Evidence that Walt Disney created the universe?
I have been in conversation with Ray Ingles over the cause of the universe’s existence. The conversation has been very instructive. I have argued that the contingent universe requires a necessarily existent cause of its existence (ultimately if not also proximately). Moreover, this necessary cause must be an agent and not merely an event cause, i.e. it must have the power to initiate a causal sequence without a prior determining cause.
Ray objected that the cause could be an infinite regress of contingent causes. I think this is a very unpersuasive claim. To illustrate its manifold problems I present the Walt Disney argument.
(1) The hypothesis that Walt Disney made the universe is highly implausible.
(2) We ought to reject any hypothesis of the universe’s origin which is highly implausible.
(3) Therefore, we ought to reject the hypothesis that Walt Disney made the universe.
(4) The hypothesis that Walt Disney made the universe is more plausible than the hypothesis that an infinite regress of finite causes made it.
(5) Therefore, we ought to reject the hypothesis that an infinite regress of finite causes made the universe.
In order for this argument to go through I need to defend (4). So what reason have we to think this is true?
First argument: we have evidence that Walt Disney has created things. Ever heard of Mickey Mouse? Disneyland? “Cinderella” and “Bambi”?
Second argument: we have no evidence of an infinite regress of causes creating anything. (Ray’s own failure to provide a single example corroborates this point.)
But wait. Ray has suggested there is one thing that is explained by appeal to an infinite regress. And what is this one thing?
“This universe. This is explained by that, that is explained by another thing, and so on by induction. What practical experience with the creation of universes do you have to argue differently?”
Unfortunately this “What practical experience with the creation of universes do you have to argue differently?” argument cuts both ways. What practical experience with the creation of the universe does Ray have to argue that it wasn’t created by Walt Disney? A ha! Gotcha!
But wait. A seemingly fatal defeater to my hypothesis looms on the horizon. Walt Disney was born in 1901. The universe is older than that. (Even young earth creationists like Ken Ham agree on that point!) So how could Walt Disney create the universe?
Easy. Ray has already provided us with the tools to defeat this defeater. He said he has no problem with circular chains of causation: A causes B, B causes C and C causes A. So it would seem then that Walt Disney could cause himself to exist along with the whole universe. What a bravura performance!
And you gotta admit, the hypothesis has a certain logic to it. Walt started out with Disneyland. Then after his death Walt Disney World was opened. So it sorta makes sense that before it all Walt would have created Walt Disney Universe all the while planning his theme parks to serve as microcosmoi of his grandest creation. Magical kingdom indeed!
So to sum up, I dealt with the defeater to the Disney hypothesis. Moreover, I pointed out that there is more evidence for Walt Disney creating the universe than an infinite regress of finite causes creating it. But if you still think that the Disney hypothesis is implausible and should be rejected (as I hope you do) then so should Ray’s infinite regress of finite causes explanation.
Tags: cosmologial argument, creation of the universe, Walt Disney
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Ray Ingles says:
Friday, April 22, 2011 at 3:35pm
If we have an infinite regress, that means the universe was always existent, and hence not ‘created’ at all. What evidence do you have that the universe was created?
Brad Haggard says:
Friday, April 22, 2011 at 4:00pm
We do know that the universe “began to exist”, at least, right?
Beetle says:
Friday, April 22, 2011 at 5:41pm
No, not really.
I would also point out that asking what happened before the Big Bang is as nonsensical as asking what is south of the South Pole.
Ray Ingles says:
Friday, April 22, 2011 at 5:50pm
As Beetle says – no, we don’t know that.
We’ve been able to trace the mass/energy of the universe back to a few femtoseconds after the Big Bang. We do not – presently – know what happened before that.
Brad Haggard says:
Friday, April 22, 2011 at 6:56pm
Doesn’t, by just calling it the “big bang” imply that it “began”? Even under M-theory the universe “began” as a quantum fluctuation. Or was the singularity past-eternal? Just because there was no space-time does not mean we can talk about before and after, or causation.
Are you really willing to go this far to sidestep supernatural hypotheses?
Ray Ingles says:
Friday, April 22, 2011 at 10:22pm
No. Bangs come from something pre-existing, in our experience. As I keep repeating, we don’t know what happened at the Big Bang, let alone before it… yet.
I can just as easily ask if you’re that eager to jump for supernatural hypotheses.
Brad Haggard says:
Monday, April 25, 2011 at 2:43am
See, Ray, the problem is that I’m not sidestepping anything. The implication of BB cosmology is a singularity, and it is the most empirically verified theory that we have. We don’t know how exactly things progressed before Planck time, but that doesn’t mean we don’t have a cogent model. “I don’t know” can only come at the expense of the implications of our best scientific theory to date.
I think it’s almost silly to doubt that the universe “began to exist” at this point. What I do think you need to focus on is finding a viable physical/natural cause (e.g. quantum gravity, multi-verse generator)
Ray Ingles says:
Monday, April 25, 2011 at 3:39pm
Not all models of the Big Bang predict a singularity. As you admit, “We don’t know how exactly things progressed before Planck time…”
Note: I’m not saying there wasn’t a singularity. I’m saying we don’t know that there was a singularity.
Isn’t a singularity the ultimate “I don’t know”? But we’ve seen similar apparent infinities in our theories get resolved before – the “ultraviolet catastrophe”, renormalization, etc.
The universe as we know it certainly ‘began to exist’ at that point. Depending on how you define things, I ‘began to exist’ several decades ago – but that doesn’t mean the mass/energy that makes me up had no history before that.
Brad Haggard says:
Monday, April 25, 2011 at 4:06pm
But Ray, even if the singularity is “rounded” like in some models, there is still a beginning point. The universe, as we know it, cannot be eternal. Now you may find some cause ,beyond the universe that is both physical and eternal, such as what I mentioned earlier, but it just seems unreasonable to go against all our intuition, philosophical argument, and scientific understanding to claim that “maybe” the universe itself is eternal.
BTW, do you extend this type charity to “skeptical theism” proposals in relation to theodicy? This is a little bit of a tangent, but it seems like your principle would seem to hold true in that area.
randal says:
Friday, April 22, 2011 at 9:30pm
Oh say the fact that the universe sprung into existence out of nothing a finite time ago. The ultimate bunny out of the magician’s hat.
Ray Ingles says:
Friday, April 22, 2011 at 3:37pm
randal says:
Friday, April 22, 2011 at 9:31pm
What practical experience do you have with infinite regresses???
Ray Ingles says:
Friday, April 22, 2011 at 10:32pm
As much as you have with the origin of universes. Which is the point… we don’t have any data indicating either that this universe had an ‘uncaused cause’ or that it didn’t.
You, however, think your intuition is up to the task even without experience. As I’ve pointed out laboriously before, that hasn’t worked out too well, historically.
David says:
Saturday, April 23, 2011 at 6:26pm
Ray, I’m beginning to doubt that you have any serious interest in truth.
David says:
Saturday, April 23, 2011 at 6:45pm
I’ll even give you a specific reason why: you don’t give thoughtful consideration or reply to objections raised against your position. You simply make clever retorts that don’t bring anyone closer to the truth. I’m sorry to be negative here, but it is really starting to bug me.
Ray Ingles says:
Saturday, April 23, 2011 at 8:40pm
David, whether you believe it or not, I’m being completely honest.
The universe has a past. The present moment has, as its cause, past moments. Right now, we can only think of two options – either that chain of causality goes back forever, or else it hits some kind of limit and we come to something that, by definition, has no cause.
Now, Randall and others don’t like the idea of a infinite regress, and say, ‘It must have started somewhere!’ I am asking in turn, “Why? I mean, what happened before that? Can there really be something with no cause?”
I’m asking that question honestly. How could anyone know that?
As I noted before, back in the early 1700s, if someone asked “What causes lightning?” the proper answer wasn’t “Zeus” or “Thor” or “Seth” or “The Thunderbirds” or “Yahweh”. The proper answer was, “We don’t know yet.”
If you think we “know already” on this score, then explain how you know.
randal says:
Saturday, April 23, 2011 at 9:03pm
Ray, I can appreciate David’s frustration and I appreciate your reply. I think you’re certainly being honest. I also think you’re being profoundly irrational. Your irrationality is evident when you try to characterize a rejection of infinite regresses as if it is made on a whim. Let’s say you pointed out that a self-described postmodernist’s position was self-contradictory. Now imagine he replied “you just don’t like contradictions.” How long before you’d be pulling your hair out?
We’re dealing here with what is most reasonable to invoke as an explanation of the universe’s origin a finite time ago. We explain past events with respect to present known acting causes. So I’ve repeatedly asked you to provide an example where infinite regress has been demonstrated to be a causal explanation for a presently known effect. You’ve provided absolutely none. The only known causes then are event causes that terminate eventually and agent causes. So to suggest with a straight face infinite regress is difficult to take seriously.
Your statement “we don’t know yet” is a piece of dogmatism. It ensures that you willnever consider an agent cause as the explanation of the universe’s origin. That is a far cry from following the evidence to the most reasonable explanation based on current knowledge.
Ray Ingles says:
Sunday, April 24, 2011 at 4:02am
You want frustration? How about me pointing out over and over again that we do not know that the universe ‘originated’ at the Big Bang, and you never acknowledging that?
To reiterate: We seem to have a pretty good idea what happened up to a few femtoseconds after the Big Bang. We don’t know what happened before that. We definitely do not know that the universe ‘popped into being’ at that point or anything like that.
I agree that you are trying to explain “the universe’s origin a finite time ago”. But how exactly do you know the universe originated a finite time ago? What breakthrough in physics have you made?
David says:
Sunday, April 24, 2011 at 1:16pm
Ray,
Please define what you mean by “know?”
Ray Ingles says:
Sunday, April 24, 2011 at 1:53pm
“Have more than a hunch about”?
Can you please explain what you mean by “know”, and how you know the universe ‘sprang into being’ at the Big Bang?
David says:
Sunday, April 24, 2011 at 2:57pm
I don’t “know” that the universe popped into existence in the Big Bang.
I simply subscribe to that explanatory hypothesis as superior to other available ones (such as the hypothesis that the universe is infinitely old).
There are all sorts of empirical confirmations for associated facts that the Big Bang predicts…one example would be the detectable redshift in light from distance objects, which implies that the universe is expanding.
Is there any evidence to suppose an infinitely old universe as the best explanation?
Ray Ingles says:
Sunday, April 24, 2011 at 7:15pm
I’m not disagreeing that there was a Big Bang at all. I’m saying, “How do you know that the Big Bang was ‘moment zero’ and no causal structure existed before that to make the Big Bang happen?”
If you can only trace somebody’s genealogy back so far – say, her great-great-grandparents – do you assume that her great-great-grandparents popped into existence out of nowhere?
randal says:
Sunday, April 24, 2011 at 7:21pm
Ray, I am charitably assuming that you are not as ignorant of what the Big Bang theory proposes as to think that your analogy has any remote relevance to the present discussion.
David says:
Saturday, April 23, 2011 at 9:06pm
Ray,
I believe that you are being sincere. I’ll respond more after watering my grass and pulling weeds. Should give me some time to think about your response.
David says:
Saturday, April 23, 2011 at 10:22pm
Ray,
Here is a refutation of an actual infinity and a few points on necessary beings.
Basic argument:
(1) A collection formed by successive addition cannot be actually infinite.
(2) The temporal series of past events is a collection formed by successive addition.
(3) Therefore, the temporal series of past events cannot be actually infinite.
In other words, a beginningless time is impossible because an infinite succession of events would never arrive at the present. You can’t count to infinity, nor can you count down from infinity. So, if there is an actually infinite series of events, there is no present moment. But there is a present moment, so there is no actually infinite series of events. (This is a reductio argument, it intends to show that an absurd conclusion follows from something so we should reject it).
Or we could state it like this:
An actually infinite series of causes entails that there is no present effect. But there is a present effect (just pick any contingent thing you like). Therefore, there is no actually infinite series of causes.
Keep in mind, we aren’t talking about a logical contradiction (such as saying that 2+2=5). We are talking about a metaphysical contradiction (such as saying that a square is triangular, or something has as shape but not a size). It is a contradiction inasmuch as it violates metaphysical constraints.
Consider a thought experiment to help you see this more clearly:
Imagine that you have a book lying on the table. The first page of the book measures 1/2 inch thick. The second page measure 1/4, the third page 1/8, ad infinitum. Now turn the book over, and lift up the back cover, exposing the stack pf pages lying beneath it. There is nothing to see, because there is no last page in the book. (This example was originally raised by Jose Benardete.)
Thought experiement number 2: Hilbert’s Hotel
Imagine a hotel with a an infinite number of room that are all occupied. Now suppose a new guest shows up, asking for a room. The proprietory performs a Herculean task (technically a supertask). He shifts the person in room #1 to room #2, and the person in room #2 to room #3, ad infinitum. Now room #1 is vacant, and the new guest can check in. What a relief! But before the guest arrived, all the rooms were already occupied. And even more shocking, there was already an infinite number of guests in the hotel, and the new guest didn’t change this situation. But we can make an even more absurd situation. Suppose an infinite number of guests shows up in the lobby. The proprietor now shifts the person in room #1 to room #2, and the person in room #2 to room #4, and the person in room #3 to room #6, ad infinitum. Now the infinite number of guests can check into the odd numbered rooms which have become available. And the proprietor could repeat this process an infinite number of times and there would never be a single person more in the hotel than before!
This is not a logical contradiction. It is a metaphysical absurdity. If an actual infinite were metaphysically possible, then Hilbert’s Hotel would be open for business.
So now that we’ve worked on the absurdity of an infinite regress, let’s turn to the question of an uncaused cause. A necessary being is, roughly, one that must exist.
Point One:
The universe consists of contingent things. Things with the property of “being explained by x” where x is some other entity than the contingent thing in question.
Point Two:
For ever thing or fact, there is a sufficient explanation or reason that it happened rather than something else. There are no events or things for which we can say “there is nor reason or cause of this thing’s existence. It just popped out of nowhere!”
Point Three:
If the universe consists of contingent things that all refer to other things for their causal explanation, then it looks like we are left with something unexplained. It might be the whole collection of contingent things (“what caused the universe?”) or it might be whatever the first contingent thing is (“what caused the first contingent thing?”).
So it looks like you must reject one of these premises:
1. The universe consists of contingent things.
2. Every thing must have a sufficient explanation for its existence rather than its non-existence.
Some things are not “evidenced” inasmuch as they are required for intelligibility. We can’t always attack a view by saying, “you don’t have any evidence for that!” Sometimes the evidence for something is simply the fact that we can’t dispense with it. For a mathematician, these are usually axioms. For the theist metaphysician, this is a necessary being.
Of course, if we can show that a necessary being is possible, then it may be the case that we’ve shown that it’s actual. For, if a necessary being exists in any possible world, it exists in all possible worlds. But, many don’t think that can be shown. But we are still left with the explanatory necessity of such a being, or at least the cosmological argument contends that we are.
David says:
Saturday, April 23, 2011 at 10:26pm
Just as an aside, if you find your response continually asserting, “ahh but we don’t know…” you are likely barking up the wrong tree in your response.
Ray Ingles says:
Sunday, April 24, 2011 at 4:06am
Why? Was it the wrong answer about lightning in the 1700s? About contagious disease before Pasteur? About heliocentrism vs. geocentrism before telescopes? About the origin of biological complexity before evolutionary theory?
“It ain’t what you don’t know that gets you into trouble. It’s what you know for sure that just ain’t so.” – Mark Twain
David says:
Sunday, April 24, 2011 at 1:13pm
Ray,
One of the easiest ways to obfuscate any discussion about metaphysics is to heap loads of irrelevant epistemological questions into the mix.
If everything has an explanation, and all things are contingent, then we have a problem.
“Ahh yes, but how do you know?! Lightning had an explanation that wasn’t God so why not apply that here.”
“Uhh, because we aren’t talking about a specific contingent thing but the whole collection of contingent things, or else the contingent thing that is leftover after all the other things have been explained (the first temporally or logically).”
Ray Ingles says:
Monday, April 25, 2011 at 1:13pm
Speaking of ‘fallacy of composition’ – just because you have a collection of contingent things, does that mean the collection itself is contingent?
David says:
Monday, April 25, 2011 at 2:30pm
That first depends on whether or not collections have their own ontological status. I have already been careful to state things in a way to avoid this objection.
But let’s say collections don’t have an ontological status. The only escape is to say that the contingent things in it somehow depend on one another in a way where A depends on B, B depends on C, and C depends on A. Some have tried to get out of it this way, but with temporal events and causation it’s going to be pretty difficult. But some have tried to dig their way out via this route.
Let’s say collections do have an ontological status. Can we infer from a collection of contingent members that the collection itself is contingent?
That depends on whether or not the property in questions can be transferred from part to whole.
Bad transfer example:
Every brick in the wall is 5 pounds.
The way is 5 pounds.
Why? The property of weight doesn’t transfer from part to whole.
Good transfer example:
Every brick in the wall is red.
The wall is red.
Why? The property of color can transfer from part to whole.
My argument:
Every thing in the universe is contingent.
The universe is contingent.
Well, if every member in the set refers to something else for its existence…what are we to say of the collection? It seems obvious to me that the collection is contingent just like the members it contains.
Your argument:
Every instance of energy in the universe follows the second law of conservation.
The universe itself follows the second law of conservation.
This one is simple to defeat because the reasons the second law work, at minimum, require space and time, But space and time are features of the universe and thus cannot be used to justify things about the universe itself.
Things in my house have the property of being in my house. My house does not have the property of being in my house. Therefore, any reduction from that property necessarily cannot apply to my house.
This is not the case for contingent properties. There is nothing inherent in them that can only apply to things in the universe and not the universe itself.
Good objection though.
Ray Ingles says:
Sunday, April 24, 2011 at 3:56am
In philosophy, they call that an “A series”. The idea of time as just some moments are before others, some are after others – as Randall terms it, a “static sculpture” – is called a “B series”. (Check Wikipedia for an intro.)
The problem is, it’s really hard to account for the relativity of simultaneity in General Relativity without recourse to a “B series” approach to time. It is by far the most natural way to understand it. And GR predicts more concrete manifestations of this in “Closed Timelike Curves” and so forth. As Einstein himself put it – “Past, present, and future are illusions, though stubborn ones.”
In relativity, time is a dimension, an extent, just like space. One second ago is one light-second (186,000 miles) away. You can’t say that “we could never reach the present time because there’s an infinite amount of past” any more than you can say “we can’t be here because space is infinite and we’d have to have traveled an infinite distance to get to this point”.
So, I’m afraid from my point of view we have strong experimental reasons to discard your second postulate – every experiment that confirms relativity counts against it.
As I’ve repeatedly pointed out, the mass-energy we see shows no signs we can detect of ever having been created or destroyed. (If you can violate the conservation laws, I’d be fascinated to hear about it.) It meets all the experimental criteria we can come up with for being non-contingent. Why assume it is?
David says:
Sunday, April 24, 2011 at 1:52pm
Nice job using copy/paste.
I purposely used multiple examples that bypass debates on the ontology of time. Go back and read what I wrote again.
But dealing with your objection anyways:
You are correct that general relativity seems to confirm an 3D block view of time (and the B series). Of course, William Lane Craig, a major proponent of the Kalam and thus an infinite regress objector, does not hold that one must accept a B series to correctly characterize general relativity. (see here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lNLKcq6JjYk. Also see the book Craig did with Quentin Smith, Einstein, relativity and absolute simultaneity.
Of course, general relativity is currently in conflict with other developments quantum physics. So, it’s a slender reed to hang an objection on insofar as these three things are weighed and found insufficient:
1. The degree to which general relativity predicts a B theory of time.
2. The degree of support we have for general relativity.
3. The necessity of accepting a B theory of time for rejecting an actual infinite.
I have granted #1. I think #2 is becoming weaker over time, as newer more fundamental interpretations arise from quantum mechanics.
I am more interested in #3.
If an A series of time is correct, then that means that an actual infinite must exist right now (the present). If you think this makes the situation better for accepting an infinite regress, I’d like to hear how.
“So, I’m afraid from my point of view we have strong experimental reasons to discard your second postulate – every experiment that confirms relativity counts against it.”
This is clearly false. Just because x implies y, it is not that the case that “every experiment that confirms x” counts against ~y. Only *relevant* ones do. Ones that confirm x in a way relevant to x’s implication of y. Sometimes, theories confirm x and yet also confirm ~y in equal measure. If only scientific explanations were so easy. Besides, you’ve given no examples of relevant experiments.
The conservation laws, and this might fascinate you, only apply to a closed system.
Besides…as the second law states…in a closed system, things tend towards increasing disorder (entropy). So if the universe has existed for infinite time, why don’t we find ourselves in a thermodynamically disordered state? The obvious answer is because the universe has not existed for an infinite time.
Ray Ingles says:
Sunday, April 24, 2011 at 2:01pm
If the universe is an open system – if the universe has an ‘outside’ – then it’s a subset of a wider entity, that could have a past before this universe ‘began’…
The second law is a probabilistic law, you’ll note. Given infinite time, spontaneous reversals of entropy will happen. Even very large ones.
David says:
Sunday, April 24, 2011 at 3:02pm
“Given infinite time, spontaneous reversals of entropy will happen. Even very large ones.”
Very interesting, can you give me a link to someone describing this position? It sounds hopelessly ad hoc, and probably even devastating for other knowledge claims in science.
Ray Ingles says:
Monday, April 25, 2011 at 1:01pm
It’s a logical outflow of the fact that the second law is a statistical law. As Wikipedia puts it: “Unlike most other laws of physics, the Second Law of Thermodynamics is statistical in nature, and therefore its reliability arises from the huge number of particles present in macroscopic systems. It is not impossible, in principle, for all 6 × 10^23 atoms in a mole of a gas to spontaneously migrate to one half of a container; it is only fantastically unlikely—so unlikely that no macroscopic violation of the Second Law has ever been observed. [emphasis added]
But when dealing with infinite time, our normal intuitions about odds don’t apply. So long as the odds are not actually, absolutely zero, an event can happen… and over infinite time, becomes effectively certain to happen.
Not when science is necessarily working on finite timescales, where ‘odds against’ actually means something. Over a mere few billion years or so, we can make some pretty solid predictions.
David says:
Monday, April 25, 2011 at 1:42pm
“But when dealing with infinite time, our normal intuitions about odds don’t apply. So long as the odds are not actually, absolutely zero, an event can happen… and over infinite time, becomes effectively certain to happen.”
I will provisionally grant this; but, now why won’t you accept this argument?
1. Given an infinity, any possibility is eventually actualized (your premise).
2. Every contingent thing has a cause of its existence.
3. The universe consists of contingent things.
4. For every contingent thing, possibly there is a time it does not exist.
5. Therefore, every contingent thing actually began to exist.
6. Therefore, everything in the universe actually has a cause.
So you’re left with explaining how the universe caused everything in the universe.
But that’s a bit like explaining how the human race caused every human in the human race.
David says:
Sunday, April 24, 2011 at 3:04pm
I have no idea what you’re talking about in the first paragraph. Let me state this as simply as possible:
The laws of conservation are like saying this: “everything in the box is x.”
From that claim you cannot derive a claim of this sort, “ahh but that proves that the box is x.”
It’s clearly a fallacy of composition.
Ray Ingles says:
Monday, April 25, 2011 at 1:06pm
You stated that “The conservation laws… only apply to a closed system.”
I assumed you were implying the universe might be an open system. If this was not your intent, you’ll need to unpack what you meant.
David says:
Monday, April 25, 2011 at 1:23pm
I am going to keep rabbit chases to a min. until you respond to the substance of what I’ve already said.
But briefly: you mentioned the conservation laws as if the fact that energy is neither created nor destroyed in a closed system is relevant to whether or not the universe is infinitely old. This is clearly irrelevant because the only way to postulate it in a way that is relevant commits the part/whole fallacy.
Your statement that the universe meets “experiemental criteria for being non-contingent” sounds absurd to me. What evidence are you referring to? Scientific explanation has contingency built into it. At minimum, we explain things by showing their (partial or full) causes. How in the world could science explain something like “the universe is non-contingent?”
Ray Ingles says:
Sunday, April 24, 2011 at 2:14pm
In regions and at energies we can’t test right now. So it’s not clear that QM isn’t the one making the wrong predictions.
And as Isaac Asimov points out, older scientific theories aren’t completely wrong, just ‘less right’ than newer ones. (NASA still uses Newtonian mechanics to navigate their space probes, with just a few relativistic fudge factors – ’cause it works.) Whatever theory replaces GR will need to account for the same observations of relativity of simultaneity that GR currently does. And those are pretty basic observations.
Did you mean A series in this line? I’m afraid I’m having trouble following you here.
David says:
Sunday, April 24, 2011 at 3:08pm
I’m saying that there is a degree of strength behind the statement: “general relativity implies the B theory of time.”
So whatever stack of evidence for general relativity we have…it doesn’t follow that all the evidence transfers to suppose the B theory of time.
David says:
Sunday, April 24, 2011 at 3:10pm
It doesn’t have to be clear which is correct. The fact that they are competing hypotheses with respect to some set of data means the probabilistic landscape is shifted.
To be fair, I didn’t argue that this shift has any impact on the A or B theories of time. But that’s because I don’t think A or B theories of time are necessarily exclusive with respect to rejecting or accepting an actual infinite.
Ray Ingles says:
Monday, April 25, 2011 at 1:11pm
Shifted how? In the direction of uncertainty?
In my own opinion, (a) a B-series of time is more consistent with infinite regress – you yourself began by arguing for ‘time as successive addition’ – and (b) that GR is most naturally understood as arguing for a B-series of time.
I could be wrong, of course. As David Gerrold put it, “You are not entitled to an opinion. An opinion is what you have when you don’t have any facts. When you have the facts, you don’t need an opinion.”
So… what facts do you have to counter my opinion?
David says:
Monday, April 25, 2011 at 2:05pm
Let’s just grant the B theory of time. Craig grants it. This doesn’t as much as suggest that an actual infinite is possible.
Remember, you raised the objection to my argument that a B-theory of time was somehow going to help you get out of the argument. It’s up to *you* to give me facts that show the argument doesn’t work on a B-theory of time. Wikipedia links ain’t gonna cut it Ray.
Ray Ingles says:
Tuesday, April 26, 2011 at 12:37pm
Because in a B theory of time, time does not progress by successive addition, and your proof that the universe had to have a starting point rested specifically on that assumption.
David P says:
Tuesday, April 26, 2011 at 1:09pm
Ray, news flash buddy: this little paddling expedition we’ve been on is quite irrelevant. You’ve ignored the substance of my post, which provided powerful counterexamples to the metaphysical possibility of an actual infinite.
Not that I haven’t enjoyed discussing the ontology of time, but perhaps we should head back to camp and talk about those things?
Besides, you are completely wrong about the B series. Craig affirms the B series, and he is the one defending this argument. The guy spent 13 years studying the ontology of time. I think he would have caught that one. But that’s all I’m going to say about it for now. Maybe if you respond to the substance of my post, I’ll say more about the B series.
Oh, and you said “proof” in the singular. Actually I gave quite a few proofs. Go back and check again.
David P says:
Tuesday, April 26, 2011 at 1:34pm
Actually I stand corrected. Craig does admit that if one accepts the B series then the counting to infinity argument doesn’t work. But of course he (and I) have other reasons for rejecting actual infinities besides just the “you can’t count to infinity by successive addition” objection.
Sorry about that, I didn’t take much time to read what I wrote. Craig accepts the A series. Bah, I got my wires crossed there.
What Craig, Quentin Smith, and Michael Tooley *do* deny is that a dynamic theory of time is incompatible with GR. There are recent developments such as the “moving spotlight” theory of space-time may undo our usual assumptions about the differences in dynamic and static temporal relations.
Now, let’s get back to those thought experiments.
Ray Ingles says:
Tuesday, April 26, 2011 at 10:50pm
I saw the “Hilbert’s Hotel” bit, and of course, I’d seen it before. But let me give you a little ‘history of mathematics’.
Once upon a time, Euclidean geometry was all there was. But one of its fundamental postulates was hard to express in words. Roughly, “Given a line, and a point not on that line, exactly one line parallel to the first line can be drawn through that point.”
Some people though to prove that by contradiction. Assume that false, and show it led to a contradiction. One guy thought he had come to a conclusion ‘repugnant to the nature of a straight line’, and rejected elliptical geometry.
As it turns out, the repugnance was all in his head. Elliptical geometry is internally consistent. And then it turns out Euclid’s postulate is actually false – hyperbolic geometry seems to be the ‘real’ geometry of the universe, per relativity.
It’s possible to show that infinity has some odd properties, and you therefore seem to assume you’ve found a contradiction. I agree that infinities are counterintuitive… but that doesn’t mean they are actually contradictory.
David P says:
Tuesday, April 26, 2011 at 11:08pm
All that shows is that we both could possibly be wrong, which of course, I would agree with.
Do you not agree that the evidence lays in favor of a finite universe, even if the possibility remains that it could be false?
Ray Ingles says:
Monday, April 25, 2011 at 12:43pm
There is a difference between the actual math and such, and the way it is popularized. As I have noted, the math breaks down a few femtoseconds from the actual Big Bang.
We don’t know that there was a ‘singularity’, we don’t know anything, really, about what happened before that point. People have hunches, speculation, informed guesses. More experiments may pin things down more fully, but until then let’s at least be clear on what we actually know versus what we guess or hope for.
Ray Ingles says:
Monday, April 25, 2011 at 3:53pm
I’m directly challenging the idea that the mass/energy we see is contingent.
The arrangements thereof are certainly contingent – see Rauser’s discussion of the “Always Prayer Shawl” today – but the actual mass/energy they’re composed of? How do you know that’s contingent?
I, er, didn’t bring up the second law (of thermodynamics, I presume) here, and I’m not sure why you’re referring to it. I was referring to the conservation laws, which – unless I’m missing some implication of yours – are orthogonal to the second law.
Besides, in relativity space and time are intimately related to mass and energy, so it’s not clear that mass-energy could meaningfully exist without space-time, and vice versa.
David says:
Monday, April 25, 2011 at 4:08pm
Are you talking about zero point energy? Otherwise, contemp. physics postulates a finite amount of energy in the universe. Physics also postulates a finitely sized universe.
I haven’t seen any “direct challenge” to the metaphysical necessity of energy/mass.
You have just admitted that they depend on space-time and vice versa. It sounds to me like you’ve just disqualified them from being non-contingent. Can you explain this?
I meant to write the second law of thermodyn not the second law of conservation. Sorry about that.
You brought up the first law to support an infinite universe. I used the second law to show that it can’t transfer part/whole. The argument runs the same way for the first law though.
Ray Ingles says:
Monday, April 25, 2011 at 4:25pm
David –
Well, a finite horizon to what we can see, and a finite amount of mass/energy within that, yes. Though we’ve some experimental evidence of stuff beyond that horizon: http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn14814-galaxy-flow-hints-at-huge-masses-over-cosmic-horizon.html
Why is the finite amount relevant to its contingency, though? If the universe were infinite in scope, it wouldn’t be contingent, is that what you’re implying?
As I understand GR, they are in some senses aspects of the same thing. Figure and ground of each other. (Hard to talk about this stuff without math.) The terms “space and time” have no meaning without mass/energy, and vice versa.
David P says:
Monday, April 25, 2011 at 4:39pm
Mathematical equations for finite energy do not rely on the visible universe Ray. Come on now, you’re just paddling further out to sea here. And you haven’t addresses either of my thought experiements.
Yes I remember “dark force” in 2008. There are and will be anomalies for any theory. This is science. What did you expect? Certainty? No one is arguing that we are certain that the amount of energy in the universe is finite. It’s a matter of the best scientific explanation.
The anomaly you mention is not relevant to this discussion, unless you are just trying to make a more general point that science is fallible and that is obviously true.
David P says:
Monday, April 25, 2011 at 4:52pm
“Why is the finite amount relevant to its contingency, though? If the universe were infinite in scope, it wouldn’t be contingent, is that what you’re implying?”
A finite universe must be contingent. That’s what I’m saying.
Ray Ingles says:
Tuesday, April 26, 2011 at 10:44pm
Are you saying that’s a given, a postulate – or is it a consequence of an argument (and if so, which)?
David P says:
Tuesday, April 26, 2011 at 10:59pm
It’s called the cosmological argument Ray.
David says:
Wednesday, April 27, 2011 at 3:40am
Summary Time!
Here is a quick summary of what we discussed. I hope it will be clear to you that your responses were not sufficient to overcome the case I made against an actual infinity, and for a necessary being. I’m not saying I “know” any of this mind you, or that I’ve proved it. I’m just saying I made a good case for it. And when confronted with conflicting data, we should accept whichever one we can make the best case for. That’s all I’m saying here. Now for the play-by-play:
You started off the discussion by pointing out an obvious fact to Randal: that we lack practical experiences regarding the origins of the universe. And you went on to say that you don’t think intuition is up to the task of justifying any conclusions about it, based on historical evidence. (Of course, in the next sentence you were putting your own metaphysical intuitions at work by talking about causal chains and whether or not they terminate.) YOu then asked me an honest question:
How could anyone know that there is something with no cause? Why can’t we just say “what happened before that?” instead of “it must have started somehwere!”
I asked what you meant by “know” and you said you would accept anything more than a hunch. So in a sense, my task was not difficult. On my definition of “know,” I only need to show that the thesis is more plausible than its competitors.
I argued as follows:
1. There are good reasons to reject an actual infinite
1a. Thought experiments that expose the metaphysical absurdity of it
1b. The impossibility of arriving at an actual infinity by successive addition
1c. The impossibility of a present effect given an actually infinite series of preceding causes
2. There are good reasons to suppose that an uncaused cause must exist
2a. Argument from Contingency
2c. Kalam comsological argument
Objection 1:
You raised an objection to 2a aiming at the assumption that a collection of contingent members is itself contingent…perhaps it commits the part/whole fallacy).
I responded by explaining why I think the properties in question are legitimately transferrable from part to whole. I also pointed out that 2a can still stand on even if you’re correct, since the collection needn’t be the only thing that requires an explanation.
Objection 2:
You pointed out that 1b. assumed a dynamic theory of time. You also pointed out that the B series is more compatible with general relativity (GR), which enjoys experiemental support.
I pointed out that many philosophers who work in the philosophy of time believe this to be false, and I cited some material (Tooley, Smith, and Craig). I also pointed out that quantum mechanics (QM) is incompatible with GR.
Objection 2:
You asserted that the mass-energy we see shows not sign of every being created or destroyed. You then referred to the violation of the conservation laws as if this upheld your claim. And finally you said that a non-contingent universe “meets all the experimental criteria we can come up with.”
I refuted your use of laws within the universe to characterize properties of the universe. Also, as an obvious reductio, my left foot shows no signs of ever having been created or destroyed.
I added on another argument at this point:
3. The second law of thermodyn postulates that in a closed system, thing tend towards increasing disorder.
You responded by sayhing that given an infinite amount of time, spontaneous reversals of entropy will happen. Even very large ones.
This is special pleading. Even if true, it doesn’t even accomplish what you want it to. The possibility of sporatic, large-scale entropy reversals that are relevant to the observable universe would only undermine the claim that the universe has never experienced any such reversal. But we already know it’s a probabilitistic law. And we can even agree that given an infinite amount of time, any possibility will be actualized. Even so, your response fails.
Objection 4
You responded to one of the two thought experiments I gave in 1a by basically just hand waving the whole thing as an odd property. You attempted to support the legitimacy of this move by telling a story about how an apparent metaphysical contradiction was matched against a mathematical theory…and the mathematical theory won! Therefore…oh wait, what follows from this? Not a darn thing. I have a whole book full of mathematical theories that postulated ontological absurdities…and get this, they were WRONG. We can infer from this only two things: (a) it is possible for a metaphysical incoherency to be resolved and (b) it is possible for a mathematical theory (about the physical world) to be incorrect. As I pointed out, this is hardly relevant. But you agreed that infinities are counterintuitive, which I’m glad to see.
So it looks like some of my arguments were left untouched, while others were objected to but not completely refuted. I think you raised lots of interesting points, but in the end I just don’t see why you are persuaded to believe that an actually infinite universe (or whatever you want to call it) necessarily exists. I see much better evidence that points to a finite universe that began to exist, and which seems to demand a necessary being as an explanation. Let’s fizzle it down now…if you think I’ve misrepresented you feel free to speak up.
Ray Ingles says:
Friday, April 29, 2011 at 2:16am
I responded to both of your thought experiments, though one only implicitly – your successive fractions argument depends on successive addition, which the B series makes irrelevant.
As to ‘metaphysical absurdity’ (note: not ‘metaphysical incoherency’, you already conceded it’s logically consistent), my example does do a damn thing – it establishes that ‘metaphysical absurdity’ is hardly conclusive evidence against a proposition. At most it’s a measure of how counterintuitive something is.
Of course, as I’ve also pointed out, ‘counterintuitive’ is not a synonym for ‘false’.
I will grant that the B series of time is not mandated by what we know of relativity, but I will contend it’s by far the most natural interpretation. As to QM, it’s already consistent with B series in some senses (see: Feynman diagrams, where antimatter is equivalent to normal matter moving into the past) and then there’s these: http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0506027
http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn7535
Why wouldn’t those properties be transitive?
Not even close. Examining the DNA of your cells – which formed by division – would show a nice ‘family tree’ of gradually accumulating typos. Ask a doctor what your bones show about the nutritional environment you grew up in. That’s just off the top of my head.
Your foot is a collection of mass/energy – a pattern – and that pattern came into being a finite time ago by multiple lines of evidence. The mass-energy that makes up that pattern? Not so much.
Why not? The universe can have experienced any number of ‘heat deaths’ and spontaneous reversals thereof.
You mentioned the Kalam argument, but I’ve already disputed the certainty of the postulate ‘the universe began to exist’.
David says:
Friday, April 29, 2011 at 11:49am
1. There are good reasons to reject an actual infinite
1a. Thought experiments that expose the metaphysical absurdity of it
1b. The impossibility of arriving at an actual infinity by successive addition
1c. The impossibility of a present effect given an actually infinite series of preceding causes
“I responded to both of your thought experiments, though one only implicitly – your successive fractions argument depends on successive addition, which the B series makes irrelevant.”
You responded to one explicitly. You don’t understand the 1c if you think it depends on the B series.
“As to ‘metaphysical absurdity’ (note: not ‘metaphysical incoherency’, you already conceded it’s logically consistent), my example does do a damn thing – it establishes that ‘metaphysical absurdity’ is hardly conclusive evidence against a proposition. At most it’s a measure of how counterintuitive something is.”
Metaphysical incoherence is not the same as logical contradiction. The statement: “the ball has a shape but not a size” it no logically incoherent. It is however metaphysicall incoherent. A metaphysical absurdity can include an incoherence. It might also include things that we just find implausible. For instance” “the ball has a little elf inside it that makes it roll.”
Notice how you keep flipping back and forth between your standard of evidence. Knowledge…”more than a hunch”…conclusive evidence. Is it all fun and games for you Ray?
“Of course, as I’ve also pointed out, ‘counterintuitive’ is not a synonym for ‘false’.”
Sure, but I maintain that it is a synonym for “reason to put the burden of proof on the person denying it.”
Why wouldn’t those properties be transitive?
I’m not repeating myself here.
Not even close. Examining the DNA of your cells – which formed by division – would show a nice ‘family tree’ of gradually accumulating typos. Ask a doctor what your bones show about the nutritional environment you grew up in. That’s just off the top of my head.
You miss the point. My foot can show something but it can’t show signs of never being created or destroyed. That inference
must be taken from causal relations. Good luck making that inference with energy.
Why not? The universe can have experienced any number of ‘heat deaths’ and spontaneous reversals thereof.
I really think you should look into the difference between the words “probably” and “possibly”…this confusion has really plagued you during our discussion.
You mentioned the Kalam argument, but I’ve already disputed the certainty of the postulate ‘the universe began to exist’.
And again, you seem to think that removing “certainty” from any argument achieves something. Sure, if the argument is supposed to confer 100% probability on some proposition. But that isn’t the case here, yet you’ve constantly interacted with these arguments by saying “well that isn’t certain!” and “well it’s possible that something else could have happened!”
Ray Ingles says:
Friday, April 29, 2011 at 4:57pm
I kinda think you’re not really grappling with the B series, myself.
When dealing with areas outside our experience, we need conclusive evidence to have more than a hunch. Recall my list of things that were unexpected and counter-intuitive, yet still true? Round Earth, heliocentrism, continental drift, atomic theory, germ theory of disease, evolution, relativity, quantum mechanics… Frankly, in areas we can’t test and have no experience in, my money’s always on the answer being something we didn’t expect.
We don’t have experience with infinities. Crying “That’s absurd!” is meaningless until and unless we do.
Actually, you need the good luck. I can show evidence that your foot came into being. Can you show me evidence the mass-energy that makes it up did so?
When dealing with areas of cosmology far outside our experience… it’s enough to show that we only have hunches and expectations. However firm those expectations are, we don’t have evidence to back them up.
You can say, “I favor this particular hypothesis.” I can say, “That’s nice. Let me know when you test it.”
David says:
Saturday, April 30, 2011 at 12:02am
Actually, you need the good luck. I can show evidence that your foot came into being. Can you show me evidence the mass-energy that makes it up did so?
Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. And that’s your claim to shoulder anyways, since you first said that energy shows no signs of being created or destroyed. All the other natural objects we’ve observed are not uncreated. Statistical probability for my claim? 99.999999999999999999999999%
When dealing with areas of cosmology far outside our experience… it’s enough to show that we only have hunches and expectations. However firm those expectations are, we don’t have evidence to back them up.
I’d say the claim you are making about how we should justify claims “far outside our experience” is about the furthest claim from our experience I can think of. So unforunately, your claim falls on its own sword.
You can say, “I favor this particular hypothesis.” I can say, “That’s nice. Let me know when you test it.”
It is interesting to me that you believe in an actual infinity and yet you have such an empiricist mindset. I would have expected you to be a huge flaming rationalist with pictures of Spinoza in your living room, and cute little Penrose drink coasters.
Ray Ingles says:
Monday, May 2, 2011 at 1:07pm
Again, note: “all the other natural objects we’ve observed” are arrangements of mass-energy. They exist at a different ontological level than the mass-energy that makes them up. (Not unlike how the Mona Lisa is a particular arrangement of canvas and pigment.)
The arrangements have (more or less) definite starting points. But the mass-energy taking part in the arrangement? Not so much. We’ve never found any sign of that coming into existence or going away – and not for lack of looking. Indeed, the fact that that never happens is elevated to a law of physics at by now.
Ray Ingles says:
Monday, May 2, 2011 at 12:23am
Go back and look carefully. When exactly did I say I believed in an actual infinity?
What I’ve been pointing out is that it’s equally consistent with the evidence we have as a finite beginning. Until we have better evidence, some other approach to test things, the only sensible thing to do is say, “We don’t know… yet.”
David says:
Monday, May 2, 2011 at 2:05am
Ray,
During our lovely Ockham discussions, you said this:
I think even an infinite number of individually comprehensible universes is simpler than one infinite and omniscient creator that is ‘absolutely simple’ in a way that differs from how everything else is ‘simple’.
This implied to me that you at least preferred it as the best theory. Sorry for misunderstanding you.
Ray Ingles says:
Monday, May 2, 2011 at 12:57pm
Well, I can say, “I favor this hypothesis,” and you can say, “That’s nice. Let me know when you test it.”