Paul Manata is from Mars. I am from Venus
As I read through Paul Manata’s review of You’re not as Crazy as I Think two words continually sprung to mind: caricature and irony. To begin with, he accused me of caricaturing my opponents, ironic since I lampoon the very practice in others. But the irony is redoubled because Paul makes his case by ironically caricaturing, misunderstanding and misrepresenting the arguments I was presenting. So while I am grateful for his review like a farmer is for the rain, I also must say that like a torrential rain after an extended drought it was at best a mixed blessing.
Paul does have a few positive things to say about the book but he summarizes them with the classic damnation by faint praise as “rather commonsensical points….” In other words the most my book can offer is good old basic native intelligence. If that is the case then why not save the fifteen bucks, plant yourself behind the wood pile, and just think hard for an hour or two? Common sense. That was about it for the positives.
As for enumerating the problems, it is here that Paul clearly hits his stride with his “the glass is half-empty” approach to most everything I say.
To start off, Paul claims that I often appear to be “hypocritical”. Evidence? Well for starters, while I warn that crisis and warfare language is amenable to indoctrination, Paul finds a few cases where I use such language. For instance, I say the evangelical world is in a state of “crisis” regarding its credibility about truth. Sure, but warning that “crisis” language can be abused doesn’t mean it isn’t ever appropriate.
Paul also accuses me of setting up my own “binary opposites” (another thing I criticize in others):
“Rauser sets up binary opposites. Either you can be the sophisticated, tentative, complexity appreciating Christian, or you will be a simplistic, passion-driven, convinced truth-hinderer. It’s either Rauser’s road or the road of “Sol,” a Woody Allen character who would rather believe in God than truth (1-4).”
This is completely false. I explicitly argue that only Christ is fully truth, and thus a truthful person. The rest of us find ourselves on a continuum on a daily basis as more or less conformed to the discipline of truth (20). Later when I talk about “brainwashing” I point out that indoctrination is much subtler than we realize, that it can affect some dimensions of our thinking and not others, and that we are all affected adversely by the ubiquitous confirmation bias. So I have no idea how Paul could possibly claim I hold to a binary opposition. Take Paul himself. He clearly doesn’t think much of my argument, but he is also nowhere near the character of Sol.
Here’s another excerpt where Paul claims that I caricature my opponents even as he does that very thing to the argument in question:
“For example, the people he [that is, Randal] wants to critique—evangelicals—are ‘taken in by the notion that a truthful person is simply one who exudes passion, conviction, and simplicity’ (27, emphasis mine). But who thinks like this?”
First off, let’s understand what I’m saying here. I’m saying that when people are looking for trusted authorities, they often gravitate to the loudest voices that express the simplest views with the most intensity. Who thinks like this? What kind of question is that? This is a pervasive problem in contemporary society. Here’s one vivid example: Rewind to the 2004 presidential campaign and get in your mind’s eye legions of Republicans caricaturing John Kerry’s complex foreign policy decisions by holding sandals in the air and chanting “Flip flop!” (Incidentally, as I note in the book, political lefties are just as likely to caricature their conservative rivals.)
Next Paul observes that “Rauser complains that the evangelicals often buy into urban legends.” But then he suggests I have bought into an urban legend myself. Why?
“He tells a story of a missionary he knows who needed money, he was three hundred dollars short. Just when the missionary was about to give up, the missionary received a call from someone who ‘felt God laying on his heart the need to support him . . . at three hundred dollars a month.’ Apparently, nobody but the missionary’s wife knew of the need. These LAMPs happen all the time according to Rauser. But why isn’t this an urban legend? Because Rauser knows the guy?”
Yes actually that is correct: because I know him. It isn’t just “a friend of a friend” (the classic hallmark of an urban legend). That missionary was William Lane Craig (yes, he was briefly a missionary working in Europe in the late eighties). To be sure, this true and documented account could grow into an urban legend (as all sorts of things can). But I’m not guilty of any inconsistency here. I would never use an urban legend. Now let’s get to the real question: why is Paul so anxious to attempt to “nail” me on an inconsistency? Why doesn’t he instead lament with me the tragic ubiquity of urban legends among evangelicals? This type of analysis makes Paul look like a real contrarian. (Of course he’ll disagree with that.)
Paul then comments on “Ted”, an average (albeit fictional) evangelical that I repeatedly use as an example to make points. Talk about caricatures! I find Paul’s description of Ted to be inexplicably hostile and distorted, and also completely dependent on his own subjective response to the character:
“Perhaps the most egregious caricature is Rauser’s “Ted.” Ted is supposed to be a benchmark of evangelicals. The paradigmatic evangelical. He is introduced to us as pretty normal, and level-headed. Throughout the book, though, Ted is a ridiculous, loud, obnoxious, wasteful American evangelical. He is emotional rather than thoughtful, drives a gas guzzling SUV, mocks the liberals at the church down the street like some kind of Neanderthal. He’s an angry, small-minded, bigoted, rash, and arrogant man. It begins to look as if Ted is just fodder for Rauser’s war with those wasteful, environmentally inconsiderate, doctrinally dogmatic, consumerist American Christians he so often takes issue with on his blog.”
Ted is based on my own life in the past, the way I’ve marginalized others, as well as the same tendency I’ve seen among other evangelicals. I find him to be a sympathetic character. Paul suggests I make him a “Neanderthal”. I would ask the reader to draw his or her own conclusions.
At this point Paul attempts to mount a clever attempt to paint me into a corner.
“Rauser’s argument also implies that all atheists and other non-Christians are not truthful persons. If being a truthful person is to be made into the image of Christ, and if this is only done by the Holy Spirit to those who have been justified, then no atheists, Hindus, etc., will be so conformed. But this has the implication of viewing those we disagree with has not possessing characters conformed to the truth. They are not truthful persons, for “we become truthful persons only insofar as we conform to Christ” (20, emphasis mine). But this turns Rauser into the kind of person he rails against. One who paints the opposition as having some deep and serious character flaw. How will the atheists and other non-Christians Rauser seeks to appeal to feel being told they are not and cannot be (unless they see things Rauser’s way) be people of truth? Or, will Rauser say that atheists &c. can be “conformed to the image of Christ?”
Paul’s analysis utterly fails because he begins by assuming something I don’t: namely that a person can only be objective and truthful if they have been justified and have the Spirit dwelling within them. I emphatically reject this notion. I write “an entity can be more or less true, depending on how well it matches up to the standard of perfection for the type of thing that it is.” (20) And the fact is that there are many people who, in the disciplines of the mind, are closer to the truth than others who have been justified and in whom God’s Spirit dwells. Oh irony of ironies! This “dilemma” only obtains if you accept Paul’s binary opposition to begin with. (To see how fine this line can be, consider the difficulty between distinguishing a pre-conversion “talent” from a post-conversion” gift”.)
Paul doesn’t like what I say about liberal Christians in chapter seven. Apparently this chapter was doomed from the start. The first red flag is that Paul continues to refer to “liberals” as a separate category of suspect Christians over-against Paul and his contingent. But the very first burden of the chapter was to demonstrate that “liberal” is a relative term. For example, there are Christians out there (albeit I suspect not many) who would consider Paul himself hopelessly liberal. So does that mean Paul is a heretic?
Paul also obsesses about the fact that I point out many people more liberal than him are sincere. So what? He wonders. You can be sincerely wrong! Yeah, yeah, we know that. But this observation brings us back to the core thesis that people might hold a particular view of a doctrine not out of sinful rebellion or ignorance but rather because it makes the most sense in light of where they’re at. And that is not a common idea. I assume Paul is well read in church history so he must be familiar with the degree to which the opinions of those who have dissented from the orthodoxy of a particular time and place have typically been marginalized as being linked to a sinful character straight back to the first legendary heresiarch Simon Magus.
In closing I’ll simply note that Paul’s characterization of the main argument of the liberal Christian chapter evinces a terrible misreading. He writes that the argument of my chapter
“is whether not all liberals are heretics, not whether all liberals are “honest people.” They can be as honest and convinced against the great truths of Christianity as is possible, they’re still not Christians if they deny the resurrection. Indeed, they’re heretics. For Rauser, it appears you can deny all the tenants of Christianity, except maybe belief in some kind of being we call God, and still be a Christian!”
This is an infuriatingly false claim. The title of the chapter is “Not all liberal Christians are heretics.” So what is a liberal? As I noted above, “liberal” is a relative term so the argument minimally means that people should not be discounted as heretics merely because they’re more liberal (or conservative!) than you. And that means that you need to listen to and try to understand those of a more liberal (and conservative) bent than you.
I never argued in the chapter that Marcus Borg, the denier of the resurrection, is an orthodox Christian (although I did present an intriguing scenario based on Paul Maier’s book A Skeleton in God’s Closet which Paul ignored). What I did argue was that we can see how a person could deny the doctrine of the resurrection for reasons other than wickedness or ignorance of the evidence. We may still choose to excommunicate such a person from Christian fellowship, but that is another issue entirely.
Nor did I argue that Christianity is mere moralism. Here’s what I actually said. First, I quoted J. Gresham Machen:
“It is said, Christianity is a life, not a doctrine. The assertion is often made, and it has an appearance of godliness. But it is radically false….”
I then commented:
“Perhaps Machen is correct, but it seems to me that the liberal view that places the deeper roots of Christian identity in ethical action at least deserves a closer look.” (136, emphasis added)
So I didn’t argue that the “liberal” view is correct. Machen, as I said, may be right. I simply presented a case for why those who take the “liberal” view are not necessarily evil or ignorant for doing so. The point of the chapter – and the book – is not to sell a particular theological agenda (e.g. one more liberal than that accepted by Paul Manata). Rather, it is to remove the roadblocks that keep us from hearing, and learning from, others.
Why is it that Paul, who is so wonderfully adept at splitting the most minute hairs, appears to be incapable of grasping some of the book’s central arguments? I don’t know, but it is difficult not to see some of the very problems I lament and seek to combat in his deeply skewed analysis of the book.
Having said all this, let me close on a positive note. First, the worst fate for a book is not that it be reviled (or mistrusted, or placed on an index of forbidden books) but that it be ignored. Paul has done a real service to me in engaging so fully with the book. Second, I don’t take this kind of critique personally. In my limited engagement with Paul in the last couple months I have found him to be very polite and intelligent, and I thank him for the attention he has given my little book, even if it is not half as crazy as he thinks.
Tags: Paul Manata, You're not as crazy as I think145 Comments
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[...] review of my review of his book is up and I am often faulted in it for not mentioning this or that part [...]

Truth Unites... and Divides says:
Friday, March 11, 2011 at 8:25pm
Greetings Randal,
Do you think you might be aiding-and-abetting or enabling a Neo-Liberal Stealth Offensive that Phil Johnson warns about?
randal says:
Friday, March 11, 2011 at 8:35pm
Good question. I could be! In certain of my arguments I could be wrong and I may lead people astray. But before you get too excited, that’s an admission that needs to be made by every fallible human author.
I do detect some worrisome trends in Mr. Johnson’s analysis however. For instance, as I have already made clear, I don’t accept the over-simplified “liberal vs. conservative [or correct]” dichotomy that undergirds his warnings. Moreover, while there certainly are “liberals” who “despise” one or another doctrine, as a general characterization this smacks of the worrisome “liberals are evil” analysis that I reject.
Finally, while transformation of the gospel is a real danger, Mr. Johnson doesn’t seem to recognize the equal danger in being a transliterator of the gospel. The irony is that somebody on the “conservative” end who merely wishes to maintain “the way things have always been done” may equally be the one who transforms the gospel.
Truth Unites... and Divides says:
Friday, March 11, 2011 at 8:54pm
Me: “Do you think you might be aiding-and-abetting or enabling a Neo-Liberal Stealth Offensive that Phil Johnson warns about?”
Randal: “Good question. I could be! In certain of my arguments I could be wrong and I may lead people astray.”
I knew it! I just knew it! Confession, Randal, is good for the soul. Feel the blessings of confession and the blessings of repentance, Randal!
“But before you get too excited, that’s an admission that needs to be made by every fallible human author.”
No, no, no, NO! Don’t even try to take away what you’ve just conceded. That’s, that’s, that’s … just wrong!
You’re a confessed enabler of the Neo-Liberal Stealth Offensive. PERIOD. Full stop. Case closed. A hearty yell of “Next!”
“The irony is that somebody on the “conservative” end who merely wishes to maintain “the way things have always been done” may equally be the one who transforms the gospel.”
What about this passage from the Book of Jude then to rebut your claim?
“Dear friends, although I was very eager to write to you about the salvation we share, I felt compelled to write and urge you to contend for the faith that was once for all entrusted to God’s holy people.
For certain individuals whose condemnation was written about long ago have secretly slipped in among you. They are ungodly people, who pervert the grace of our God into a license for immorality and deny Jesus Christ our only Sovereign and Lord.”
Phil Johnson’s warnings mesh with Jude’s, and *not* with your idea of him being a “transliterator” who equally transforms the Gospel.
James Palmer says:
Friday, March 11, 2011 at 8:57pm
“They are ungodly people, who pervert the grace of our God into a license for immorality and deny Jesus Christ our only Sovereign and Lord.”
I see this happen equally all through the “conservative-liberal spectrum.” I don’t see how it’s related.
Truth Unites... and Divides says:
Friday, March 11, 2011 at 9:01pm
I don’t.
It’s much more heavily weighted on the Liberal Protestantism and Liberal Emerger side of the spectrum.
It’s observable and documented.
James Palmer says:
Friday, March 11, 2011 at 9:04pm
Well, on the more conservative side, I have very often seen Paul and/or the Bible held up as more sovereign than Jesus.
I have also many times seen the “sinners prayer” given as the only thing necessary to be a Christian, and repentance (i.e. morality) is hardly brought into it at all.
These are things that fit the description in Jude, but I find virtually only in conservative evangelical churches.
I’m not denying that you will find other issues in liberal churches… just saying that if you’re not seeing it all over the spectrum, then you are not looking, or you’re blinded to it somehow.
randal says:
Friday, March 11, 2011 at 9:03pm
I enjoyed reading a biography of Claudette Colvin last fall, a book that chronicled her stand for civil rights by refusing to give up her bus seat 9 months before Rosa Parks. And Claudette was only 15 at the time! What a hero of the civil rights movement. At that time the Christians from the north who were fighting the demonic evils of segregation were the “liberals” who were perverting the gospel while the conservatives in the south were “right” even though they were the ones actually defending a truly demonic form of oppression.
randal says:
Friday, March 11, 2011 at 8:57pm
Truth, Christians have worked to understand that “faith once for all entrusted” for the last two thousand years. Studying that history is called “historical theology”. Of course if you’re convinced that you could not possibly be wrong about anything then I suppose there’s nothing left to discuss.
Truth Unites... and Divides says:
Friday, March 11, 2011 at 9:02pm
“Of course if you’re convinced that you could not possibly be wrong about anything then I suppose there’s nothing left to discuss.”
An example of a caricature that Paul Manata charges you with making in your book.
Simply further evidence of his charges.
randal says:
Friday, March 11, 2011 at 9:05pm
Truth, when I said every human author could be wrong (including the conservative ones!) you replied “No, no, no, NO! Don’t even try to take away what you’ve just conceded. That’s, that’s, that’s … just wrong!”
How should I understand that??
Truth Unites... and Divides says:
Friday, March 11, 2011 at 9:10pm
To express in a humorous way the following:
After you’ve confessed to being an enabler to the Neo-Liberal Stealth Offensive as Phil Johnson writes about, there’s no need to dilute your confession.
James Palmer says:
Friday, March 11, 2011 at 8:37pm
While I haven’t read Randal’s book, from what I can tell, it would encourage someone who was in one of those “theologically liberal” churches to look at conservatives and not dismiss their views but to engage with them honestly. Would you consider that a bad thing? I don’t see it as aiding any sort of conspiracy.
randal says:
Friday, March 11, 2011 at 8:40pm
Indeed. Let me add that I wrote the book for evangelicals — my community — and since the people they tend to marginalize are on “the left” defending those people was part of the theme. But anybody who reads the book carefully would certainly apply those same principles in the other direction.
PM says:
Friday, March 11, 2011 at 8:34pm
Dr. Rauser, thanks, I’ll respond at my place. I think your counter was wide of the mark and I’ll try to establish that. I’m grateful to see that you don’t bring up any serious, substantial flaw in my review. Lastly, I may be from Mars, but I’m not as crazy as you think!
randal says:
Friday, March 11, 2011 at 8:42pm
Yes, no substantial flaws, except that you consistently misunderstand and/or misrepresent my arguments with churlish red herrings. And since it is happy face emoticon day
.
PM says:
Friday, March 11, 2011 at 9:03pm
Dr. Rauser, this is interesting, because your take on my review is my take on your review of my review
randal says:
Friday, March 11, 2011 at 9:05pm
My head is spinning…
Truth Unites... and Divides says:
Friday, March 11, 2011 at 9:17pm
Paul Manata is from Mars. I am from Venus.
Then what planet is Steve Hays from?
He wrote a post rebutting Randal’s remarks titled:
Hunting Heresy Hunters
James Palmer says:
Friday, March 11, 2011 at 9:33pm
I don’t understand how he could have a problem with what Randal said in his blog. If he’s a Calvinist, doesn’t he believe that God ordained Randal to say all those things for His glory?
David Parker says:
Saturday, March 12, 2011 at 9:21pm
(Moving the comment back out a bit to reduce clutter).
“Um, sure I can. I just did! If God ordains all he does, then what he does and what God ordains clearly have a large amount of overlap. Can you explain why this overlap does not exist?”
I should have clarified that you can’t if you want to be seriously engage this topic.
What God has ordained, and what is best for Randal to do, are distinct. One is an objective fact about what will happen. The other is a subjective fact that is indexed to Randal’s background knowledge and reasoning capabilities.
“I just don’t understand why people would complain about what a perfect, loving God has ordained to happen. If someone believes that Randal writing his blog was the best possible thing for him to do, then why tell him that he shouldn’t have done it?”
I’ll take one more shot at it for you.
The best possible thing for Randal to do…epistemically…depends on his background beliefs and reasoning capabilities. The best thing for God to ordain Randal to do…epistemically…depends on what configuration of events works together for the greatest good.
Randal has already pointed out that there may be multiple best things for Randal to be doing that would accomplish God’s ordaining purposes. So, do you still not see why we should tell him that he shouldn’t have done it (if there were a legit reason to tell him that)?
God’s ordained purposes don’t always intersect with what is best for Randal to do. But what Randal does always interects with God’s ordained purposes.
Just read the previous sentence a few times..maybe it will sink in.
James Palmer says:
Saturday, March 12, 2011 at 10:07pm
I understand what you mean by the difference between “Randal did it” and “God ordained it”, but I don’t see how that difference is relevant.
“The best possible thing for Randal to do…epistemically…depends on his background beliefs and reasoning capabilities. The best thing for God to ordain Randal to do…epistemically…depends on what configuration of events works together for the greatest good.”
No, this can’t really be true. I can see that it may *appear* to us that the best thing for Randal to do depends on his background beliefs and reasoning capabilities, but wouldn’t you agree that God knows what is the best thing for Randal to do? And if God is ordaining him to do that best thing, then I don’t see how Randal’s background knowledge and reasoning abilities matter – do we not want the best thing, as defined by God, to occur, as opposed to the best thing, defined by Randal (or any other human)?
If that’s the case, why should we be telling Randal that he should have done something else, based on our own limited understanding, when we know that God has a larger understanding and ordained Randal to do just the right thing based on that greater understanding?
And how can it even make sense to say that someone “should have” done anything different at all, when they were going to do was set in stone since the beginning of time by God? We would be expressing wishes that would simultaneously have been impossible, and would be for something that could not possibly be better in the grand scheme of things.
randal says:
Friday, March 11, 2011 at 9:41pm
Somewhere beyond the Kuiper belt perhaps…
PM says:
Friday, March 11, 2011 at 10:14pm
James, you clearly misunderstand Calvinism or what it entails. There’s a fallacy called the fallacy of composition, even if the ultimate end of all things is for God’s glory and all things work for good, that doesn’t imply that each individual thing is good or desired.
James Palmer says:
Saturday, March 12, 2011 at 2:12am
Thanks for the clarification, PM.
Perhaps you can clarify further – are you saying that God ordains things that are not good or desirable, or that God does not ordain all things?
David says:
Saturday, March 12, 2011 at 4:06am
James,
I think PM would affirm the latter, though “desire” would need to be fleshed out.
David says:
Saturday, March 12, 2011 at 4:08am
Haha, wow I put my foot in my mouth there. I meant to say former…ie, that “God ordains things that are not good or desirable.”
Maybe I shouldn’t comment on blogs after downing several brown ales.
The Atheist Missionary says:
Friday, March 11, 2011 at 11:22pm
Randal, thanks for adding the share icons. Very slick.
PM says:
Saturday, March 12, 2011 at 4:05am
James,
God ordains all things, and all things work together for good. This does not entail that each individual thing is good or desired by God considered in itself. These two propositions are consistent:
[1] God ordains a murder for a greater good.
[2] The murder itself is not a good.
James Palmer says:
Saturday, March 12, 2011 at 6:33am
PM,
It seems you’re agreeing with my assessment of the Calvinist belief, that God ordained Randal write his blogs for His glory, even if, the blogs themselves, are possibly not good or desirable in themselves.
Thanks for the education on Calvinism though – it was most enlightening.
PM says:
Saturday, March 12, 2011 at 1:31pm
James, perhaps you forgot what you said, let me remind you:
“problem with what Randal said in his blog. If he’s a Calvinist, doesn’t he believe that God ordained Randal to say all those things for His glory?”
So, it entirely consistent to “have a problem with what Randal said” and also agree that it was ordained as a part in the entire plan that is for God’s glory.
James Palmer says:
Saturday, March 12, 2011 at 2:32pm
So was there a better thing for God to ordain Randal to have done with that time than to write that post?
David says:
Saturday, March 12, 2011 at 2:59pm
“So was there a better thing for God to ordain Randal to have done with that time than to write that post?”
Better in what sense? If only better in the isolated sense, sure. God could have ordained that Randal go on a mission trip to Rwanda. But if better in the overall sense, we have no idea. How could anyone know how each individual piece lines up for the greater good, or how moving any single one would affect it.
randal says:
Saturday, March 12, 2011 at 3:14pm
Rather than assume that for every action there are only better and worse actions (i.e. those which produce more or less good) we can assume that there are also many possible actions which would produce the same amount of good. Thus Randal blogging and Randal going on a mission trip to Rwanda and Randal working the drive thru at the Tastee Freeze ice cream shop could all produce the same amount of good which would make God’s choice of which to actualize a matter of indifference.
James Palmer says:
Saturday, March 12, 2011 at 3:31pm
“But if better in the overall sense, we have no idea.”
According to Calvinism, don’t all events *have* to be the best, as God is perfect and ordained them? As Randal has mentioned, perhaps there are other possibilities that are “tied” for being the best, but if there really is something better in the overall sense, why didn’t God ordain those things to happen instead?
David says:
Saturday, March 12, 2011 at 3:48pm
That seems right. But then, your question to PM becomes moot.
Many take comfort in the fact that, despite current suffering, all things work together for the good. This needn’t require that we should find ever individual thing to be good. To the contrary, as Randal has pointed out, there may be other wooden spoons in the drawer. Instead of stubbing my toe, I could have won the lottery. The same maximal good might have resulted in the end. But, like I was saying, who the heck knows? So you say damn when you stub your toe. And you say thanks when you win the lottery.
David says:
Saturday, March 12, 2011 at 3:57pm
Since we’re on the same page now I’ll just answer the question.
“So was there a better thing for God to ordain Randal to have done with that time than to write that post?”
No.
James Palmer says:
Saturday, March 12, 2011 at 6:21pm
Well really that is my point. We now seem to agree that according to Calvinism, Randal writing that post was the best thing for him to do with his time and energy. If it wasn’t the best thing for him to do, God would have ordained him to do something else instead.
David Parker says:
Saturday, March 12, 2011 at 6:38pm
“Well really that is my point. We now seem to agree that according to Calvinism, Randal writing that post was the best thing for him to do with his time and energy. If it wasn’t the best thing for him to do, God would have ordained him to do something else instead.”
False. You can’t conflate best with respect to “for him to do” and “for God to ordain.”
Secondly, what follows from this even granting it?
James Palmer says:
Saturday, March 12, 2011 at 8:27pm
“False. You can’t conflate best with respect to “for him to do” and “for God to ordain.””
Um, sure I can. I just did! If God ordains all he does, then what he does and what God ordains clearly have a large amount of overlap. Can you explain why this overlap does not exist?
“Secondly, what follows from this even granting it?”
I just don’t understand why people would complain about what a perfect, loving God has ordained to happen. If someone believes that Randal writing his blog was the best possible thing for him to do, then why tell him that he shouldn’t have done it?
David says:
Saturday, March 12, 2011 at 11:23pm
“I understand what you mean by the difference between “Randal did it” and “God ordained it”, but I don’t see how that difference is relevant.”
I just explained that “Randal did it” and “God ordained it” are not different (so far as descriptions of Randal’s doings go). I said that “the best thing for Randal to do” and “the best thing for God to ordain Randal to do” are different.
The reason that is relevant is because you had just stated that you couldn’t understand why people would complain about what God ordained. You said that if someone believes that blogging is the best thing for Randal to do, then why tell him that he shouldn’t have done it?
My response (and this comment as well) point out the distinctions between “the best thing for Randal to do” and “the best thing for God to ordain Randal to do.”
You say that you understand the distinction, but don’t see the relevance.
Again…the relevance is that you “couldn’t understand” because you were applying a defective set of assumptions about the scenario.
“No, this can’t really be true. I can see that it may *appear* to us that the best thing for Randal to do depends on his background beliefs and reasoning capabilities, but wouldn’t you agree that God knows what is the best thing for Randal to do? And if God is ordaining him to do that best thing, then I don’t see how Randal’s background knowledge and reasoning abilities matter – do we not want the best thing, as defined by God, to occur, as opposed to the best thing, defined by Randal (or any other human)?”
Now you have completely removed Randal from the equation. It no longer matters why Randal chose to do x. It only matters that x was in accords with God’s ordaining will. This isn’t what compatibilism holds.
“If that’s the case, why should we be telling Randal that he should have done something else, based on our own limited understanding, when we know that God has a larger understanding and ordained Randal to do just the right thing based on that greater understanding?”
One answer, which has been given at least 5 times now but you are ignorning it: there are multiple things that Randal could have done that would satisfy God’s ordaining purposes.
Another answer, what one should do (in your scenario) is a statement about practicality…what is the most practical use of Randal’s time. But let’s think about morality. God says that we shouldn’t commit murder. Does it follow then that if someone murders someone, we shalln’t say “you shouldn’t have!” because it so happened that this act was part of God’s plan to achieve a greater good? This would entail that any thing that happens is morally good since it happens to be part of the overall plan of achieving God’s goods. Do you see how this is incorrect?
“And how can it even make sense to say that someone “should have” done anything different at all, when they were going to do was set in stone since the beginning of time by God? ”
Because “thou shalt not commit murder” is a statement about actions contradict God’s moral nature. It is not a statement about what we actually won’t do. As in “you shall not leave this house in that skirt young lady.” God’s moral nature is what it is.
James Palmer says:
Sunday, March 13, 2011 at 12:06am
“Now you have completely removed Randal from the equation.”
This is part of my point. PM stated that God ordains people’s actions, but they are responsible for their desires. When I asked if God ordained their desires, PM stated yes, but those desires “arise through us, in virtue of our cognitive meachanism.” I’m confident if I asked PM if God ordained the cognitive mechanism and everything it does, he would say yes. Perhaps he would add yet another layer, but would admit that God ordained that too. It ends up being God all the way down and it devolves into some kind of twisted version of pantheism.
“This isn’t what compatibilism holds.”
As I mentioned, I reject compatibilism. If your argument relies on it, then we’re probably at a stalemate then (pending, I suppose, the conclusion of the compatibilism discussion going on here.
)
“One answer, which has been given at least 5 times now but you are ignorning it: there are multiple things that Randal could have done that would satisfy God’s ordaining purposes.”
I didn’t ignore it. I explicitly referred to it and explained why I didn’t believe it was relevant to this discussion.
“God says that we shouldn’t commit murder. Does it follow then that if someone murders someone, we shalln’t say “you shouldn’t have!” because it so happened that this act was part of God’s plan to achieve a greater good? This would entail that any thing that happens is morally good since it happens to be part of the overall plan of achieving God’s goods. Do you see how this is incorrect?”
Yes, thank you! That was my point.
“Because “thou shalt not commit murder” is a statement about actions contradict God’s moral nature. It is not a statement about what we actually won’t do. As in “you shall not leave this house in that skirt young lady.” God’s moral nature is what it is.”
True, but according to Calvinism, everything that has happened in the past, including rape, murder, etc. is “all for the best”. If it truly is “all for the best”, why should we wish it to have been different, when being different would, at best, be the same good, but quite possible, mean that things (from God’s point of view) would be much worse.
We could say, for instance, that Randal was morally wrong for writing his blog, but to say “he shouldn’t have done it”, is to say we know more than God does about what is for the best, overall. Perhaps that is where I have been erring in my argument… that “shouldn’t have done it” and “did something morally wrong” appear, from what I can tell, to be two different things from the Calvinist view-point.
David says:
Sunday, March 13, 2011 at 12:38am
“It ends up being God all the way down and it devolves into some kind of twisted version of pantheism.”
I think you should just go read some articles about compatibilism. You probably could confuse yourself out of confusion, but it isn’t likely to work.
Compatibilism just is the thesis that God ordains all that happens and also we are morally responsible for our actions.
You can’t argue against it by continually saying, “but God ordained that, how could they be responsible!?!?!” or “but God ordained it, how could you wish they had done different?!?!”
Yes, you are frustrated because you don’t see how compatibilism works. I have shared your frustration (and continue to do some to some degree). These words we use are hopeless imprecise, and until you get a good philosophical grounding in agency, volition, causality, etc….we are really just playing games. Seriously. You aren’t going to solve this any other way than reading about it. Or just stick with with whatever view you have now. It doesn’t matter right…God ordained it!
“I didn’t ignore it. I explicitly referred to it and explained why I didn’t believe it was relevant to this discussion.”
I haven’t seen any explicit reference, but I might have missed it. Apologies. Feel free to point it out.
“True, but according to Calvinism, everything that has happened in the past, including rape, murder, etc. is “all for the best”. If it truly is “all for the best”, why should we wish it to have been different, when being different would, at best, be the same good, but quite possible, mean that things (from God’s point of view) would be much worse.”
I’d just like to point out that you’re doing the “but God ordained it” thing again. Yes, we all agree that Calvinism entails that.
But saying someone shouldn’t murder is equivalent to saying that murder doesn’t accord with God’s nature.
Picture this: a vehicle has a brick shoved on top of the gas pedal so that it flies down an interstate (somehow keeping in line) at 130mph. It is still correct to say that the vehicle is breaking the speed limit.
No one disagrees over that part (but you appear to belabor the confusion you have here). Where the disagreement lies is whether or not someone should be punished for driving their car at 130mph (by their own choice) even though it turns out that the engine was actually determined to go 130mph regardless of what they chose. But they still chose. (And let me just stop you…it doesn’t do any good to say, “aha but God ordained that choice!”…yeah…got it. He did. That’s what Calvinism entails. Yup.
“Perhaps that is where I have been erring in my argument… that “shouldn’t have done it” and “did something morally wrong” appear, from what I can tell, to be two different things from the Calvinist view-point.”
I think we just haven’t come to terms with what the words point to. Like I said…it takes more philosophical precision to really cut into these things. This kind of language literally won’t cut it.
James Palmer says:
Sunday, March 13, 2011 at 12:47am
“But they still chose. (And let me just stop you…it doesn’t do any good to say, “aha but God ordained that choice!”…yeah…got it. He did. That’s what Calvinism entails. Yup.
”
Thanks David. I think you have done well to point out the crux of the issue. What you say here (that “It was the person’s choice and they are responsible for it” and “God made the person choose it” are two compatible statements) is as intuitively wrong to me as 2 + 2 being equal to 5.
I have yet to hear a convincing argument as to why this is true – I mostly just get “Yup” and “I don’t see a problem with that.” So I suppose I am left confused as to why something that seems so clearly and intuitively wrong to me is clearly and intuitively right to others.
So I will look at some of those articles and see if they speak more of this.
Thanks for the discussion!
David says:
Sunday, March 13, 2011 at 12:22am
“As I mentioned, I reject compatibilism.”
Of course you do, but you can’t argue against it by pointing out flaws in a straw man.
Go read the articles James.
James Palmer says:
Sunday, March 13, 2011 at 12:28am
My apologies, David. I didn’t scroll down on that page you sent me, and I didn’t realize there was more than just the definition there, but links to other articles.
I don’t believe I made a straw man attack though – It seems to me I have pointed out what (occur to me) to be fundamental flaws to the idea of compatibilism.
But I will check out those articles, and see if they are addressed there. Thanks.
I should point out, that with my slightly clarified argument at the end of the last post, that I don’t believe whether compatibilism is true or not is relevant to my point.
The Atheist Missionary says:
Saturday, March 12, 2011 at 11:25am
These two propositions are consistent:
[1] God ordains [infant rape] for a greater good.
[2] The [infant rape] itself is not a good.
It’s this kind of reasoning that makes religion scare the hell out of me.
PM says:
Saturday, March 12, 2011 at 1:36pm
TAM, I appreciate your emotional reasons against religion, but are there rational ones? It seems you’re suggesting [1] is defeated by something like this:
[D1] There is no possible good reason an infinitely wise, all-good, and all-knowing being could have for ordaining the [horrible] rape of an infant for a greater good.
How would you go about arguing for [D1]? I mean, how much would one have to know to know a thing like that (nevermind the theses about your finitude, the fall affecting your noetic equipment, that you’re literally less than an infant compared to God (in terms of knowledge, etc), that you dislike God and so are ripe for things like confirmation bias, etc.
randal says:
Saturday, March 12, 2011 at 3:07pm
Two comments:
First, emotion is not necessarily contrary to reason. We all reason morally and we do so based ultimately on moral intuitions or moral perception. This intuition / perception is not infallible but it is a fully rational starting point. I accept a doctrine of meticulous providence and by implication I am committed to the consistency of a moral horror occurring in accord with the will of a maximally powerful and good moral agent. But that doesn’t mean the person who dissents from this based on their moral perception / intuition is reasoning based solely on emotion.
Second, a person could argue that not-D1 is an unreasonably high demand. Let’s say that Billy believes the world was created eight years ago on his birthday. We demur. And Billy replies with D2 “There is no possible way that an infinitely wise, all-good, and all-knowing being could have for ordaining the creation of the world on the day of Billy’s birth.” How, Billy asks us, can we argue not-D2? I don’t know that we can. But that hardly means we’ll consider his thesis seriously.
PM says:
Saturday, March 12, 2011 at 3:24pm
Which is why I asked if there were also rational reasons.
Second, that may be a high demand in the abstract, but not in the context of the debate on the problem of evil. Moreover, I gave reasons for thinking that the good reasons TAM thinks he has access to are no where near close the total amount of God-justifying reasons there are. What justifies that assumption? TAM seemed to be saying that there’s no possible justification one could have for ordaining [1], does he want to clarify that he doesn’t believe that. Next, the Bible tells us that God works all things together for good. I have a reason to believe it. What reason could Billy have for believing the very early earth thesis? I could also argue against D2 if Billy is a Christian theist. It destroys Christianity: no Jesus, no perfect life, no death, no resurrection . . . uh-oh, now I’m getting into my response to your review!
randal says:
Saturday, March 12, 2011 at 3:38pm
“Which is why I asked if there were also rational reasons.”
But I’m saying an emotional response can be a fully rational response.
Now you ask Billy about the reasons for his belief. Are you saying that there is a similar evidential burden on the Christian to provide reasons for their belief in meticulous providence?
PM says:
Saturday, March 12, 2011 at 8:44pm
Being “frightened” of something isn’t a rational reason to think it’s untrue. Are you disagreeing with this?
I brought up a lot issues that show disparity between the Billy case and mine. I don’t think there’s any similarity, and I don’t think it’s warranted in the basic way Christian theism is, so denying that one need evidential support for all their beliefs to be warranted isn’t to say Billy’s belief doesn’t. Moreover, as you may know, there is an internalist character to Plantinganian or externalist theories of warrant, such as the no-defeater condition. I raised defeaters for Bill’s view. If someone does that to my view, I think it’s appropriate and sometimes necessary to defeat the defeaters. But anyway, I don’t think there’s much parity between what I said and your Billy-defeater.
The Atheist Missionary says:
Saturday, March 12, 2011 at 7:25pm
PM wrotes: the Bible tells us that God works all things together for good. PM, have you ever considered the possibility that your Bible is a crock of sh*t? Have you ever considered that there simply is no justification for kids getting raped or babies getting snatched out of the arms of their mothers by tsunamis? Simply put, have you ever considered that the problem of evil is the ultimate disproof of an all-loving god?
PM says:
Saturday, March 12, 2011 at 8:45pm
Have you considered that that’s not a rational response to the issues I raised? Look, if you’re gonna curse and rant and rave and dogmatically assert, I don’t have time for that. it’s like talking to an atheist version of an Appalachian Mountain fundy.
The Atheist Missionary says:
Saturday, March 12, 2011 at 7:21pm
PM, the day I cease to use my human emotions when I rationalize will be the day I cease to be human.
PM says:
Saturday, March 12, 2011 at 8:34pm
I didn’t say you couldn’t use your emotions . . .
Walter says:
Saturday, March 12, 2011 at 12:29pm
One of the great things about Calvinism is that we are all doing the will of God, no matter what we do or believe. Richard Dawkins and the Pope are doing the will of God as much as John Piper is.
James Palmer says:
Saturday, March 12, 2011 at 2:34pm
Yes Walter.
I find the only way to ensure I’m following God’s will is to reject Calvinism. If Calvinism is true, I’m doing God’s will because He has ordained me to reject Calvinism. If Calvinism is false, then I’m doing God’s will by rejecting a false theology.
It seems to be my only logical choice in the matter.
randal says:
Saturday, March 12, 2011 at 3:10pm
If one accepts compatibilism — the compatibility of determination with free will — then one could argue that I was determined to write my blog but insofar as I did so freely I am nonetheless culpable for all the errors, inane comments and lame jokes I make on a regular basis.
James Palmer says:
Saturday, March 12, 2011 at 3:27pm
I suppose – but I dislike it when people bring up compatiblism as I haven’t heard an explanation for it that makes a lick of sense. So that will never be a satisfying answer for me.
randal says:
Saturday, March 12, 2011 at 3:39pm
Surely it makes sense. You (and I) just don’t accept that determination is compatible with free action. Correct?
James Palmer says:
Saturday, March 12, 2011 at 6:20pm
No, if it made even some sense, then perhaps I’d at least be willing to entertain the idea.
It is of course possible that I just haven’t been able to find a good enough explanation of it. But that doesn’t necessarily mean it “makes sense”.
PM says:
Saturday, March 12, 2011 at 8:47pm
So what’s your refutation of John Martin Fischer’s semi-compatibilism? Tell me, what scholarly books on the metaphysics of compatibilist action theories have you read?
James Palmer says:
Saturday, March 12, 2011 at 8:53pm
I have to admit I have not read any scholarly books on the topic. Is that the only place to find a sensible argument for it?
Can you point me somewhere online where I could read a good argument for compatiblism, or give an argument yourself for it?
David Parker says:
Saturday, March 12, 2011 at 9:28pm
http://www.monergism.com/directory/link_category/Free-Will/Compatibilism/
James Palmer says:
Saturday, March 12, 2011 at 10:12pm
David, that is similar to other descriptions I have seen. It is a good description, but not much of an argument.
Perhaps you can answer a couple questions I have about it:
“Our choices are only our choices because they are voluntary, not coerced. We do not make choices contrary to our desires or natures.”
Are our desires and our natures something that God ordains?
“Voluntary does mean, however, the ability to choose what we want or desire most.”
Similarly, does God ordain what we choose that we want, or what we choose to desire most?
PM says:
Saturday, March 12, 2011 at 10:56pm
There’s good stuff in books and journal articles, just like with libertarianism. I can’t do justice to an argument here. Some basics:
[1] Exegetical: I have exegetical reasons to hold that God ordains whatsoever comes to pass in such a way that given the decree we cannot do otherwise and our not the *ultimate* source of our actions.
[2] I accept the number one libertarian argument (the consequence argument) and take the semi-compatibilist route in response.
[3] I give defeater-defeaters to the other libertarian arguments against compatibilism, viz., ought-implies-can and the principle of alternative possibilities.
[4] I argue that in fact *libertarianism* doesn’t provide us with the control and other desiderata required for free will (e.g., the “luck” argument, powerfully given by former libertarian and now mysterian, Peter van Inwagen.
[5] I’m convinced that moral responsibility (and freedom) only require guidance control and not regulative control (e.g., suppose, unbeknownst to you, your car’s steering mechanism were locked and necessitated to turn right at time t. You, for reasons that are yours, that you acknowledge and own up to, and that you are also responsive to reasons to the contrary, decide to turn right at t. You exhibit “guidance control” over the car but not “regulative control” i.e., you could not have turned left. This kind of control is compatible with determinism, and so is the reasons-responsive mechanism point.
James Palmer says:
Saturday, March 12, 2011 at 11:07pm
PM,
I’ve heard a similar car-driving analogy before, but it really doesn’t make sense to me. Perhaps you can clarify a few things.
1. “You exhibit “guidance control”…”
So this guidance – our desires, etc. are not ordained by God as viewed by Calvinism? I was under the understanding that everything was ordained by God, which would include all people’s actions, including those that go on inside their brain.
2. What is the mechanism that aligns our guidance control and the regulative control. In this analogy, it is apparently pure coincidence. Is that how it is in Calvinism? I don’t think so, but I cannot picture what this mechanism would be. If God predicts our desires and makes our actions accordingly, then that makes it so God isn’t truly ordaining it, but then if God is making our desires fit the actions that he has ordained for us, then that doesn’t sound like compatibilism anymore, but just pure determinism.
Any help on these difficulties would be most appreciated.
David says:
Sunday, March 13, 2011 at 12:26am
I wasn’t linking you to read the definition…scroll down and you’ll see a bunch of articles about it.
David says:
Saturday, March 12, 2011 at 3:14pm
James,
I think you’re oversimplifying God’s will…some theologians think God has two, maybe three distinct kinds of will. Decretive will, secret will, moral will, etc…
PM says:
Saturday, March 12, 2011 at 3:27pm
James,
If God *infallibly believes* that you are going to heaven, then you will; if he infallibly believes that you are going to hell, you are. In fact, if God knew you would reject Arminianism (or whatever) if he created you, and he still willed to create you, then your rejecting Arminianism (or whatever) is doing God’s will. So you’re not raising any objection that it just unique to Calvinism.
James Palmer says:
Saturday, March 12, 2011 at 3:29pm
Ah, but I’m an Open Theist, and in that view, God doesn’t know all the decisions I will make because those decisions don’t exist to be known.
I agree, there are very similar problems with Arminianism, though.
PM says:
Saturday, March 12, 2011 at 8:48pm
Right, one has to critique my view only from the stance of Open Theism, which for me is just a reason to affirm my view. Anyway, since some people here say that emotional arguments are good ones, here’s my critique of Open Theism: It scares me.
James Palmer says:
Saturday, March 12, 2011 at 8:49pm
Sounds like you lack faith!
PM says:
Saturday, March 12, 2011 at 10:29pm
Okay Dr. Rauser, my response is up. Sorry it was so short, I do have a lot more to say . . . and we haven’t even got into the problems with your book I didn’t have time to address
http://aporeticchristianity.wordpress.com/2011/03/12/r4-review-of-rausers-review-of-my-review/
randal says:
Sunday, March 13, 2011 at 1:15am
O goodie! I’ll review your review of my review of your review of my book asap.
PM says:
Saturday, March 12, 2011 at 11:19pm
God ordains our desires, but they are still *our* desires. They arise through us, in virtue of our cognitive meachanism, and we are responsive to reasons to the contrary. So, yes, desires are ordained by God. What’s the problem there?
James Palmer says:
Saturday, March 12, 2011 at 11:24pm
“God ordains our desires, but they are still *our* desires.”
That’s like saying, “I gave my son a black eye, but it’s *his* black eye.” The fault still lies in the giver, not in the receiver.
So yeah, I see a pretty huge problem with that.
PM says:
Sunday, March 13, 2011 at 1:23am
‘fraid I don’t follow or see what the problem is supposed to be. I said enough to clearly present relevant disanalogies between what I said and your black eye analogy.
James Palmer says:
Sunday, March 13, 2011 at 1:47am
Perhaps not clearly enough, or I honestly have missed them. Can you refer to which post(s) you presented such disanalogies? To be honest, I find many of your posts unclear, but I am thinking that is mostly because I am at best an amateur theologian and am unfamiliar with a lot of the arguments and terminology, so you’ll have to forgive me for that.
David says:
Saturday, March 12, 2011 at 11:28pm
“[5] I’m convinced that moral responsibility (and freedom) only require guidance control and not regulative control (e.g., suppose, unbeknownst to you, your car’s steering mechanism were locked and necessitated to turn right at time t. You, for reasons that are yours, that you acknowledge and own up to, and that you are also responsive to reasons to the contrary, decide to turn right at t. You exhibit “guidance control” over the car but not “regulative control” i.e., you could not have turned left. This kind of control is compatible with determinism, and so is the reasons-responsive mechanism point.”
I’m happy to find out that my video game analogy from a few weeks ago wasn’t as far off as I had thought!
David says:
Sunday, March 13, 2011 at 12:41am
“I should point out, that with my slightly clarified argument at the end of the last post, that I don’t believe whether compatibilism is true or not is relevant to my point.”
Do explain that one. I can’t see it from here.
James Palmer says:
Sunday, March 13, 2011 at 1:53am
In short, I was saying that if you believe a person is morally responsible and at the same time God ordained everything he did and that it was for the best (i.e. compatibilism), that while you can say “what the person did was morally wrong”, you can’t say “He shouldn’t have done that”, because God desired it to occur so there for it should have occurred, and we as humans couldn’t possibly give any alternative for that person to have done and say, “That would have worked out just as well or better.”
Hope that makes my thoughts a bit clearer.
James Palmer says:
Sunday, March 13, 2011 at 2:01am
David – here is a genuine request for some clarification, after having read a bit from those links that you sent me.
Consider this analogy:
I have this LEGO Mindstorms kit – basically it lets me build a robot and program it to do what I’d like it to do.
Let’s say I program it to move forward, and then turn left or right, and then move forward again, and it repeats these actions a few times. I have programmed it to decide whether to turn left or right based on some sort of algorithm (random, pseudorandom, nonrandom – take your pick, whatever seems most analogous with the way God gives us desires to make certain choices.)
I start the robot up, and it starts moving and turning. At some point, it decides to turn right, moves forward, and bumps into one of my son’s toys, breaking it.
Now, as far as morally responsibility goes, who is responsible for the toy breaking – my robot, or me?
It seems to me, that if the answer is “me”, then it is somehow disanalogous to Calvinism, since Calvinism would seem to say that even though I gave the robot it’s desires and decision-making algorithms, it is still the robot’s decision which way to turn, not mine.
So if the answer is in fact me, who would be responsible, where does this analogy break down? I’m guessing it does, but I can’t see where, and am wondering if you can help me out.
David says:
Sunday, March 13, 2011 at 5:21pm
James, that is a good analogy. I’ll give it a shot, just because it’s Sunday and I have nothing better to do at the moment.
Before we worry about moral responsibility we have to first decide if it is possible that humans have free will and determinism is true. Most debates swirl around moral responsibility, but neglect to even look at basic questions like “what is free will?” and “what conditions must hold for an agent to have free will?” As you might expect, philosophers have a hard time pinning down a precise definition that will suit both camps.
In your example, you have not given the robot free will. So, right off the bat…your example is set up to show that incompatibilism is true. It succeeds…but then we might as well say that we shouldn’t hold a lawnmower morally responsible for running over a baby. In other words, that view of freedom just won’t cut it.
Specifically, you reference an “algorithm” that is analogous to human desires. If you think hard about it, this probably won’t do. An algorithm is a set of steps that guarantees an outcome. I am not aware of the possibility of a random algorithm, without plugging in reference to some variable outside of it (for instance, you have a formula that utilizes the current temperature in Ottawa…this would produce a random outcome, but the algorithm is set in stone…the variables that go into it allow for random results). More importantly, if human desires are analogous to an algorithm, then humans don’t appear to have free will. So there is nothing to make compatible given the way your robot has desires. The robot doesn’t have free will…humans supposedly do. But what is free will?
The debate has generally swirled around the the ability to choose otherwise.
So, consider this example:
Sarah wakes up and decides to take her doggy for a walk. Little does she know that a mad scientist has hooked up a neuron-control mechanism to her brain, such that if she is about to decide *not* to take her dog for a walk, he will hit a button and fire the appropriate neurons so that she decides to take her dog for a walk.
Now, it looks like Sarah freely decided to take her dog for a walk even though she couldn’t have done otherwise. So, it looks like this illustration can help us understand how one could be morally responsible for something even though they couldn’t have done otherwise. Paul Manata, Victor Reppert, and Steve Hays (and others) have debated Frankfurt counterexamples on their blogs…worth a Google.
Remember: the compatibilist merely holds that it is *possible* for free will and determinism both be true. The incompatibilist holds that it is *impossible*. So far, efforts to show that it is impossible have been less-than-decisive.
Now, your response to this analogy might be, “aha! but given determinism wouldn’t her decision to walk the dog be purely determined via prior conditions.”
Well, unfortunately others (PM has alluded to this) argue that if our decisions don’t have any causal or explanatory basis, then they are arbitrary, and thus don’t really give us any moral culpability either. Think about it, what explains the fact that John decided to kill Jack? If free will is completely devoid of an explanatory mechanism, then it appears the answer is that there is none. Even if we asked God, he would simply shrug his shoulders. But how should we hold someone morally responsible for something arbitrary like that? Some philosophers say no. Others try to find a way for it to work.
Another line of defense that PM alluded to (reactive attitudes) was used by PF Strawson to show how the truth of determinism (note that Strawson is not interested in theological determinism) is compatible with moral responsibility. Examples of reactive attitudes: gratitude, resentment, forgiveness and love. Strawson argues that we can hold someone morally responsible for their reactive attitude regardless of determinism. A full essay on his ideas is available here.
So, as we’ve seen…there are problems defining free will as an algorithm, problems defining it as random, and problems all over the damn place. This is the world of philosophy.
For me, a lot of the support for determinism comes from scripture. I enjoy the philosophy side of it, but I have a high view of the Bible as God’s revelation. So, ultimately, I have exegetical issues as well that we haven’t discussed.
So, back to your analogy. Here is one that works:
Suppose you made a robot and gave him free will (whatever is is). Now, the robot made a morally significant decision. Was he morally responsible even though he’s a robot with free will?
James Palmer says:
Monday, March 14, 2011 at 8:51pm
“So, consider this example:
Sarah wakes up and decides to take her doggy for a walk. Little does she know that a mad scientist has hooked up a neuron-control mechanism to her brain, such that if she is about to decide *not* to take her dog for a walk, he will hit a button and fire the appropriate neurons so that she decides to take her dog for a walk.”
I certainly see a couple major problems with this example, but I think I’ll try to take it charitably and just ask this:
What, in this example, means that Sarah has free will, and my robot does not? My robot decides to do things, just as Sarah does. Sarah’s decisions come out of the cognitive mechanisms God gives her, my robot’s decisions come out of the cognitive mechanisms I gave it.
Compatibilist arguments I’ve read have said something similar to what you have said – that it is the act of deciding, not the ability to choose otherwise, that makes one morally culpable. But when you’ve taken out that quality of “free will”, I’m left wondering what differentiates a person from a robot. Can you clarify?
David says:
Monday, March 14, 2011 at 11:50pm
James,
The point of Frankfurt examples isn’t to explore the nature of free will. It’s to show that defining free will as “the ability to choose otherwise” is problematic.
If you believe that “robot decides” is equivalent to “the robot calculates a behavior result using the cognitive equipment James gave him”….you are viewing the robot’s mind through materialist lenses. (Some have argued that Frankfurt counterexamples presuppose materialism…but that’s another topic.)
A robot is simply a convenient description for machine that can maintain a series of causal relationships to calculate algorithms. The algorithm’s result maps to a behavior. Thus, “the robot decided to raise his arm” is basically a statement about what the robot has calculated.
A materialist (technically a functionalist) does believe that humans minds are comparable to the robot.
A non-materialistic view of the mind entails that there are some non-physical components which are described by the statement, “James decided to raise his arm.”
As to the nature of this non-material aspect of the mind…that is another question.
You’re basically asking me to explain what free will is…no one has done that friend.
James Palmer says:
Tuesday, March 15, 2011 at 1:49am
“You’re basically asking me to explain what free will is…no one has done that friend.”
Haha, sorry. I really just want to know what makes us morally culpable according to Calvinists. It appears to me, that most arguments and examples, such as the one you mentioned, are there to tell us what *doesn’t* make us morally culpable.
I just want to know what *does* make us morally culpable, from the Calvinist standpoint. “free will” = “morally culpable” doesn’t quite work for me, at least not when free will has been redefined to exclude “could choose otherwise.” So I must still be missing something.
As far as your Sarah example goes, the term, “about to decide” has to mean something completely absurd and contradictory for the example to work. But for now I”m happy to ignore that right now, as I’m trying (for the moment) to learn about Calvinism rather than refute it. I just want to know, if I accept compatibilism – then what? Compatibilism redefines free will for me so it doesn’t automatically solve my problems.
David says:
Tuesday, March 15, 2011 at 2:20am
I’d like to know what makes us morally culpable according to non-Calvinist. It isn’t as if “free will” has a default definition, or that you’ve offered a satisfactory one entailed by your position and then said, “now how the heck does Calvinism square with this?”
What do you say free will is, according to an open theist?
Also worth noting, in the example with Sarah “about to decide” refers to the temporal point in time before she decides. I’m not sure what’s absurd about a temporal point in time before one’s decision. What do you find absurd here?
In one sense we have to ask what “morally culpable” means…who decides whether or not one is morally culpable? Do we tell God that he can’t hold us responsible? Or does he tell us that, despite our best efforts to define the things he has created us with, there is still a mystery as to how it exactly works. But there isn’t a mystery (to me) that God has said in the Bible that he knows the future, and that he works all things according to his plans.
My problem with the God of open theism is he has no definite plans. He has highly probable contingencies. But what exactly does “free will” mean such that God has a high probability of knowing what we’ll choose?
Is God continually intervening in the causal world we live in to ensure that his plans are accomplished despite what free agents throw at him?
It isn’t clear that open theism is any less problematic.
James Palmer says:
Tuesday, March 15, 2011 at 2:50am
“What do you say free will is, according to an open theist?”
I have always found the idea of free will very difficult to grapple. I think if I was atheist, I would have to conclude I don’t believe in it at all. I do feel that “the ability to choose otherwise” is central to it, so taking that away is very much redefining it for me. That is what I am grappling with in trying to understand Calvinism.
” I’m not sure what’s absurd about a temporal point in time before one’s decision. What do you find absurd here?”
Lots of things. How can there be a temporal point in time before one decides to walk a dog, if the scientist hits a button which means you never decide to walk the dog? Think about it. What would the scientist need to know to know that Sarah is “about to decide to walk the dog.” He would either need to know that she is in a state that she would inevitably make that decision, in which case she has already chosen that nature so whether she gets interrupted before the actual decision doesn’t particularly mater. Or otherwise, he has magical knowledge about a fictional future, fictional because it doesn’t happen (since he stops it from happening.) In that case, you have some sort of strange time travel paradoxes going on. There’s plenty of absurdity in the idea.
“there is still a mystery as to how it exactly works.”
I’m impressed! I th ought all that “mystery” stuff was just for the “emergent” types like Rob Bell.
“My problem with the God of open theism is he has no definite plans. He has highly probable contingencies.”
Sure, God has definite plans. When God in the Bible states he knows things that happen in the future, he *does*. Many times, it is because they are part of his definite plan. But yes, according to Open Theism, he also partners with us in those plans, as opposed to controlling us – something that appears to me to be clear from the Bible. And that is one of the things that makes God so awesome and powerful in my eyes. I’m reminded of Schindler’s List where Oskar Schindler tells the concentration camp leader Amon Goeth how the truest power comes when you restrain your possible power for the grace and uplifting of others. For God to be partnering with us and allowing us freedom, rather than to exert his all-consuming power over us, demonstrates far more love, wisdom, and even power.
“But what exactly does “free will” mean such that God has a high probability of knowing what we’ll choose?”
As far as free will goes according to Open Theism, I don’t believe it’s really any different than Free Will according to Arminianism. What I suppose I see it meaning is that God is sharing some of that “first cause” ability with us. Don’t quote me on that though – as I said, free will is confusing stuff!
To answer it specifically to “high probability”, I don’t think that’s too difficult. I know my wife well enough that I can confidently say there’s a high probability she won’t murder anyone. God knows our natures even moreso, so He’s going to similarly know with such a high probability. However, he is equally prepared for the low probability possibilities, as He is just as thoroughly knowledgable about them. In a way, he knows a lot more “future”, if it’s even quantifiable, as He knows every possible future.
“Is God continually intervening in the causal world we live in to ensure that his plans are accomplished despite what free agents throw at him?”
Sure. Of course, as part of his plan is that people freely choose Him, “what free agents throw at him” are part of his plan. Are you saying that the Bible doesn’t demonstrat God intervening in the world? The flood seems to be an awfully big intervention, and what about Jesus in general? I guess I have no idea what you’re getting at here.
Anyways, good job on turning this around – I must have been making some headway if you felt like you needed to go back on the attack against open theism? (J/K!
)
I’m actually quite new to Open Theism – a little over a year ago I hadn’t even heard of it. So I’m happy to discuss it to try to clarify my quite newbie thoughts on it. Although while researching it, I read as many or more articles and books refuting open theism, and have yet to find one that really understands it at all. (Then again, I’m suer Calvinists will say the same thing about articles refuting Calvinism!)
David says:
Tuesday, March 15, 2011 at 10:59am
“How can there be a temporal point in time before one decides to walk a dog, if the scientist hits a button which means you never decide to walk the dog?”
It is logically possible, which is all that is required. There is nothing about it that violates the laws of logic. True, it is physically incredible.
James Palmer says:
Tuesday, March 15, 2011 at 1:21pm
No, it’s not logically possible. That was my point. You can’t have “Time A is 3 seconds before Event 1″. And “Event 1 never occurs.” Those two statements are at odds with each other.
David says:
Tuesday, March 15, 2011 at 2:20pm
You can’t have “Time A is 3 seconds before Event 1?. And “Event 1 never occurs.” Those two statements are at odds with each other.
Time A is 3 seconds before Event 1 would occur. In other words, this counterfactual: “If Event 1 occurs, then Time A is 3 seconds before Event 1.”
There is nothing logically impossible about this.
Furthermore, “Event 1 never occurs” is a statements about what actually happens. Logical possibility is about what possibly happens. It is possible that Event 1 occurs, and that there is a time 3 seconds before it.
That’s all that is required. The physical actuality of “Event 1 doesn’t actually occur” is not what’s under consideration.
James Palmer says:
Tuesday, March 15, 2011 at 2:34pm
Perhaps my open theist ideas are coming into play here. If the future doesn’t exist to be known, then “Event 1 would have happened” cannot be a true statement where it is involved with a free will decision. So saying that really is logically impossible under that view.
In such a way, the example begs the question, as it assumes open theism is false as part of its premises.
David says:
Tuesday, March 15, 2011 at 2:44pm
“Perhaps my open theist ideas are coming into play here. If the future doesn’t exist to be known, then “Event 1 would have happened” cannot be a true statement where it is involved with a free will decision. So saying that really is logically impossible under that view.
In such a way, the example begs the question, as it assumes open theism is false as part of its premises.”
You’re coming off your rocker! You have just stated that God knows the future, and also that the future doesn’t exist to be known. You can’t have both of those positions.
Also, I’d like to see an open theist demonstrate that it is *logically impossible* for future counterfactuals to be true or false. That would be quite a feat!
Also, Frankfurt counterexamples have nothing to do with open theism. Your charge of “begs the question” is the equivalent to me saying this:
The majority of philosophers, theologians, and Biblical exegetes have all affirmed that the future exists. Therefore, they all beg the question against open theism!
You can’t beg the question unless you are attempting to argue for that conclusion.
You have also collapsed your own ability to define “could have chosen otherwise”…since presentism entails that the past doesn’t exist either. Ooopsy!
James Palmer says:
Tuesday, March 15, 2011 at 2:51pm
Haha, you’re probably right, I’m coming off my rocker. Oh well!
“You’re coming off your rocker! You have just stated that God knows the future, and also that the future doesn’t exist to be known. You can’t have both of those positions.”
Where have I stated that “God knows the future”? God knows everything there is to be known about the future, true. I was just saying that future free will decisions do not exist. You’re going to have to point out my contradiction, as I don’t see it.
“You have also collapsed your own ability to define “could have chosen otherwise”…since presentism entails that the past doesn’t exist either. Ooopsy!
”
I never claimed to be a presentist. One can believe the past exists and still be an open theist.
“The majority of philosophers, theologians, and Biblical exegetes have all affirmed that the future exists. Therefore, they all beg the question against open theism!”
No, only if they *assumed* the future exists would they be begging the question. If they are affirming based on some sort of reasoning, then that would be different. I see no such reasoning in the example given. Clearly if a philosopher or theologian is going to argue against open theism, they can’t “assume” the future exists, but must argue for it in some way.
But yes, I’m probably off my rocker.
I’m just very much an amateur philosopher, and want to use fancy words and phrases like “counterfactuals” and “begging the question” as much as I can!
David says:
Tuesday, March 15, 2011 at 3:15pm
James, the point is that Frankfurt counterexamples are not arguing against open theism. Thus, they can’t beg the question against it.
It maybe the case that open theism is exempt from these counterexamples. But that wouldn’t be because they beg the question. It would just be because they don’t impact open theistic views of free will.
But of course, you’ve already said that you accept “the ability to choose otherwise” as a working definition of free will.
So, as it stands..I don’t how you would escape this argument.
David says:
Tuesday, March 15, 2011 at 11:16am
“When God in the Bible states he knows things that happen in the future, he *does*. ”
Do you affirm that God has true propositional knowledge of future events? Many open theists (presentists) deny that future tensed counterfactuals have any actual truth value…for example, “If Sally goes to the store tomorrow, she will buy some milk.”
Also, since the future doesn’t exist, how could God have true propositional knowledge about it?
“I know my wife well enough that I can confidently say there’s a high probability she won’t murder anyone.”
And yet, if she did…it would ruin your plans for her.
“Sure. Of course, as part of his plan is that people freely choose Him, “what free agents throw at him” are part of his plan. Are you saying that the Bible doesn’t demonstrat God intervening in the world? The flood seems to be an awfully big intervention, and what about Jesus in general? I guess I have no idea what you’re getting at here.”
So it’s possible that no free agent would choose Him? In other words, there is a possible world where no free agent actually chooses God?
I do believe God intervenes in the physical world, but open theism seems to require that he constantly “clean things up” as free agents muck up his plans. It’s a rather sloppy affair..even granting that he has a high probability of being correct.
“Anyways, good job on turning this around – I must have been making some headway if you felt like you needed to go back on the attack against open theism? (J/K!
)”
Well, it seems rather arbitrary to nay-say Calvinism if you lack an adequate defense or definition of free will on your own terms.
“So I’m happy to discuss it to try to clarify my quite newbie thoughts on it. Although while researching it, I read as many or more articles and books refuting open theism, and have yet to find one that really understands it at all. (Then again, I’m suer Calvinists will say the same thing about articles refuting Calvinism!)”
For me, I reject open theism because I affirm an eternalism view of time as opposed to a presentist view. There are certainly a lot of philosophers around today that affirm presentism, but when conjoined with the exegetic hurdle of re-interpreting passages that have been traditional understood otherwise…I don’t see what “all the rage” is about open theism.
James Palmer says:
Tuesday, March 15, 2011 at 1:43pm
“Do you affirm that God has true propositional knowledge of future events?”
Yes. This is actually where open theism and Calvinism share some ground. In both cases, God knows what will happen in the future because He ordains it to happen. When God says He’s going to do something, He does it. He also understands physics and nature perfectly, and thus will also know that certain future events are inevitable based on the current state of the Universe. It is a bad mischaracterization of God to show Him as completely blind about future events. There are many that He can be absolutely confident will happen.
“”I know my wife well enough that I can confidently say there’s a high probability she won’t murder anyone.”
And yet, if she did…it would ruin your plans for her.”
True, but I’m not God. This view I find that people have that God couldn’t achieve His goals without absolute minute control over everything really bothers me. I can accomplish many goals in my life, and I don’t have a scrap of control over external events and my knowledge is minuscule. I don’t think it’s that big of a leap to say that God *can* accomplish His goals while allowing true freedom to others. Many people say the Open Theist God is “small” and at the same time they don’t believe their own God would be able to accomplish what the Open Theist God does.
“So it’s possible that no free agent would choose Him? In other words, there is a possible world where no free agent actually chooses God?”
Well, I’ve seen many people choose God, so no, this isn’t a real possibility, so we don’t in any real sense have to consider this. Hypothetically, was it a possibility at the beginning of time? I don’t know. I think most open theists would say yes, it was, but real love can’t come without real risk. I’d have to think on it more myself though.
“I do believe God intervenes in the physical world, but open theism seems to require that he constantly “clean things up” as free agents muck up his plans. It’s a rather sloppy affair..even granting that he has a high probability of being correct.”
I think you’re injecting a Calvinist mindset into this idea. As if there is one straight line “best way for history to unfold”, and we keep straying off that single track and God keeps pushing history back on to the track. I don’t think it works like that. It also seems to be assuming that God’s only response to us is cleaning up after our mistakes, when the Bible often talks about Him delighting in us as well. This kind of partnership doesn’t have to be such a “sloppy affair”. And what’s wrong with a little sloppiness? I have to clean up the slobber, spit up, pee and poo of my 7 month old son. I really do have to clean up for him constantly, but it is all in pure joy, and the relationship we have is a beautiful thing. The delights I have in him far outweigh any sloppiness.
“Well, it seems rather arbitrary to nay-say Calvinism if you lack an adequate defense or definition of free will on your own terms. ”
I gave you what I thought was central to free will, which is, oddly enough, the one thing that most Calvinists take away from it. And I’m here to learn – my nay saying is not about convincing people to abandon Calvinism – it’s just my Socratic way of learning more about it. My apologies if I come on to strong – I’m working at softening that (which I hope you have seen throughout our conversation.)
“For me, I reject open theism because I affirm an eternalism view of time as opposed to a presentist view. There are certainly a lot of philosophers around today that affirm presentism, but when conjoined with the exegetic hurdle of re-interpreting passages that have been traditional understood otherwise…I don’t see what “all the rage” is about open theism.”
Yes, the crux of Open Theism is not about the nature of God (Arminians, Calvinism, and Open Theism all state that God is Omniopotent, omniscient and omnibenevelent.) It really is about the nature of time and the future. To be honest, the only way I’ve seen “rage” and “open theism” come together is on Calvinist articles about it, haha! Most people I know have never heard of it, to be honest. I have thus far found it to require much simpler, more straight-forward exegesis of the Bible, but I agree, any shift of that kind of view is a big one. But I also find that open theism tends to quickly cut through the paradoxes that seem to come up with Calvinism, Arminianism, and the “God outside of time” view, that is often associated with Arminianism.
Anyway, I don’t try to push the open theist view on others – I’m still learning about it and it’s still new to me, and I know it’s a minority view. But often people assume if I’m questioning Calvinism I must be Arminian, so I’m happy to correct people’s (understandable) assumptions.
David says:
Tuesday, March 15, 2011 at 2:51pm
“Yes. This is actually where open theism and Calvinism share some ground. In both cases, God knows what will happen in the future because He ordains it to happen. When God says He’s going to do something, He does it. He also understands physics and nature perfectly, and thus will also know that certain future events are inevitable based on the current state of the Universe. It is a bad mischaracterization of God to show Him as completely blind about future events. There are many that He can be absolutely confident will happen.”
I don’t think open theism and Calvinism share this in common at all. To the contrary, open theism entails (as far as I can see) that God can’t know the future because future tensed propositions of that sort doesn’t have a truth value.
Secondly, how is it that God’s knowledge of the physical world gives him such a high probability of accuracy?
It sounds like whatever “free” will we have is pretty marginal…if God’s knowledge of the physical world grants him nearly indubitable accuracy. What kind of free will is that?
The universe is 99.99% determined, but gosh darn it we have .01% free will! Does that really appeal to you?
James Palmer says:
Tuesday, March 15, 2011 at 2:54pm
In this post you have twisted and/or ignored everything I have stated about open theism so far. This does not make the conversation educational for either of us, and it makes it completely uninteresting for me. I think I have had enough.
David says:
Tuesday, March 15, 2011 at 3:11pm
Anyways, good job on turning around and running away – I must have been making some headway if you felt like you needed to declare this uneducation (J/K!
)
David says:
Tuesday, March 15, 2011 at 3:19pm
Of course, you would like us to believe that you’re just interested in learning…but then you say things like compatibilist views “devolve into some kind of twisted version of pantheism.”
Come to terms with the emotional currency you have invested in your theology. We all have it…I’m emotionally invested in my theology.
There is no need to end the conversation in frustration just because you want your theology to be right and can’t seem to demonstrate that mine is wrong. Philosophy is full of such frustrations my friend.
James Palmer says:
Tuesday, March 15, 2011 at 3:28pm
“Of course, you would like us to believe that you’re just interested in learning…but then you say things like compatibilist views “devolve into some kind of twisted version of pantheism.”"
David. I apologized for coming on so strong in those earlier statements, and your response now is to throw it back into my face. There are differences in our understanding of Christianity that go well beyond Calvinism vs Open Theism. That is part of the reason why I am feeling frustrated and this will be my last post as part of this conversation. I need a break. So you will have to forgive me again, as you are right – it *is* to a great extent for emotional reasons.
randal says:
Tuesday, March 15, 2011 at 3:37pm
James and David, I ask you both to listen to this. It’ll only be three minutes out of your day.
David says:
Tuesday, March 15, 2011 at 4:05pm
James, no worries good sir. There is probably some formula for how long a blog debate can continue rationally before someone throws sand. It’s kind of like that joke about “how long someone can debate an atheist before they bring up Hitler.”
I think we’ve both learned something and yet disagreed. And at the end of the day, that’s better than not having learned at all. Til’ next time. Cheers.
James Palmer says:
Tuesday, March 15, 2011 at 4:14pm
“James, no worries good sir. There is probably some formula for how long a blog debate can continue rationally before someone throws sand. It’s kind of like that joke about “how long someone can debate an atheist before they bring up Hitler.””
Oh so true. I probably should have let things be the first time I thought the discussion was done.
Have a good one.
David says:
Tuesday, March 15, 2011 at 11:36am
James,
Check out John Frame’s article(s) here and here.
I have always appreciated his way of saying things.
David says:
Tuesday, March 15, 2011 at 11:40am
These two articles are also quite good:
Reformation 21
Steve Hays topic index
Feel free to share any good articles on open theism. Greg Boyd is the only one I have paid much attention to.
David says:
Sunday, March 13, 2011 at 6:43pm
Probably another point worth making about free will is that it ties in with other issues in the philosophy of the mind.
Materialists would say that a sentence like, “John intends to raise he hand” expresses a higher level description of something that is completely reduceable to some physical level. Some want to go all the way down to physics (Daniel Dennett), others think the neuro-biological level is the proper level of description for talking about John’s intention to raise his hand.(John Searle)
But regardless, there is the same problem here. John intended to raise his hand, and his hand went up, and then dropped an axe on a victim. But is John morally responsible for this if “John” is really a lump of particles, and “John intended to raise his hand” is a description about some causal relationship among those particles.
At some point, we have to come to terms with the absurdity of our language in describing complex things. Even if we aren’t materialist, we have to realize that common language won’t always cut it.
So, to say “John is morally responsible for killing Jack” might be better seen to be a description of this relationship:
Lump of particles known as ‘John’ participated in a causal relationship among particles known as ‘raising and dropping an axe’ and also participated in a causal relationship of particles known as ‘John intended to raise and drop the axe’.
Some saay that ‘John is morally responsible for killing Jack’ just is the preceding relationship. Arbitrary? You bet you. But of course, the libertarian often introduces notions of “free will” that also seem arbitrary to solve other problems.
Either everything is (in principle) explainable by causally sufficient conditions or it isn’t. Introduce God, and you’ve got the ultimate causal condition. Introduce human free agents, and you’ve got secondary causal conditions.
Open theism maintains the highest possible view of secondary causal conditions.
Calvinism (and probably some well-thought out forms of passive foreknowledge as well) maintains the highest possible view of the primary causal condition.
There is always a trade-off. A little more human freedom, take a little from omnipotence or omniscience. That’s the way I see it at least.
Walter says:
Sunday, March 13, 2011 at 7:23pm
Here’s my two pennies from someone who is not an orthodox Christian.
If a person is compelled to commit an unlawful act due to a mental illness, we don’t seek retribution for that person’s crimes, we seek to treat that person’s illness. Traditional Christianity contends that we are born with the “illness” of a sin nature that causes us to commit crimes against the Creator, and orthodox Christianity makes the claim that we deserve retribution for crimes against God that we cannot help but commit. That’s just messed up. How can you deserve retributive punishment for something that God has guaranteed that you will do in the first place? Do people have a choice about being born as a sinner? No. We are thrust into this world hardwired to commit acts of sin, then told that we deserve severe punishment because we “chose” to sin–as if we could actually choose not to sin. I guess I come down on the incompatibilist side because I cannot see how a person can be said to deserve retribution unless that person is a free moral agent, who had the ability to do other than what they did.
The Atheist Missionary says:
Sunday, March 13, 2011 at 7:45pm
Walter wrote: That’s just messed up Exactly.
David says:
Sunday, March 13, 2011 at 8:33pm
“Traditional Christianity contends that we are born with the “illness” of a sin nature that causes us to commit crimes against the Creator”
I don’t think that traditional Christianity says that sin nature “causes” us to sin.
For instance, Adam and Eve didn’t have sin nature but they did in fact sin. So right off the bat it looks like sin nature isn’t a necessary condition for sinning (assuming the traditional Christian teaching on this story as literally something that happened).
Secondly, the Bible seems to affirm that all are declared guilty because of Adam and yet at the same time each person is judged by the sins that they personally commit. So we seem to have a universal condemnation” because of Adam and yet an individual guilt that we are to blame for.
I’m not affirming or denying these teachings, only pointing out that the issue is trickier than simply saying that sin nature causes us to sin and we get punished for sinning and that’s messed up.
Walter says:
Sunday, March 13, 2011 at 10:10pm
I don’t think that traditional Christianity says that sin nature “causes” us to sin.
So every single human ever born just happens to want to sin because humans are vile pieces of rebellious trash. Where does that desire to sin and rebel come from anyway? Sounds like we are created that way, no? If I am created with an irresistible desire to sin, then how can I be held morally responsible and deserving of horrible punishment for committing sins that I cannot keep myself from doing? You–you as in orthodox Christianity– blame the individual for something that is beyond their ability to control.
For instance, Adam and Eve didn’t have sin nature but they did in fact sin.
I don’t believe the A&E story is literal history, but even if it is, I think a case can be made that A&E were not culpable for their actions because they had no prior knowledge of what it means to be lied to. The serpent and Yahweh were contradicting each other. They would not have known whom to believe.
Secondly, the Bible seems to affirm that all are declared guilty because of Adam and yet at the same time each person is judged by the sins that they personally commit
This is where the buck stops for most: The bible says it, they gotta believe it, and that settles it. I don’t share your high view of the bible (I did say that I was not an orthodox believer). My view is that the books of the bible are human documents, and not an inerrant revelation from God.
The belief that retribution is compatible with determinism is completely counter-intuitive, and I see no reason to believe it.
David says:
Sunday, March 13, 2011 at 10:30pm
“Where does that desire to sin and rebel come from anyway?”
Are you asking what the Bible says about this, or what other theories are out there?
“Sounds like we are created that way, no?”
We were *conceived* that way in the womb, yes. But the world was not created with sin originally (or so the story goes), so it would be incorrect to say that “we”, as in humans, were created that way.
“If I am created with an irresistible desire to sin, then how can I be held morally responsible and deserving of horrible punishment for committing sins that I cannot keep myself from doing? You–you as in orthodox Christianity– blame the individual for something that is beyond their ability to control.”
What does “unorthodox Christianity” have to say about this issue?
I think original sin passed down through biological means could be plausible. For instance, your parents passed along genetic material and he also provided you with a certain environment growing up. We wouldn’t say that they gave you an irresistible desire to…let’s say…hate seafood. But perhaps the science on the matter shows that they did indeed endow you with a very strong urge to avoid seafood. But this doesn’t mean that you are unable to learn to love seafood. It just means you have to try harder. Likewise, it is not the case that your hatred of seafood is “beyond your control.” Do you see how this analogy works? I think it accords pretty well with science if taken in a weak sense (the Puritans went way to far with the whole inherited sins and punishment thing in my opinion.)
“I don’t believe the A&E story is literal history, but even if it is, I think a case can be made that A&E were not culpable for their actions because they had no prior knowledge of what it means to be lied to. The serpent and Yahweh were contradicting each other. They would not have known whom to believe.”
This doesn’t make sense, because knowledge of being deceived is irrelevant to whether or not they had good reasons to suppose that they should have obeyed God. He created them. He placed them in the garden. He did all sorts of things. What did the snake do? He showed up and claimed otherwise. Eve had every good reason to believe God, but she didn’t. Regardless of deception, I think she is culpable for her decision even on rational grounds.
“This is where the buck stops for most: The bible says it, they gotta believe it, and that settles it. I don’t share your high view of the bible (I did say that I was not an orthodox believer). My view is that the books of the bible are human documents, and not an inerrant revelation from God.”
I agree that the books of the Bible are human documents as well. I doubt that my definition of inerrancy would cause you much grief either if I took the time to explain it (but I won’t).
However, I don’t see why you responded this way. We were talking about somethign that is a Biblical concept (original sin)…and so when I presented an argument from the text that sheds light on this concept. *Your original comment* started with, “orthodox Christianity makes the claim that”….I was responding by showing that this is not actually what orthodox Christianity teaches. And after I point out some relevant things in the text, you simply response by telling me you don’t believe it. Doesn’t that seem oddly irrational to you?
“The belief that retribution is compatible with determinism is completely counter-intuitive, and I see no reason to believe it.”
This is an interesting fact about you, but it has not bearing on the discussion at hand. The belief that quantum particles behave in a manner that isn’t precisely determined is also completely counter-intuitive…and I see no reason to believe it (since I’m ignorant of physics). What follows from this fact about me? Not a darn thing.
The Atheist Missionary says:
Sunday, March 13, 2011 at 10:39pm
Walter, this is for you: http://www.atheistmissionary.com/2009/06/just-and-loving-god-toddler-in.html
The Atheist Missionary says:
Sunday, March 13, 2011 at 10:43pm
Mea Culpa The link that I just posted in almost a couple years old and, just so the record is clear, I regret the offensive remark at the end of the post. That being said, I find the analogy of the “toddler in the minefield” bang on.
David says:
Sunday, March 13, 2011 at 10:49pm
TAM, I commented on your old post. If you want me to paste it here I can..but you’d have to paste it for me I don’t have it in my clipboard anymore.
The Atheist Missionary says:
Sunday, March 13, 2011 at 11:05pm
David, it’s posted over there so you can copy and paste if you like.
The basic thrust of the analogy is that none of us chose to be born. IMHO, the suggestion that we are like some characters in God’s Sims game is ridiculous.
David says:
Sunday, March 13, 2011 at 11:06pm
You prefer the assumption that we are non-characters in a meaningless clash of particles that will eventually die out?
David says:
Sunday, March 13, 2011 at 11:06pm
The Atheist Missionary says:
Sunday, March 13, 2011 at 11:57pm
The question isn’t what I would prefer, it’s what makes sense. The suggestion that an all-loving deity would create beings knowing that some would end up being tormented for eternity (and, depending on your theological bent, perhaps predestining that some would be tormented for eternity) is absurd. Without even getting into emotional reactions, that suggestion is simply absurd.
I recognize that universalism and annihilationism are a couple ways out of this conundrum. However, I don’t see how conventional Calvinism gets around it without admitting that their God is kind of nasty.
David says:
Monday, March 14, 2011 at 12:02am
“it’s what makes sense.”
I’m assuming by this you mean that this is what current scientific theory implies.
“The suggestion that an all-loving deity would create beings knowing that some would end up being tormented for eternity (and, depending on your theological bent, perhaps predestining that some would be tormented for eternity) is absurd”
I’d like to leverage your argument to show that women shouldn’t have children. Given the amount of pain and suffering that a human experiences during their lifetime, an infant-loving mother who would deliver an infant knowing that it would end up experiencing all that pain and suffering is absurd.
And by the way, I don’t think one needs to accept that the torment of hell is any kind of “fiery brimstone” scenario as the imagery in the Bible suggests. Perhaps it is simply torment to know that you don’t get to hang out with the greatest conceivable being.
The Atheist Missionary says:
Monday, March 14, 2011 at 12:18am
David, parents whose children have a high likelihood of experiencing a miserable life shouldn’t have children.
David says:
Monday, March 14, 2011 at 12:19am
That wasn’t the claim though TAM. I’m saying that the amount of suffering the average person experiences is such that a loving mother wouldn’t want to put a child through it.
Why would you disagree?
The Atheist Missionary says:
Monday, March 14, 2011 at 12:42am
David, I’m sorry but I would need more details about your “average person” being able to respond. In any event, we’re talking about your [from my perspective, hypothetical] god. All I can tell you is that I would not bring a child into the world if there was a statistically significant chance that their life on this earth would be full of suffering. As I trust you appreciate, this line of reasoning can be turned back on Christians – why would someone who believes that there is any chance that their offspring would spend an eternity in hell ever bother to have kids?
David says:
Monday, March 14, 2011 at 1:17am
TAM: There is not a statistically significant chance that my child won’t profess faith in Christ.
The Atheist Missionary says:
Monday, March 14, 2011 at 1:21am
Don’t bet on that. I fully expect all of mine to go to Bible school just to piss me off.
David says:
Monday, March 14, 2011 at 1:22am
LOL
David says:
Monday, March 14, 2011 at 12:22am
Do you realize how many great people you just killed (hypothetically) with that statement? Check out Beethoven’s biography…
The Atheist Missionary says:
Monday, March 14, 2011 at 12:45am
David, do you agree that a couple should refrain from having children [of their own] if DNA testing indicates that it is highly likely that there children will have serious birth defects?
David says:
Monday, March 14, 2011 at 1:21am
I don’t agree that this should be a recognized rule of thumb, or legal declaration. But I also don’t think it’s unreasonable that in some cases a couple might decide against it.
I’m biased though…my sister has such a condition. I’m kind of glad she’s around you know?
The Atheist Missionary says:
Monday, March 14, 2011 at 1:24am
Don’t get me wrong, I’m not suggesting for a moment that we would wish away the disabled. However, most parents (Christians included) would decide not to have children if they were told in advance that it was likely that child would have a short, painful existence.
The Atheist Missionary says:
Monday, March 14, 2011 at 1:01am
David, perhaps we both should read David Benatar’s Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence. I just ordered my copy.
Walter says:
Monday, March 14, 2011 at 12:09am
I think original sin passed down through biological means could be plausible. For instance, your parents passed along genetic material and he also provided you with a certain environment growing up. We wouldn’t say that they gave you an irresistible desire to…let’s say…hate seafood. But perhaps the science on the matter shows that they did indeed endow you with a very strong urge to avoid seafood. But this doesn’t mean that you are unable to learn to love seafood. It just means you have to try harder. Likewise, it is not the case that your hatred of seafood is “beyond your control.” Do you see how this analogy works? I think it accords pretty well with science if taken in a weak sense (the Puritans went way to far with the whole inherited sins and punishment thing in my opinion.)
This is dis-analogous with Christian dogma. Can people simply “try harder” not to sin and actually accomplish a life free from sin? No they can’t. People are automatically born with a desire to sin, and there is no way that they will live a life without acting on those desires at some point (remember, even thoughts can be sinful). In other words, we can “try harder” all we want, but we are incapable of not sinning. This is what I mean about being punished retributively for something that is beyond human control.
David says:
Monday, March 14, 2011 at 12:17am
You didn’t answer my question.
I think I misunderstood your original claim, I thought you were saying that original sin causes *all sins*. It seems you are making this argument:
Sin nature entails that all humans will sin at least once during their lifetime.
It only takes one sin to deserve eternal separation from God
Therefore, it is morally unacceptable for God to punish us for sin.
I don’t find this argument compelling at all.
I’ve already shown that Adam and Eve committed a sin without sin nature.
It may be the case that everyone experiences differing levels of punishment depending on the degree to which they sinned.
Also, just because sin nature contributes to our sinfulness, it doesn’t follow that we lack moral responsibility for our actions.
That would be the equivalent of me telling the judge he should let me off the hook for dropping a rock on someone’s head since “the law of gravity ensures that the rock will always fall.”
On a slightly different take with the same imagery..Sin nature is like gravity…we live in a world where the natural tendency is to sin.
Do you reject this? I already asked what unorthodox Christianity says about other things. What is your take on sin nature..do you believe any external circumstances contribute to our choices to sin??? What about family upbringing, genetics, mTV, Beavis and Butthead, you name it? Are you saying that if any of those external factors can be shown to be related to our choice in a way that we could say “I didn’t choose to have that contributing factor” then we shouldn’t blame someone for their actions?
That seems pretty radical. I’m interested in hearing exactly what you think about sin.
Walter says:
Monday, March 14, 2011 at 12:17am
However, I don’t see why you responded this way. We were talking about something that is a Biblical concept (original sin)…and so when I presented an argument from the text that sheds light on this concept. *Your original comment* started with, “orthodox Christianity makes the claim that”….I was responding by showing that this is not actually what orthodox Christianity teaches. And after I point out some relevant things in the text, you simply response by telling me you don’t believe it. Doesn’t that seem oddly irrational to you?
You have waffled in your responses. You claim that inheriting original sin does not cause us to sin, and that Christianity does not teach that it does. Then you go on to describe how original sin is something that may be passed on through genetics. So what exactly is original sin from your perspective? And what does original sin “do” to us if anything? Is it simply inherited guilt for Adam’s “crime?” Why are we born “totally depraved?”
David says:
Monday, March 14, 2011 at 12:30am
Walter,
I don’t think you’re reading closely enough. I am trying to use words like “cause” very carefully, because there are many kinds of causal relationships.
You started off with a claim about the teaching of orthodox Christianity…here are you exact words: “Traditional Christianity contends that we are born with the “illness” of a sin nature that causes us to commit crimes”
Now, your previous sentence had said “compels” with regard to mentally incapable people. You should have probably stuck with that word. Cause is too strong. That is all I am responding to with those lines of argument.
The difference is this: you can’t say that sin nature is the only reason why we sin…that would be a sufficient cause. I also argued that it isn’t a necessary cause (Adam and Eve).
But you’re welcome to say that sin nature compels us such that we find it hard not to sin. That is what orthodox Christianity teaches…and you’re free to disagree. I just insist that you get it right before you disagree.
David says:
Monday, March 14, 2011 at 12:39am
“So what exactly is original sin from your perspective? And what does original sin “do” to us if anything? Is it simply inherited guilt for Adam’s “crime?” Why are we born “totally depraved?”
I’m not sure why I would need to explain any of that.
You were trying to mount an objection to the traditional understanding of sin nature. I’ve shown the ways in which your objections fails..both in it’s understanding of what the doctrine says, and in the failure of the objection to actually show where there’s a problem for the orthodox teaching.
While I’d like to discuss the finer points of Federal headship, imputation, and the like…I’m not sure it is the best use of my Sunday afternoon. Especially after I spent time with James discussing compatibilism. Perhaps another day though.
Walter says:
Monday, March 14, 2011 at 12:31am
“I don’t believe the A&E story is literal history, but even if it is, I think a case can be made that A&E were not culpable for their actions because they had no prior knowledge of what it means to be lied to. The serpent and Yahweh were contradicting each other. They would not have known whom to believe.”
This doesn’t make sense, because knowledge of being deceived is irrelevant to whether or not they had good reasons to suppose that they should have obeyed God. He created them. He placed them in the garden. He did all sorts of things. What did the snake do? He showed up and claimed otherwise. Eve had every good reason to believe God, but she didn’t. Regardless of deception, I think she is culpable for her decision even on rational grounds.
I won’t waste a lot of time on this tangent because I do not accept the story as literal history. Point being that A&E could not know that it was wrong to trust the snake over Yahweh because they had no concept of right and wrong until after they ate the fruit, not before. At best, they would have been guilty of poor judgment, not malicious rebellion. And the punishment far exceeded the crime.
David says:
Monday, March 14, 2011 at 12:43am
“I won’t waste a lot of time on this tangent because I do not accept the story as literal history.”
What do you accept Walter?
Walter says:
Monday, March 14, 2011 at 12:45am
Also, just because sin nature contributes to our sinfulness, it doesn’t follow that we lack moral responsibility for our actions.
…It only takes one sin to deserve eternal separation from God
We are incapable of not committing at least that one act–even if it is just an impure thought. What you have just admitted was that something that we are incapable of doing is sufficient to warrant eternal retribution. We are measured against an impossible standard of perfection and condemned for falling short of that standard. That strikes me as being profoundly evil. Saddling me with some collective guilt for something a mythical ancestor did also strikes me as evil.
David says:
Tuesday, March 15, 2011 at 3:08pm
“Many people say the Open Theist God is “small” and at the same time they don’t believe their own God would be able to accomplish what the Open Theist God does.”
I’m inclined to say that there are trade-offs here. To steal a line from Alexander Pruss:
“In particular, open theists can’t take God to be omnipotent. There is another route to that conclusion. If open theism is true, God can’t now know whether tomorrow I will mow my lawn. But if God couldn’t now know what I will write in my next sentence, then he can’t intentionally bring it about that right now (open theists need to accept absolute simultaneity, of course) on Pluto there exists a piece of paper saying what my next freely produced sentence will be. But to be unable to do that would surely be a limitation of God’s power.” (http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/search/label/open%20theism)
Now, perhaps your response is that Calvinist’s can’t take God to be omnibenevolent, or that he is unable to create a world with morally responsible creatures.
Either way, there is a stand-off about what is *possible* for God and whether that counts against our conception of God as omni-whatever.
“Well, I’ve seen many people choose God, so no, this isn’t a real possibility, so we don’t in any real sense have to consider this. Hypothetically, was it a possibility at the beginning of time? I don’t know. I think most open theists would say yes, it was, but real love can’t come without real risk. I’d have to think on it more myself though.”
Again, a *logical possibility* is not refuted by saying “well it didn’t actually happen.” This is one of those philosophical lessons that’s hard to follow (trust me, I have struggled myself). If it is even possible for this to happen, then that means that possible, God believes something false. I have a huge problem with this! How could God exist with the attributes that we associate with him, and yet believe something false?!
“I think you’re injecting a Calvinist mindset into this idea. As if there is one straight line “best way for history to unfold”, and we keep straying off that single track and God keeps pushing history back on to the track. I don’t think it works like that.”
You do not think that God is interested in achieving the best possible outcomes for his creation? That is odd.
“It also seems to be assuming that God’s only response to us is cleaning up after our mistakes, when the Bible often talks about Him delighting in us as well. This kind of partnership doesn’t have to be such a “sloppy affair”. And what’s wrong with a little sloppiness? I have to clean up the slobber, spit up, pee and poo of my 7 month old son. I really do have to clean up for him constantly, but it is all in pure joy, and the relationship we have is a beautiful thing. The delights I have in him far outweigh any sloppiness.”
Right, but my problem is that God’s intervention in this manner causes some serious problems for understanding the physical world. How is it that he constantly mucks with the physical world in this way, without so much as a trace of his presence?
“I have thus far found it to require much simpler, more straight-forward exegesis of the Bible, but I agree, any shift of that kind of view is a big one. But I also find that open theism tends to quickly cut through the paradoxes that seem to come up with Calvinism, Arminianism, and the “God outside of time” view, that is often associated with Arminianism.”
I would like to see one passage from the Bible that implies a “straight-forward” exegesis and implies open theism. Just give me one. :
David says:
Wednesday, March 16, 2011 at 12:24am
Randal,
That’s the kind of funky drums, bass and organ that only the seventies can provide!
Is the story about Craig's need of $300 true and also accurate? says:
Tuesday, October 25, 2011 at 4:14am
Randal, Is the story about Craig’s need of $300 true and also accurate? Only Craig’s wife knew of such a precise need? And she didn’t know the doner? And she didn’t know someone who knew the doner? Was the need exactly $300/mo, no more no less? Or did they need a one time gift of $300?
Who was the doner? Any chance they or their close relative can tell us just how that doner heard about Craig’s needs in the first place? And Craig’s wife had no connect with that doner even through a secondary conact?
I would say that missionaries are in the business of seeking financial assistance, and it is their job to let their needs be known to everyone and secondary contacts are also likely to pass along messages concerning such needs.
Is the story about Craig's need of $300 true and also accurate? says:
Tuesday, October 25, 2011 at 4:18am
Randal,
Speaking of “Little Amazing Moments [that you attribute to] Providence” the world is full of “coincidences,” because so many ideas, people, places and words criss-cross before us each day.
Also, people tend to notice things that appear to them to be “hits” and disregard the rest, the number of misses and near hits being phenomenal in comparison with the few “hits” that we tend to recall. I’m sure you can read the transcripts from the Salem Witch Trials and learn about the coincidences that folks noticed back then, “little amazing DEMONIC moments,” that led to people’s executions.
Also, this from a skeptic:
Tracy King, one of the skepchicks, mentions that she “was on a train, and was just about to take my book from my bag. The book I was reading was George Orwell’s Down and Out in Paris and London, the Essential Penguin edition. As I did so, I noticed the guy opposite me was reading the same book, same edition, and was roughly 3/4 of the way through like me. I didn’t get my book out, because he’d have noticed and I didn’t want to talk to anyone at that particular moment, or even exchange any ‘huh! We are synchronised!’ looks.”
She adds, “A very minor coincidence, especially compared to some of the corkers I’ve heard about (and I’ve had a few myself). I once bumped into a friend in a bakery in a part of the city I was only in for the day. He usually lives 200 miles away and was also there just for the day. We passed through the bakery for no longer than five minutes, but it was enough to coincide. The best part? He was at the exact moment I tapped him on the shoulder, telling his colleague about me. He turned, saw me, and said to his colleague, ‘er, and this is her,’” Tracy adds, “Situations like that always make me think of the number of near-misses that we simply never find out about.”
Cracked magazine has a list of five of the most mind bowing coincidences of all time: http://www.cracked.com/article_18788_the-5-most-mind-blowing-coincidences-all-time.html
Look at this amazing little moments in the life of ordinary people, including bank robbers at the end of the video: http://www.flixxy.com/lucky-day.htm
Or the way Christians used a known syndrome (that people recover from naturally) as evidence of an answer to prayer: http://new.exchristian.net/2010/05/ihoporg-johnathans-testimony-out-of.html
The Body Can Beat Terminal Cancer —Sometimes. They should be dead. But a tiny number of people conquer lethal diseases.
by Jeanne Lenzer
http://discovermagazine.com/2007/sep/the-body-can-stave-off-terminal-cancer-sometimes/article_view?b_start:int=1&-C=
The Jason Winters “tea” story. Did the tea heal him of an incurable inoperable tumor in his throat, or was he one of the few mentioned above?
http://www.sirjasonwinters.com/story.htm
Norman Cousins survived three incurable illnesses in his lifetime–starting with TB as a child (he tried the unaccepted water cure and beat it), to an incurable heart ailment (he tried vitamin C and laughter therapy, watching Marx brothers films!) Cousins wrote a lot about the effect that emotional states have on the body’s ability to heal.
So, what can one say about people’s belief in miraculous apparitions of the Virgin Mary (I personally heard a story from a married Catholic couple about the “sun dancing” — in which the sun appeared to be around them and their travel group instead of up in the sky)? On ther other hand a few seekers after Marian miracles who go to pilgrimages with crowds of others to see such miracles have stared into the sun so long they have been permanently blinded to one degree or another. I have some news stories on that.
Or what about the wide variety of NDEs by Mormons, Buddhists, and Hindus? As well as Native American Vision Quests, UFO encounters, and Muslim apparitions and miracles? Not to mention ghost stories.
Another odd coincidence is this one:
A large stained glass window in the Trinity United Presbyterian Church in Santa Ana, California, bears an uncanny resemblance to the well known image of a clown named, “Bozo” (with his wavy red hair parted down the middle, red nose and big lips), though the window was not designed with that image in mind at all. (SOURCE: Ship of Fools, “Miracle Pictures,” ship-of-fools.com)
And this one:
Lightning Man
The park ranger Roy C. Sullivan, the “human lightning conductor,” was struck by lightning seven times. “In his lightning encounters from 1942 to 1977, Roy had his hair set alight, lost his big toe nail and eyebrows, and suffered injuries to his arms, legs, chest, and stomach.”[www.guinnessworldrecords.com] Yet he survived.Now this is a remarkable story, and one is tempted to see a supernatural activity behind it. But if one considers that there are more than six billion people in the world, it is not so remarkable that one of them should be struck by lightening seven times and survive. Of course there might be a supernatural activity behind the lightning encounters. But the story itself is no proof of such activity, since among a number of more than six billion people it is likely to happen to one of them. [Especially a park ranger, who is usually up in a tower surveying the forests during lightning storms, looking for fires.] (I also have news reports of religious people and/or church buildings being struck by lightning. Sometimes the people are struck dead.)