balance between immanence and transcendence.

  • leebert

    Sorry, but that’s a low bar, easy to jump. This is why most atheists eschew the antitheism of Chris Hitchens (RIP) because it only serves to reify the dialectic of either-or, invariably in the favor of the theists. Theism is not for everybody, but it’s a bloody-minded litmus tossed about on perfectly good and fair nontheists. Do you approve of nontheistic Buddhists or Taoists suffering opprobria at the hands of fundamentalist zealots? Of course you don’t. It’s lame-brained parochialism that informs the false piety of religionists, not expansive panentheism or charity. Crushing to the front pews in order to be recognized is easy sport, anybody can join in. Are the rest of us beneath the carilloner’s loft just randy kids making out in the back pews?

  • leebert

    Either or. Theist vs. antitheist. Who needs this? Both sides want to reify evidence into doctrine, doctrine into judgment. The problem isn’t belief b/c as lil’ motes in God’s eye, what we believe doesn’t matter one wit. The problem is the sanctimony of the pious, the impulsiveness of the ignorant, clinging to security & eschewing uncertainty … it all leads to suffering. The binary vernacular of true vs. false is a framed ultimatum, it robs the ability of people to balance notions and ideas, robbing us of the freedom to be happy. Both sides claim they offer happiness & liberation from the other, but both the literal theologue & the literal anti-theist are utter killjoys.

    The answers lie in the middle. Agnosticism, deism, panentheism, nontheism, lower-case atheism. It’s short order for reactionaries to hijack apologia, however, and that’s where the anti-theists find traction with their milquetoast allies. But then it was Paul who turned the NT into a Pauliad, not a Christiad, and generations of educated Christians have stated as much. Fundamentalism is the triumph of Paul over Christ, but education, and Christic charity remain Christiandom’s vanguard against sanctimony and vainglory. The agnostic-minded could have a bigger role to play than napping in the back pews.

  • Pingback: Thomas Nagel, Iconoclast and Antitheist, on Intelligent Design